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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In December of 2013 the world’s gaze was upon South Africa, as the nation mourned the 
passing of former President Nelson Mandela. The last time South Africa captured the world’s 
attention was 20 years prior, in 1994, when the first vote of universal adult suffrage led to the 
election of Mandela as President. Mandela guided the nation into successful reconciliation and 
transformation after the fall of the racist, white-led apartheid regime. As a result, Mandela 
signifies hope, perseverance, forgiveness and racial harmony for many. It should be little surprise, 
then, that Mandela’s death caused many South Africans to reflect on progress they have made 
since the 1994 election. The “soul-searching” (Mark 2013) was particularly salient for South 
Africa’s coloured population, who felt the transition from white-majority to black-majority had 
done little to change their intermediary position. As one coloured South African confessed, 
“Apartheid was worse for blacks, it’s true. But after everything we coloureds did to help 
[Mandela’s Party] the ANC, they only care about their own people. I spent time in prison for the 
struggle, and I can’t see anything is better for us coloureds today” (Lofty qtd. in Mark 2013). 
Another coloured South African described the choice she had to make to either “go for white” or 
remain a coloured during apartheid South Africa. Her soul-searching meant recognizing that her 
choice to be coloured resulted in a life of poverty and marginality. After many similar 
conversations with coloureds, the journalist poignantly concludes: “the racial limbo coloureds 
suffered under apartheid continues today” (Mark 2013). 
 Indeed, coloured South Africans represent an exemplar case of racial limbo, which I 
define as belonging to a group positioned between a dominant and subordinate group in a racial 
hierarchy. Currently labeled as a mixed-race population group in South Africa, the majority of 
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coloureds are descendants of interracial unions and/or relations between white (i.e., Dutch 
colonists) and black (i.e., Khoikhoi Africans) occupants in the western cape of southern Africa 
circa 1600 (Patterson 1953). Research suggests coloureds occupied an intermediate status in the 
racial hierarchy during twentieth century South Africa (Goldin 1987; Lewis 1987; Morse and 
Peele 1974; Patterson 1953). Furthermore, a respondent in my previous fieldwork (Laster 2008) 
illustrates that racial limbo shaped her everyday experience in contemporary South Africa by 
describing living as coloured as “walking the fence…bordering two worlds and hard to balance.” 
Although South Africa has “stood in the annals of social science as a monument to racial 
inequality” (Seidman 1999:420) and has received ample scholarly attention in regards to its rigid 
racial hierarchy and troubled race relations, the sociological research on coloureds remains 
underdeveloped. The omission is even more glaring when we consider the recent influx of 
research on groups with mixed race history and those holding intermediary positions today. 
Moreover, a limitation of the prior work on racial limbo is that the focus has been on biracials in 
the United States (e.g., Brunsma 2006; DaCosta 2007; Daniel 2007; Davis 1991; Telles 2004; 
Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008; Reuter 1969; Root 1996; Spencer 1999) or, to a lesser extent, 
pardos/morenas in Brazil (e.g., Nobels 2002; Telles 1995; 2004; Wade 2004).  The few cross-
national studies of racial limbo in South Africa and elsewhere (e.g., Frederickson 1981; Marx 
1997; van der Berge 1967; Winant 2001) require a high level of abstraction and thereby minimize 
how well scholars understand racial limbo in any given context. Further, the extant research on 
coloureds occurred mostly before the fall of apartheid (Goldin 1987; Lewis 1987; Morse and 
Peele 1974; Patterson 1953; Stonequist 1937) and is outdated.  
An additional important limitation within available literature is that it emphasizes one of 
two perspectives on racial limbo: top-down or bottom-up. On the one hand, the top-down 
perspective focuses on the historical formation of racial limbo (e.g., Adhikari 1997, 2005; Daniel 
2007; Davis 1991; Marx 1998; Telles 2004). This descriptive line of research concentrates 
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heavily on how nation-states and ideologies construct racial limbo. On the other hand, the 
bottom-up perspective analyzes the social psychological perspectives of individuals belonging to 
groups in racial limbo (e.g., Brunsma 2006; Erasmus 2001; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008). 
The two perspectives are rarely in conversation with each other, minimizing integration of what 
we know across the macro- and micro-levels.  
Though various scholarly works allude to the sociological significance of racial limbo, 
past research is limited in its scope, cohesiveness, and conceptual clarity, which leaves the 
construct fairly fuzzy.  One final reason for the fuzziness is that empirical research on racial 
limbo using individual level data relies on single-item self-reported racial identification rather 
than a multidimensional measurement, which might better account for variation in the lived 
experience of racial limbo. 
All in all, the limited extant research leaves many questions unanswered, especially when 
considering coloureds. For instance, what was the role of the South African nation-state is 
cultivating a position of racial limbo for coloureds? Is coloureds’ position maintained today? Do 
coloureds’ attitudes or perceptions reflect their historical, intermediate position? Are there 
divisions within the coloured population, or do all coloureds share a phenomenological 
experience of racial limbo? In this dissertation project I provide a systematic study of racial limbo 
by exploring the history of coloureds in South Africa and examining coloureds’ contemporary 
attitudes, perceptions of deprivation, and racial identifications. I argue findings from this project 
will be informative for examinations of racial limbo in other contexts and contribute to our 
understanding of race across social levels. Before I discuss further the specific research questions 
addressed in this dissertation project, I provide an overview of the concept of racial limbo.  
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THE CONCEPT OF RACIAL LIMBO 
Positions of Limbo 
Limbo represents a state of in-betweenness; it involves suspension in an intermediate 
position. It implies the quality of being an outsider within (Collins 1986). Adolescence, the state 
between childhood’s dependence and adulthood’s independence, is a familiar example of limbo 
(called liminality by Erikson 1993). There are numerous other examples: a person on parole is 
technically neither free nor incarcerated (e.g., Petersilia 2003); a bisexual person chooses not to 
define themselves as heterosexual or homosexual (e.g., Garber 1995); a first or second generation 
immigrant oscillates between homeland ties and host country allegiance (e.g., Kasinitz et al. 
2008). Despite incoherence limbo positions seem to invoke, individuals learn to live in, with, and 
through limbo, because social contracts actually support in-between and/or transitional positions.  
Causes of limbo positions are multi-level and interactive, and differences in its 
production have consequences for individuals’ experience of it. At the macro-level, the nation-
state can act to construct such positions instantaneously or through protracted processes (e.g., 
immigrants with work visas). At the meso-level, social relationships can create limbo (e.g., 
miscegenation) or community contracts (e.g., American Indians living reservations). Finally, at 
the micro-level, social interactions can create limbo (e.g., a transgender man may be asked to 
leave a woman’s bathroom) and even individual psychology and/or genetics can produce limbo 
(e.g., diagnosis of bipolar disorder). What is more, limbo can be caused by volition, coercion, or 
both. [1] 
Racial Limbo 
Although limbo can be found in many social situations, the most provocative studies of 
limbo typically involve race (e.g., Adhikari 2005; DaCosta 2007; Daniel 2001; Degler 1986; 
Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008; Reuter 1969; Root 1996; Sue 2013; Telles 2004; Wade 1995; 
also see review by Telles and Sue 2009). This is so because race remains the most enduring social 
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cleavage across the globe (Winant 2001). Race is central to the organization of our personal, 
professional, and political lives and serves as a concrete abstraction, having created divisions 
among peoples and places from antiquity. 
As mentioned, there are groups positioned in limbo in the contexts seminal to the 
sociological study of race: the United States, Brazil, and South Africa. Specifically, biracials in 
the United States, pardos/morenos in Brazil, and coloureds in South Africa are all cases of racial 
limbo. Across contexts, what remains constant is that whiteness occupies the dominant position 
and blackness occupies the subordinate position; what differs is who and what characterizes the 
middle of the racial hierarchy.  
Example of titles of work on these groups include: “Race Mixture: Studies in 
Intermarriage and Miscegenation” (Reuter 1969), “Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race 
Relations in Brazil and the United States” (Degler 1986), “The Marginal Man: A Study in 
Personality and Culture Conflict” (Stonequist 1937), “Land of the Cosmic Race: Race Mixture, 
Racism, and Blackness in Mexico” (Sue 2013), “Mixed Messages: Multiracial Identities in the 
Colorblind Era” (Brunsma 2006), “More Than Black? Multiracial Identity and the New Racial 
Order” (Daniel 2001), “Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African “Coloured” 
Politics” (Lewis 1987), and “Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South 
African Coloured Community” (Adhikari 2005). Descriptors repeated in the titles include 
“between”, “more than”, and “marginal”. Not surprisingly, mixed race history comes to the 
forefront as the primary focus of race mixture research.  
Similarly, the concept of mestizaje occupies research in the Latin American context, and 
it is characterized by high rates of race mixture (Telles 1995; Wade 1995). Creolization is another 
term sometimes used to describe research on these groups (Erasmus 2001), but it again emphases 
the mixing of cultures. Perhaps, then, a more fitting label (as opposed to racial limbo) to describe 
the referenced research is race mixture. Telles and Sue (2009:130) define race mixture studies as 
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encompassing research of “intimate social interaction across social boundaries” and other 
sociological issues (e.g., identity, social movements, national ideologies) surrounding the progeny 
of race mixture. Overall, however, Telles and Sue (2009) assert that the field of race mixture is 
concentrated and underdeveloped, and urge more systematic and comprehensive scholarship on 
the important subject. 
I employ racial limbo as a term to describe an intermediate position in a racial hierarchy. 
Where my own research diverges from race mixture, then, is that it broadens the narrow focus 
from the creation of these groups (e.g., miscegenation, race mixture) or identities of these 
individuals (e.g., bi- multi-racial identity) to one that engages with structural positioning. In this 
dissertation project, I seek to shift the focus past race mixture to positions of racial limbo. 
Coloureds: An Exemplar Case of Racial Limbo  
Despite being a highly studied context for race research, the contemporary sociological 
research on coloureds and racial limbo in South African is insubstantial. I argue coloureds 
represent the strongest case of racial limbo because of South Africa’s rigid hierarchy, which 
influenced coloureds longstanding, well-defined, and intermediate position, and because 
coloureds current status can not be characterized as either mixed or marginal. 
The reasons that make South Africa an important context to study for race relations 
broadly (Seidman 1999), are the same reasons more attention is needed in analyses of coloureds. 
South Africa was founded on an explicitly racist ideology (Cell 1982; Frederickson 1981). The 
nation-states’ rigid classification system and the racial discrimination coloureds have encountered 
directly impacts their experience of racial limbo. Furthermore, coloureds, moreso than their U.S. 
and Brazilian counterparts, have remained a legally sanctioned and socially distinct group for the 
greater part of the last century. 
Also, despite the common acceptance that coloureds are a racially mixed group in South 
Africa, most coloureds today do not have ties to first-generation race mixture. That is, the 
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majority of coloureds have coloured parents and grandparents (Adhikari 2005) as opposed to 
having a parents belonging to different races (which often characterizes other instances of racial 
limbo). I argue that, although race mixture is an important aspect of coloureds’ history, race 
mixture is not a defining feature of coloureds; rather, it is coloureds enduring ‘between’ status.  
Furthermore, I do not believe that marginality accurately captures coloureds’ experiences. 
Although coloureds have not held substantial representation in either the majority-white or 
majority-black governments, they have always been an integral part of South Africa’s social 
landscape.  
For these reasons, I argue that coloureds have had the most time to come to terms with 
their intermediary position, which might be visibly reflected in coloureds’ lived experiences.  
Thus, conclusions regarding variation within coloureds, or whether coloureds might push back 
against the macro-level forces that work to create their position, will provide a convincing, 
conservative argument about racial limbo more broadly. All things considered, I maintain 
coloureds in South Africa provide an exemplar case study for an exploration of racial limbo.[2] 
Before I continue, I should note why I do not study Indians and Asians—who are also 
neither black nor white and potentially hold an intermediate position in South Africa—in this 
dissertation project. The first reason I focus exclusively on coloureds is because they make up 
approximately 9% of the South African population (which is equivalent to white South Africans), 
whereas Indians/Asians only make up 2%. Second, I develop the concept of racial limbo for 
groups positioned between a dominant group and subordinate group in a racial hierarchy. In 
order to achieve my goal, I included only those groups who do not have another identity or 
attachment that marks them as different or outsiders (e.g., ethnicity, foreigner), and could restrict 
their ability to be placed neatly in a racial hierarchy. Indians’ and Asians’ foreigner/sojourner 
orientation or ethnic identity means they have another social identity that sets them apart from 
white, coloured, and black South Africans. Kim’s (1999) work on triangulation or even 
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Bonacich’s (1973) work on middleman minority may be more applicable to these groups. This is 
not to say ethnic or ethnoracial groups do not fit within the bounds of racial limbo, but rather an 
exploration of that potential is outside of the scope of this dissertation project. Future work should 
examine similarities and differences between coloureds and Indians and Asians in South Africa to 
address whether the concept of racial limbo is suitable for all between groups. I now outline my 
dissertation project.  
 
PROJECT OUTLINE 
The purpose of this dissertation project is to investigate the concept of racial limbo by 
studying the history of coloureds in South Africa and examining coloureds’ contemporary 
attitudes, perceptions of deprivation, and racial identifications. I conduct three empirical studies 
for this dissertation project. In Study One, I investigate whether the apartheid nation-state 
cultivated a position of racial limbo for coloureds and whether their intermediate position is 
maintained in post-apartheid South Africa. Conceiving of legislative data as a productive way of 
engaging with a nation-state’s race-making processes, I analyze thirty-three legislative documents 
during apartheid South Africa (1948-1992) and post-apartheid South Africa (1993 to 2014) for 
Study One. Specifically, I examine how the South African nation-state (1) defined coloureds, (2) 
positioned coloureds between white and black South Africans in the racial hierarchy, and (3) 
distributed power and resources to coloureds relative to white and black South Africans. Findings 
from Study One allow me to assess the nations-state’s role in constructing racial limbo across 
historical periods, while simultaneously allowing for coloureds’ voice to be surface through 
legislative disputes.  
In Study Two, I investigate whether the generalized attitudes and perceived relative 
deprivation of coloureds might align with their position of racial limbo. Specifically, analyzing 
two waves of the Southern African Barometer (SAB), I examine whether self-identified coloureds 
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in post-apartheid South Africa (1) report generalized attitudes that reflect their group’s 
intermediate, historical position between white and black South Africans, and (2) perceive their 
group as both deprived and gratified compared to white and black South Africans, respectively. 
Findings from Study Two allow me to assess whether group position is associated with a broad 
array of contemporary individual level outcomes. Moreover, it provides evidence for how 
coloureds’ intermediate, historical position may be reflected today.  
Finally, in Study Three, I explore whether a multidimensional measure of coloureds’ 
racial identification (as compared to a single-item self-reported racial identification) better 
reflects coloureds’ position in racial limbo in contemporary South Africa. I take up recent calls 
for innovative approaches to measuring race and question whether identification with a race 
group accurately captures group experience. Specifically, I conduct latent class analysis on 
coloured respondents in the Cape Town Area Study (CAS).  Using instruments theorized to 
capture of the phenomenology of race in the LCA, I attempt to locate potential latent classes (i.e., 
unobserved subgroups) of coloureds. I then determine whether the latent classes of coloured, as 
opposed to a single indicator, better demonstrates whether coloureds’ position in racial limbo is 
reflected in attitudes and perceptions of deprivation located, on average, between white and black 
South Africans. Findings from Study Three allow me to explore the potential heterogeneity 
within coloureds’ position of racial limbo.  I now overview the conceptual model that ties the 
dissertation project together, before I conclude with a discussion of the project’s contributions.  
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL: A RACIALIZED SOCIAL SYSTEM  
I employ Bonilla-Silva’s racialized social system as a conceptual model. Bonilla-Silva 
(1997) makes three key points about racialized social systems. First, he asserts that every nation-
state is a racialized social system because the “placement of people in racial categories involved 
some form of hierarchy that produces definite social relations between races.” (p. 469). 
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Moreover, Bonilla-Silva argues that nation-states mark groups by race and also structure these 
groups in a hierarchy such that race becomes an integral part of social life. [3] Second, races 
placed in the superior position tend to receive greater economic, political, social, and 
psychological benefits compared to groups in the subordinate position. For instance, Bonilla-
Silva (1997) argues that the higher a group is placed on the racial hierarchy, the better labor 
market prospects, social esteem (e.g., smarter, better looking), and “psychological wage” 
(Roediger 1991) they receive.  
Finally, according to Bonilla-Silva (1997:470), “[i]nsofar as the races receive different 
social rewards at all levels, they develop dissimilar objective interests.” These interests are 
collective rather than individual, and based on relations between groups rather than explicit needs 
(Bonilla-Silva 1997). So, not only does position impact the power and resources groups have 
access to, it also shapes their interests and practices. Moreover, Bonilla-Silva claims that race 
comes to have independent effects in social life. Cultural, political, economic, social, and 
psychological phenomena are racialized as a result of race being a fundamental part of every 
nation-state’s organization.  
In sum, the racialized social system model proposes that a nation-state forms racial 
categories and dictates how the categories are arranged in a racial hierarchy. Groups’ positioning 
in the racial hierarchy then impacts benefits they receive and their collective interests and 
behaviors (Bonilla-Silva 1997). This model is informed from the social structure and personality 
framework, which “…direct[s] our attention to the hierarchically organized processes through 
which the macrostructures come to have relevance for the inner lives of individual persons and, in 
theory, the processes through which individual personals come to alter social systems” (McLeod 
and Lively 1999:77) and encourages explorations of phenomena across social levels. This 
dissertation follows others who use the social structure and personality framework (e.g., Bobo 
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1999; House 1995), and specifically the racialized social system model (Bonilla-Silva 1997), as a 
guide for examining how social structures shape outcomes for race groups. 
For instance, Forman (2003) used the racialized social system as a conceptual model to 
examine how race-related structural constraints (i.e., racial segmentation in the workplace) can 
impair African Americans’ psychological functioning. Forman argued that perceptions of group 
position and group deprivation in the workplace are a product of racist structures, which has a 
direct and indirect relationship with psychological functioning for African Americans. As such, 
he claims the racialized social system allows for a succinct description of how structures could 
plausibly impact micro-level outcomes.    
The racialized social system guides my dissertation project by supporting the argument 
that racial limbo represents one position in South Africa’s racial hierarchy, and this position, in 
turn, influences the attitudes, perceptions, and identifications of those in racial limbo. As Figure 1 
illustrates, a racialized social system shapes racial hierarchies and can directly and indirectly 
impact groups’ lived outcomes. Relationships in this model are theoretically bidirectional 
(Forman 2003; McLeod and Lively 1999). On the one hand, I argue that this conceptual model is 
a helpful guide because it mends the top-down (i.e., structural; nations and hierarchies matter 
most in race-making) verses bottom-up (i.e., agency; identities and individual choices matter 
most in race-making) fracture of the literature regarding racial limbo by implying that racial 
hierarchy shapes macro- and micro-level outcomes. 
Despite its strengths, the racialized social system is limited by the fact that it is a heuristic 
conceptual model, meaning it “describe[s] structures that constrain, shape, limit, and redirect 
action, rather than linear forces that determine it” (Diesing 1991:91). On the other hand, then, I 
acknowledge that this model is limited by its descriptive nature. Moreover, the central argument 
of the racialized social system cannot be empirically tested; there is no valid way to empirically 
test the social construction of a group or how structure is directly related to meso- and micro-level 
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social outcomes for a group. Relatedly, the racialized social system is limiting because it is 
ubiquitous in its consequences (i.e., everything is racialized) and for that reason is not potentially 
falsifiable.  Finally, as it is currently treated in research, the racialized social system model leaves 
little room for agency by dictating that all members of a racial group share the exact same 
relationship to their racial group and other racial groups (see Loveman 1999 for a comprehensive 
critique).  
Although I recognize limitations of the racialized social system, I attempt to mitigate the 
limitations in three important ways. I first provide a critical assessment of the South African 
nation-state’s role in cultivating a position of racial limbo for coloureds. Although I cannot test 
the construction, I can, however, demonstrate the ways in which the nation-state may engineer 
group positions. Second, in choosing multiple individual level outcomes for analysis (e.g., 
generalized attitudes, perceptions of deprivation), I am able to examine multiple and specific 
aspects of individuals’ lives that might be impacted by group positions in the racial hierarchy. 
Finally, I develop a multidimensional measure of coloureds’ racial identification, rather than 
relying on the assumption that a single-item self-reported racial identification captures what it 
means to be coloured.   
By attempting to overcome the racialized social systems shortcomings, I argue I am able 
to set up a clear path for analyses and background investigation of other testable theories used in 
each respective study. Moreover, the racialized social system conceptual model guides the funnel 
approach I used to structure my dissertation: I begin with evaluating the nation-state and work 
down levels of analysis, thus building conclusions that speak to multiple social levels.  
 
CONTRIBUTION  
 I argue that the examinations of racial limbo reveal hidden facets of racial hierarchies and 
can likewise reveal limitations of race theories.  Yet, past research on race limbo is limited in its 
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scope, cohesiveness, and conceptual clarity, which leaves the construct fairly fuzzy. Furthermore, 
South Africa’s case of racial limbo is stands as an important outlier, but remains largely ignored 
today. The research that is available emphasizes a top-down or bottom-up perspective on racial 
limbo. The perspectives do not often speak with each other; thus, minimizing integration of what 
we know across the macro- and micro-levels. Finally, empirical research on racial limbo using 
individual level data relies on self-reported racial identification rather than multidimensional 
measurement that might account for variation in the lived experience of racial limbo. 
My dissertation project contributes to the literature by: (1) examining the South African 
case—a context investigated rarely post-apartheid; (2) using a conceptual model that emphasizes 
interconnections between the macro- and micro-levels by describing how the historical 
construction of coloureds as a group in racial limbo might be evidenced in individual outcomes 
today, and (3) attempting a multidimensional measurement of the coloured racial identification 
that may better capture racial limbo. This systematic study of coloureds will contribute 
conceptual and methodological clarity to the concept of racial limbo.  
The potential broader implications of this study are substantial. This dissertation project 
engages in one of the longstanding sociological debates: structure versus agency? Moreover, I 
engage with research informed broadly by the social structure and personality framework and 
apply it to one of the most pressing social cleavages today: race. Specifically, guided by the 
racialized social system conceptual model, I examine how hierarchies are constructed and 
investigate whether they have relevance and permanence in people’s lives. I question whether 
structure can be reflected in individual level outcomes, and whether examining micro-level 
aspects of race reveals the phenomenological experience of race. Findings from the dissertation 
suggest that racial hierarchy infiltrates coloureds’ lives, even when the structures (i.e., apartheid) 
have themselves gone away. At the same time, however, individual agency—especially among 
those positioned in race limbo—remains active in contesting structural constraints.   
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NOTES 
[1] The distinction between volition and coercion in constructing limbo is often blurred and/or 
intersects across context and historical time. For instance, crossing a nation-state border to 
become an undocumented immigrant is a choice, but a choice often conditioned by adverse 
living situations or safety concerns in an immigrant’s home country.  
[2] Racial liminaltity was actually the first term I employed when I began working on this 
dissertation project in spring of 2013. However, when Mark (2013) used racial limbo to 
describe coloureds in her December 2013 article, I decided to borrow from her term. The fact 
that we both arrived to very similar conclusions suggests racial limbo might be a reliable 
construct. 
[3] Diverging slightly from Bonilla-Silva’s claims, I believe that race can be made at both 
institutional and individual levels. The modern creation of race circa the 1700s was largely a 
macro (e.g., ideological and institutional) construction (Hirschman 2004; Frederickson 1981; 
Winant 2001). However, social movement analyses on racial inclusion and identity politics 
have shown that individuals also have agency in marking and assigning meaning to their race. 
For instance, the multiracial movement in the United States was spearheaded by a few 
multiracial entrepreneurs (DaCosta 2007) who were successful in implementing their policies 
at the institutional level (e.g., 2000 census change for the “check more than one race” option).  
Furthermore, individuals have the ability to resist group membership, but whether or not 
others accept their resistance is variable (see Rockquemore and Brunsma’s (2008) discussion 
of unvalidated biracial identities for example).  This notion is examined in Study Three. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
RACIAL FORMATION, PROJECTS, AND LIMBO:  
EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION DURING AND AFTER APARTHEID 
 
The South African nation-state stands out for its strict governance over race relations. Seidman 
(1997) declares, “As everyone knows, South Africa is unique: For fifty years, it stood in the annals of 
social science as a monument to racial inequality.” Cell (1982) described South Africa as the highest 
stage of white supremacy and Frederickson (1981) claimed that South Africa enacted the most pernicious 
form of institutionalized racism, while South Africa was called “the world’s most unabashedly racial 
state” by Winant and Seidman (2001:128).  Put succinctly by Marx (1998:7), “South Africa’s race 
relations bark most loudly.” What all of these scholars suggest is that the very structure of the South 
African state was blatantly racist.  
White South African’s unmitigated control over the nation-state and the legally enforced 
subjugation of black South Africans sets South Africa apart as an extreme case. Indeed, the juxtaposition 
of a small white ruling class against a disenfranchised black majority has received ample consideration in 
social scientific research. Post-apartheid South Africa has also received much attention in regard to the 
long contested shift in power from white to black South Africans. Yet, white and black South Africans are 
not the only populations present in South Africa. Coloured South Africans, considered a racially mixed 
group, have made up a considerable and constant proportion of the population in South Africa in the last 
century.  
Remarkably less social scientific attention has been given to the role of the state in shaping 
coloureds’ position and experience in South Africa. Exceptions include historical descriptions of 
coloureds written during apartheid (Goldin 1987; Lewis 1987; Patterson 1953) and cross-national 
comparative analyses that dedicate a chapter to miscegenation and consequentially cover coloureds 
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(Frederickson 1981; Marx 1998; van de Berge 1967). Such scholarship suggested that coloureds held 
intermediate position between white and black South Africans during the early history of South Africa. 
More recent research on coloureds, by South African scholars such as Adhikari (2005) and Erasmus 
(2001), has brought the conversation into the twenty-first century. Although coloureds’ position is more 
ambiguous today, these scholars suggest coloureds’ intermediate position between white and black South 
Africans remains stable.  
I argue that more systematic research is needed to examine the cultivation and maintenance of 
coloureds’ position in what I call racial limbo. Racial limbo means belonging to a group positioned 
between a dominant white group and a subordinate black group in a racial hierarchy. I agree with race 
scholars who argue that the treatment of groups in racial limbo within highly stratified nations is 
informative to overall systems of domination (Daniel 2007; Brunsma 2006; Frederickson 1981; Marx 
1998; Telles 2003; Telles and Sue 2009). Although these groups often have less clear boundaries than 
whites (as a dominant group) or blacks (as a subordinate group), examining racial limbo has value; it can 
reveal hidden facets of racial hierarchies.  
 In this study, I examine whether the South African nation-state cultivated a position of racial 
limbo for coloureds and whether it is being maintained today. I split my analysis into two periods: (1) 
apartheid South Africa from 1948-1992 and (2) post-apartheid South Africa from 1993 to 2014. I 
investigate how the South African nation-state defines coloureds, positions coloureds between white and 
black South Africans in the racial hierarchy, and distributes power and resources to coloureds relative to 
white and black South Africans. I conceive of legislative data as a productive way of engaging with a 
nation-state’s race-making processes (Gordon-Reed 2002; Marx 1998; Omi and Winant 1994), and 
therefore analyze legislation and official state documents.  
 In the sections that follow, I discuss racial formation, racialized social systems, and race mixture 
as frameworks that inform the purpose and analytical strategy of this study. Next, I set the stage by 
providing background information about South Africa as a racist nation-state. I then lay out my 
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expectations and describe the analytic strategy. Finally, I present findings from the analysis of apartheid 
and post-apartheid legislation in order to assess the cultivation and maintenance of coloureds’ position in 
racial limbo, respectively. I argue contrasting the two periods allows for a critical examination of the 
nation-state’s role in forming the position of racial limbo for coloured South Africans.  
 
FRAMING  
Racial Formation 
 To understand how a nation-state comes to attach significance to race, we must first interrogate 
the concept of race and how it comes to have meaning. As defined by Desmond and Emirbayer 
(2009:336), race is “a symbolic category, based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed according to 
specific social and historical contexts, that is misrecognized as a natural category.” I add emphasis to the 
term symbolic category in order to highlight that no scientific basis to race (as attached to phenotype) 
exists, despite the fact that race has long been thought to be a biological category. Rather, race functions 
as a symbolic category separating people into groups and generating feelings of similarity and difference 
(see Epstein 1992; Lamont and Molnar 2002). When symbolic categories are widely agreed upon they 
become social categories, which pattern social interactions (Lamont and Molnar 2002). 
 Another important aspect within the aforementioned definition of race is that it is a sociohistorical 
concept: racial categories must be understood within the social, economic, political, and historical context 
in which they are embedded (Omi and Winant 2012:18). That is, what race means or who belongs to what 
race varies across time and place. The process of creating the meaning of race within the applicable 
contexts is termed racial formation by Omi and Winant (1994). Racial formation takes into account the 
social, economic, and political forces that determine the content and importance of racial categories.  
Omi and Winant further articulate that racial formation happens through a series of racial 
projects. Racial projects are defined as the “simultaneous interpretation, representation or explanation of 
race dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines” (Omi 
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and Winant 1994:56). Racial projects work by first identifying and signifying racial categories and then 
organizing resources according to the particular signification attached to the racial categories. The racial 
formation process has serious implications for social life. Put succinctly by Omi and Winant:  
[S]ociety is infused with racial projects, large and small, to which all are subjected. … Everybody 
learns some combination, some version, of the rules of racial classification, and of her own racial 
identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation. Thus we are inserted in a 
comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes “common sense”—a way of 
comprehending, explaining, and acting in a social world. (Omi and Winant 1994:60, emphasis 
added)  
 
In other words, racial projects help spread ideas about race and classification. Once the ideas are learned 
they become embedded into the social structure: a process called racialization.  
Furthermore, racial formation encompasses an array of racial projects. Some are bottom-up 
projects that stem from individual and group agency (e.g., grassroots, social movements) and others are 
top-down projects that are the result of structural forces (i.e., institutions, government mandates), but all 
work to create racial categories. My goal is to examine the role of the South African nation-state in 
forming a position of racial limbo for coloureds; therefore, I emphasize a top-down perspective in this 
study.   
The Nation-state as Racial Formation 
Consistent with the racial formation thesis, Bonilla-Silva (1997) contends that nation-states act as 
racialized social systems, which means they are “societies in which economic, political, social, and 
ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or races” (p. 469). 
He argues that nation-states mark groups by race and also structure these groups in a hierarchy, and in 
turn, such societies are shaped by these racialized structures.  Furthermore, Bonilla-Silva argues that races 
placed in the superior position tend to receive greater economic, political, social, and psychological 
benefits compared to groups in the subordinate position. For instance, he describes the correlation 
between being higher placed on the racial hierarchy with better labor market prospects, social esteem 
(e.g., smarter, better looking), and “psychological wage” (Roediger 1991).  
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Marx’s (1998) influential book, Making Race and Nation, sets up a framework that is consistent 
with Bonilla-Silva’s theorization regarding racialized social systems, but further articulates the nation-
state. Marx explains, “[d]omination has been officially encoded in racial terms, suggesting that the state 
plays a role in constructing and enforcing the institutional boundaries of race” (1998:4). Moreover, Marx 
conceives of the nation-state as the focal point of analysis in racial formation. He defines the state as an 
association that claims control of society within a territory, whereas the nation is defined as a popular 
loyalty, often obliged to serve and be served by the state. Jointly, then, the nation-state is “institutional 
rule and allegiance to it” with the primary goal of diminishing internal conflict (Marx 1998:4). Therefore, 
the creation of racial categories is one means the nation-state employs to control the population, diminish 
conflict, and create boundaries: “states bind the nation they claim to represent by institutionalizing 
identities of racial inclusion and exclusion” (Marx 1998:5). Marx claims that as states work out their 
nation-building they simultaneously work out their race-making, and as nation-states progress, racial 
categories remain central to the maintenance of the social order.  
The racial formation and racialized social system frameworks orient us to think about the 
meaning and position of racial categories and suggest the nation-state acts as a primary place for race-
making. However, they do not specifically address groups positioned in racial limbo. Therefore I also 
consulted studies of racial mixture for my analysis of coloured South Africans.   
The Nation-state, Racial Projects, and Race Mixture  
Telles and Sue (2009:130) define race mixture studies as encompassing research of “intimate 
social interaction across social boundaries” and other sociological issues (e.g., identity, social movements, 
national ideologies) surrounding the progeny of race mixture. On the importance of race mixture, 
Frederickson (1981) argues, “the concerns a dominate group expresses about its sexual and marital 
relations with racial or ethnic “outsiders,” what it actually does to regulate “miscegenation,” and how it 
treats people of mixed percentage reveal much about a society’s pattern of group stratification” (p.156). 
Although my examination of racial limbo in this dissertation project entails more than race mixture (i.e., 
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miscegenation), this is a useful framework because it provides direction on how to think more critically 
about the way the South African state dealt with coloureds’ racially mixed history.  
Researchers have studied race mixture in the United States (e.g., DaCosta 2007; Daniel 2001; 
Davis 1991), Brazil (e.g., Degler 1986; Telles 2004), and Colombia (e.g.,Wade 1995), South Africa (e.g., 
Adhikari 2005; Goldin 1997; Patterson 1953) and have conducted cross-national comparisons (e.g., 
Daniel 2007; Frederickson 1981; Marx 1998; van der Berge 1967).  This research reveals how social and 
historical context informs variation in the production of racial limbo—from the erasure of racial limbo to 
multiple iterations of racial limbo and so on. For instance, the one-drop rule can be analyzed as a racial 
project in the racial formation of blackness (and not racial limbo) in the United States. According to the 
Racial Integrity Act of 1924, a “"white person" shall apply only to the person who has no trace 
whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian” (Integrity Act, State Legislature of Virginia 1924). 
Moreover, just one-drop of black blood meant legal and social categorization as black. This act, and its 
widespread, historical de jure application, diminished the existence of racial limbo in the United States 
during the nineteen-century. This rule had ramifications for social organization as well: it increased the 
base of low-wage workers (see Davis 1991).  
One instructive, yet largely neglected text on race mixture is Reuter’s (1969) study of white and 
black race mixture in the United States. According to Reuter (1969:188), a dominant group can foster 
three possible “distinctive social positions” for the half-castes: (1) lower segment of the dominant group; 
(2) members of the exploited group; or (3) an intermediate class or caste. His typology, which may be 
applicable to other contexts, provides a useful framework to assess the positions of those individuals with 
racially mixed backgrounds.[1] In my analysis, I attempt to verify the placement of coloureds as an 
intermediate class in South Africa’s racial hierarchy: thus, occupying a position of racial limbo. Before I 
further lay out my expectations, I provide a brief background on the formation of the South-African 
nation-state and of the coloured race in South Africa.  
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Foundations of South African Nation-State[2]  
Traders of the Dutch East India Company set up a station in the Cape of Good Hope, located at 
the southwestern tip of Africa, in 1652. The Dutch (initially referred to as Boers) planned to use the area 
as a reenergizing stop for its vessels on the way to India. They did not expand their land holdings until 
about five years later when they began to view their coincidental landing at the southernmost tip of Africa 
as more than a pit stop. The Dutch often settled in close proximity to indigenous Africans, primarily of 
the Khoikhoi tribe. Although the two groups occasionally worked interdependently for shared lifestyles, 
interactions between settlers and indigenous peoples predominantly privileged whites (Chazan et al. 1999; 
Frederickson 1997).  For example, Africans were often forced into trade or work and small wars and 
foreign disease decreased Africans numbers in the area (Thompson 1996).   
Interracial intimate relations, primarily between white men and Khoikhoi women were common 
but inegalitarian as well (Cell 1982; Chazan et al. 1999; Frederickson 1981). Before long, miscegenation 
in the cape resulted in a population of people of mixed parentage, sometimes socially referred to as people 
of colour (Patterson 1953). One report on parish registers reveals that 24% of marriages between 1688 
and 1807 were between white males and a female with some degree of non-white ancestry (Hesse 
1971:10). According to Frederickson (1981), interracial marriages in which the non-white partner was of 
mixed race were six times more common than interracial marriages with an indigenous black woman. 
Indeed, existence of racially mixed individuals means that there had to be a sizeable amount of initial 
miscegenation between whites and indigenous Africans, but the fact that more marriages were between 
whites and non-whites/non-indigenous Africans (i.e., the racially mixed) may indicate that those between 
had greater social status than their black indigenous counterparts.[3]  
 The racial hierarchy in South Africa was altered by miscegenation, because it introduced a 
racially mixed population. Moreover, the mix between two unequal status groups resulted in a population 
of offspring that was set apart, and possibly between, white and black South Africans. Still, no legal 
definition or definitive position existed for this group at this time. 
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In 1794 the Dutch East India Company declared bankruptcy and a year later the British Empire 
sought out to establish rule in Southern Africa. As the colonizers began to push inward towards the East, 
they encountered other African tribes, such as the Xhosa and Zulus. These African empires were fierce 
and clashed with Europeans (Thompson 1996). For much of the next century a plethora of wars, battles, 
and squabbles were fought between the Boers and the Africans, the British and the Boers, the Africans 
and the British, and among African tribes. They fought to determine who owned what land and who 
created the laws of those lands. In the end, the British, backed with strong aid, large numbers, and new 
technologies, came out as the primary victors during the nineteenth century (Chazan et al. 1999; 
Thompson 1996).  
British attitudes towards Africans were inconsistent but relatively more humane compared to the 
Dutch (Lewis 1987; Marx 1998). For instance, the British mandated emancipation of Africans in 1833. 
However, after being defeated by the Zulus in a battle in 1879, the British retaliated with their growing 
power and established legalized segregation in the Eastern Cape in 1894.  
A catalyzing event in the formation of the South African nation-state was the discovery of 
diamonds and gold between 1867 and 1886 in the eastern coastlines. The lure of instant wealth increased 
the population of Europeans in South Africa from 200,000 in 1865 to over one million by 1905 (Chazan 
et al. 1999). Furthermore, the demand for mineral wealth intensified altercations between all population 
groups. With the discovery of and antagonism over precious minerals, race and class stratification soon 
became a permanent fixture of South African society.  
Conflict continued to plague South Africa. The South African War began in 1899 and lasted until 
1902. During the war, over 500,000 British troops were sent to squash African empires, such as the Zulu, 
and to suppress Boer power (Chazan et al. 1999). The British implemented the South African Act of 1909 
and founded the Union of South Africa. Indeed, the South African Act, made into the first constitution 
one year later, is known for setting in motion discriminatory social, economic and political systems 
because it began to legally restrict access from blacks and coloureds (Marx 1998). Despite the act, 
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though, conflict between the Europeans would continue. The Boers worked to increase their political base 
and power by pushing for even more restrictions against the black and coloureds, and by opening up 
voting privileges of white Dutch women (Frederickson 1981). In 1948 the National Party, a Boer political 
group, finally declared victory over South African rule.  
South Africa as a Racist Nation-state 
What is important to make explicit after this brief historical overview is that the formation of 
South Africa was grounded in beliefs of white supremacy (Cell 1982; Frederickson 1981; Marx 1998; 
Winant 2001). White supremacy is defined by Frederickson (1981:xi) as: “attitudes, ideologies, and 
policies associated with the rise of blatant forms of white or European dominance over “non-white” 
population.” White supremacy serves as the ideological force that ties together various practices, laws, 
and institutions that have worked to form the South African nation-state, and importantly, form the 
structure of South Africa’s racial hierarchy.  
By the early twentieth century, whites rose steadily to the wealthy class in South Africa, whereas 
some blacks remained poor farmers and others took low paying jobs as miners and house servants.  As a 
majority, black South Africans remained uneducated and lived in destitution (Frederickson 1981). It was 
during this period that ‘people of colour’ evolved into the category of coloured.  It was also during this 
time that coloureds began to solidify a group that was different and above black South Africans. For 
instance, coloureds were allowed to stand and serve as elected or nominated representatives in the houses 
of Parliament during the beginning of the twentieth century (Frederickson 1981). Still, the nation-state 
had yet to be fully developed or officially decide upon the place of coloureds within South Africa’s racial 
hierarchy.   
South Africa and ‘The Break’ 
 I described the foundations of South Africa to set the stage for my analysis of the apartheid and 
post-apartheid nation-state’s role in forming a position of racial limbo for its coloured population. Before 
I move to the expectations, it is important to clarify my periodization of the South African nation-state: 
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(1) apartheid South Africa from 1948-1992 and (2) post-apartheid South Africa from 1993-2014. This 
decision accounts for the crisis of racial formation (Winant 2001:135). Moreover, Winant argues that 
post-World War II there was a break; an economic, political, and cultural context in which most national 
racial conflicts had to be reworked. According to Winant, “once the incompatibility of the old racial 
system with the postwar social order both national and global was acknowledged, it became clear that the 
widespread social and political transformations would have to occur” (2001:135). The break resulted in a 
type of global racial formation that forced nations to re-conceptualize racial domination in the wake of 
democracy and universal humanity, but its impact hit each particular nation-state in a different way and at 
different times. Winant (2001) outlines four principal determining factors for the racial break: 
demographic change, movement mobilization, interaction with global racial networks, and reform of state 
policies.   
Winant and Seidman argue that South Africa is an obvious choice for studies of racial formation, 
not only because it “was the world’s most unabashedly racial state”, but also because “[t]he very lateness 
of the coming of the break, of the beginning of the passage toward a democratic and inclusive society, 
makes South Africa a crucial case study.” (2001:138). Apartheid, which began in 1948, used state 
authority to legally separate and control races, but its demise was finally written into law in 1992. Thus, 
the end of apartheid signifies the impact of the break in South Africa.  Post-apartheid South Africa is 
often referenced by the colloquialism, the new South Africa, used to specify separation from the former, 
racist nation-state that most citizens are now ashamed of (see Waldmeir 1997). Post-apartheid South 
Africa represents a supposed democratic, nonracial, and progressive nation-state. All of the factors that 
Winant (2001) outlines were present in the 1990s as South Africa was transitioning away from the 
apartheid state, but consistent with my goals, I emphasize the reform and change of state policies after the 
break as the central factor in my analysis. Therefore, examining differences in legislation and state 
policies during and after apartheid should allow me to determine the role of the nation-state in first 
cultivating and then maintaining a limbo position for coloured South Africans.   
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HYPOTHESES 
I argue that an analysis of racial projects as portrayed through legislation and official state 
documents makes it possible to assess how a nation-state defines racial categories, organizes the positions 
of racial categories, and distributes of power and resources according to these categories. Specifically, for 
my analysis, I investigate how the South African nation-state defined coloureds, positioned coloureds 
between white and black South Africans in the racial hierarchy, and distributed power and resources to 
coloureds relative to white and black South Africans. 
I inform my hypotheses by taking into account the aforementioned frameworks regarding the 
making of race and nation and the brief description of South Africa’s formation. Given the ideology of 
white supremacy that motivated the colonization and exploitation of black/African people in South 
Africa, and the ambiguous, but relatively higher social standing that coloureds held in South Africa, I 
expect that as South Africa continues demarcate its boundaries as a nation-state, it will also concretize 
what it means to be coloured in South Africa. Specifically, in regards to the apartheid regime, I expect to 
find evidence that the nation-state clearly and legally defined coloureds as a distinct racial category.  I 
also anticipate finding evidence that apartheid South Africa crafted a racial hierarchy in which coloureds 
held an intermediate position between white and black South Africans. This is would be evidenced by 
legislation that discusses coloureds relative to white and black South Africans. Relatedly, I expect to find 
evidence of that the apartheid South African nation-state distributed more power and resources to 
coloureds compared to black South Africans (who were forced into the subordinate position), and less 
power and resources compared to white South Africans (who secured a superior position). Overall, this 
would suggest apartheid South Africa cultivated a limbo position for its coloured population.  
In regard to post-apartheid South Africa, I anticipate that as the nation-state goes through the 
reconstruction phases, it will also have to decide on whether or not to re-define or re-organize its race 
categories and hierarchies. Accounting for processes of racialization (i.e., race takes on a life of its own), I 
posit that racial structures will remain in place (i.e., reaffirm prior categories) and expect that South 
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African will continue to define coloureds as a distinct race group. Further, I expect that coloureds’ 
intermediate position within the racial hierarchy would remain intact, which again would be evidenced by 
legislation that discusses coloureds relative to white and black South Africans. However, accounting for 
the break, I expect that legislation in post-apartheid South Africa will not differentially distribute power 
and resources to coloureds relative to white or black South Africans. That is, I anticipate post-apartheid 
South Africa will neither allocate nor withhold power and resources according to race, given the goal of 
creating a racially harmonious nation.  All things considered, I expect that coloureds’ intermediate 
position of racial limbo will be maintained by the nation-state in contemporary South Africa. Figure 1 
summarizes these hypotheses.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data for this study comes from legislation implemented by the South African government. I 
operationalize legislation to include laws, rules, regulations, acts, ordinances or other official state 
documents. Informed by Marx (1998), I focus on legislation that was important in the formation of the 
nation-state, the enumeration of races, and/or acts that determine the allocation of power and resources by 
racial categories.  
Data for this study are not an exhaustive survey of all legislation; rather they emphasize a broad, 
purposive sample that captures influential legislation across the two periods and allows me to assess the 
construction of coloureds’ intermediate position. The sample was first informed by overviewing the work 
of various historical and political experts of South Africa to elicit an initial sample of legislation deemed 
important in shaping the racial hierarchy. Then, I used national (South African) and international 
databases to locate the original documents. Finally, I went back through the databases to supplement the 
sample to ensure breadth of legislation (e.g., penal, regulatory) passed at various historical points within 
the timeframe. In total, I analyzed twenty-two legislative documents from apartheid South Africa, and 
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eleven documents from post-apartheid South Africa. Table 1 summarizes these data. A research design 
that examines more quantitative aspects could serve as an interesting and complimentary future project.  
My methodological strategy is informed by Omi and Winant (1994) and their conceptualization 
of racial projects. An analysis of racial projects makes it possible to assess how a nation-state defines 
racial categories, the status and meaning of racial categories, and the distribution of benefits according to 
racial categories. Specifically, in my reading of the data, I will document (1) representations of race and 
(2) re/distributions of power and resources according to those representations of race. I contend the 
sample of data I constructed highlights the most impactful legislation that speaks to the representation and 
organization of race in South Africans. 
 
RESULTS  
Apartheid South Africa  
 In 1948 the National Party, a Dutch political party led by Daniel François Malan, took over the 
South African government. The South African Act of 1909 was retained as the constitution during the 
1948 takeover. Although discriminatory, it was not the constitution that set in motion unabashed racist 
state, but rather a series of legislations that fell under the label of “apartheid laws.” Apartheid derives 
from the Dutch word apart and is explicitly based upon tenets of white supremacy. The question I engage 
during the analysis of apartheid South Africa is whether the state cultivated a position of racial limbo for 
coloureds.  
Representations and Definitions of Race in Apartheid South Africa    
One of the first pieces of legislation enacted by the apartheid government was the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act No. 55 of 1949.  Of all the issues brought before a new government, it is interesting 
that the problem of mixed marriages seemed most pressing. The apartheid state decided to make marriage 
punishable by law if:  
“…any party to such marriage professing to be a European or a non-European, as the case may 
be, is in appearance obviously what he professes to be, or is able to show, in the case of a party 
  
 
	  
33	  
professing to be a European, that he habitually consorts with Europeans as a European, or in the 
case of a party professing to be a non-European, that he habitually consorts with non-Europeans 
as a non-European.” (Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 1949, Section 1:ii). 
 
What the fuzzy passage declared was the criminalization of any future instances interracial marriages 
between “Europeans” and “non-Europeans” in South Africa. The Immorality Act No. 21 of 1950, enacted 
one year later, took this idea a step further by making sex across the color line illegal. The 1950 act also 
amended the first Immorality Act of 1927 by stating, “we hereby amended by the substitution for the 
word “native”, wherever it occurs, of the word “non-European” (Immorality Act of 1950: Section 5). That 
is, the initial act only prohibited sex between a white (i.e., European) person and a black (i.e., native 
African) person, but did not account for anyone between. Therefore, the amended act’s purpose was to 
clarify that that relations between white Europeans and all non-whites would be illegal as well. Jointly, 
these acts made it apparent that races were to be thought of as distinct and separate, and sought to 
eliminate any future chances of racial mixture.   
The segregation of intimate relationships was the first step in apartheid’s mission to separate 
races, but as language of the documentation demonstrates, the government was unsure of how to actually 
classify the races. Thus, in 1950, the Population Registration Act No. 30 was implemented. This act 
named and separated the entire South African population into distinct racial categories and introduced an 
identity card for all persons over the age of eighteen. The act defined whites, natives, and coloureds races:  
(iii) “coloured person” means a person who is not a white person or a native 
(xv) “native” means a person who in fact is or is generally accepted as a member of any 
aboriginal race or tribe of Africa  
(x) “white person” means a means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally 
accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously 
a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person.  
(Population Registration Act of 1950, Section 1: iii, xv, x) 
  
The Population Registration Act reveals the apartheid nation-state explicitly defined coloured as a 
separate race. Notably, the definition rests on what they are not: neither black nor white. White South 
Africans were defined by their lack of non-white ancestry (i.e., pure), black South Africans were defined 
as native to Africa, and coloureds implicitly fell somewhere between.  
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 The Population Act of 1950 is one of the most cited pieces of apartheid legislation and the racial 
categories named therein were used by all official agencies throughout the apartheid era. Enumerators of 
the 1951 census were first charged with the job of classifying South Africa’s population, and then the 
Department of Native Affairs. However, classifications defined on fuzzy terms such as “appearance 
obviously” or “generally accepted” allowed subjective bias to factor into classification. For instance, 
Posel (2001a) found that classifications were based primarily on skin color and other phenotypic 
characteristics (e.g., hair texture), but also took into account ways of life. Consequentially, multiple 
amendments to the 1950 act were made throughout apartheid’s reign.   
The 1962 Population Registration Amendment Act No. 61 divided coloureds into seven sub-
groupings: Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Indian, Chinese, other Asiatic, and other Coloured. As such, 
coloured became a catchall for groups between white and black South Africans. Nonetheless, broadening 
the inclusion of coloured did little to help its clarity. A judge of the Supreme Court of Cape Town 
actually ruled that this proclamation was void for vagueness in 1967 (Horrell 1971). In this same year, 
1967, the Population Registration Amendment Act No. 64 stretched the bounds of classification to 
include descent.  
The move to make descent a deciding factor in determining race was the result of a very public 
case of racial reclassification: the case of Sandra Laing (Stone 2004). Sandra Laing was born in 1955, to 
two white Afrikaners who lived in Piet Retief, a small conservative white designated area in South Africa. 
Like her brothers, Sandra was sent off to an all-white boarding school. At the age of ten, however, Sandra 
was expelled from school. Without her parent’s permission, Sandra was officially reclassified as coloured 
and was therefore unable to attend the school. The school administration made the charge on the grounds 
that Sandra had brown skin and kinky hair that failed to pass the pencil test (i.e., if a pencil can stay in 
hair without falling out, a person was considered non-white). Despite having three-generations of white 
ancestry, Sandra ‘looked’ coloured, and because of the definitions provided in the Population Registration 
Act, Sandra was legally reclassified as coloured. The reclassification had damaging ramifications; 
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according to other apartheid laws, Sandra, a coloured, was only allowed to live with her parents if they 
also classified her as a servant.  
In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Laing’s brought forth a scientist who claimed Sandra’s 
appearance was result of a dormant ‘throwback’ gene, which refers to traits reappearing which had 
disappeared generations before (Stone 2004). Mr. Laing also argued that Sandra was brought up as 
naturally white.  The public was highly divided on the issue, but the Supreme Court decided to amend the 
1950 Population Registration Act to include descent as a form of classification and dictated specific 
directions for reclassification. As soon as the law passed, Mr. Laing successfully applied to have Sandra 
reclassified as white.[4] The Population Registration Amendment, No. 64 read: 
(4)If at any time it appears to the Secretary that the classification of a person in terms of 
subsection (1) (other than a classification in accordance with a decision of a board) is incorrect he 
may, after giving notice to that person and, if he is a minor, also to his guardian, specifying in 
which respect the classification is incorrect— 
(a) alter the classification of that person in the register after affording such person and 
such guardian (if any) an opportunity of being heard; or 
(b) refer the case to a board for decision as to whether the classification of that person in 
the register should be altered. 
(5) In the application of this section— 
(a) a person shall be classified as a white person if his natural parents have both been 
classified as white persons; 
(b) a person shall be classified as a coloured person if his natural parents have both been 
classified as coloured persons or one of his natural parents has been classified as a white 
person and the other natural parent has been classified as a coloured person or a Bantu; 
(c) a coloured person whose natural parents have both been classified as members of the s
 ame ethnic or other group, shall be classified as a member of that group; 
(d) a person shall be classified as a Bantu if his natural parents have both been classified 
as Bantus. (Population Registration Act 1967, Section 4 & 5) 
 
The 1967 amendment’s decision to include descent in racial classification meant South Africans 
had another factor to consider for racial classification. In general, reclassification during apartheid was 
not a rare occurrence (Erasmus and Ellison 2008; Posel 2001a). Thousands of cases were brought to The 
Office of Race Classification and sixty-nine cases were heard by the Supreme Court between 1950 and 
1991 (Erasmus and Ellison 2008).  One summary of racial reclassification in 1968 provides detail into 
patterns of reclassification. According to Bowker and Star (1999), four primary reclassifications occurred: 
white to coloured, coloured to black, black to coloured, and coloured to white (See Table 3). In their 
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estimates of 1968, ninety-one coloureds reclassified as white, with 100% of those cases brought forth on 
behalf of the individual. One hundred and eight black South Africans reclassified as coloured, again with 
100% of those cases brought forth on behalf of the individual. Contrarily, nine white South Africans 
reclassified as coloured, and only one individual brought forth that case (11%). The other eight cases of 
white-to-coloured reclassifications occurred as a result of others wanting the reclassification to occur 
(e.g., Sandra Laing was reclassified from white to coloured as a result of others). Similarly, twenty-nine 
coloureds reclassified as black, again with only around 10% bringing forth these cases. As this summary 
illustrates, most reclassifications occurred when individuals attempted to move up the racial hierarchy. In 
the scenario in which when individuals were reclassified to a race with lower status, this occurred 
primarily on account of others. What’s more, reclassification from the poles of white and black was 
extremely rare; reclassification mostly dealt with the question of who should be defined as coloured. 
Importantly, what reclassification highlights is that the definitions of the nation-state did not always map 
clearly onto individuals’ experiences—especially those who teeter across the bounds of racial limbo.  
 In order for apartheid, a system of racial separation to succeed, the South African nation-state had 
to define race and racial categories. The first step was to eliminate future cases of racial mixing and then 
the next step was to divide the current population into distinct race groups. However, because racial 
mixture was a founding feature of the developing South Africa, the nation-state struggled to come up with 
a clear definition of the racially mixed. The naming of the group, coloured, was not the difficult part, it 
was the consensus of who belongs in the coloured category that was contentious.  Whereas it was widely 
accepted that coloureds were racially mixed, it was debatable whether social acceptance, appearance, or 
descent should factor most prominently into determining who was coloured. Furthermore, South Africans 
often pushed the bounds of coloured classification, either moving into or out of the category. The 
constancy, though, for the group remained: coloured were something other than white or black.  
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Distribution of Power and Resources According to Race in Apartheid South Africa    
Whereas the Population Registration Act assigned official racial categories, it said little about 
differential treatment of the groups in the racial hierarchy. That function was first carried out by the 
Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950. The Group Areas Act designated separate living (and working) areas 
for each race group. The purpose of the act was “to provide for the establishment of group areas, for the 
control of the acquisition of immovable property and the occupation of land and premises” (Section 1). 
According to the act, a group was white, coloured, or native, with definitions directly borrowed from the 
Population Registration Act.   
 In effect, the Group Areas Act sanctioned the forced removal of black and coloured South 
Africans from their homes and reassigned them to separate desolate areas. Only white South Africans 
were allowed to remain (yet most of the land was never developed after the removal). In the end, more 
than 80% of South Africa’s land was reserved for the white minority (Hendricks 1990). Figure 1 shows 
the effects of the Group Areas Act. Shortly thereafter, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 
of 1953 enforced racial segregation in all public amenities from restaurants to parks and city benches, 
instructing that being present as “a race or class to which he does not belong” (Section 2[ii]) would be 
fined.  
Within five years of gaining control, the National Party had segregated every aspect of social life. 
All South Africans knew definitively who they were, where they could live, and with whom they could 
interact. Through forced removal of black South Africans and coloureds, and separation of intimate and 
public space, the governing white party made it certain that white South Africans held the dominant 
position on the racial hierarchy, whereas distinctions within the non-white category were less well-
defined. However, there were a series of laws created solely to further oppress native black South 
Africans, which helped refine the racial hierarchy.   
As a prominent example, the apartheid government decided to reestablish tribal organization for 
black Africans. First, the Bantu Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951, and later the Promotion of Bantu Self-
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Government Act No. 46 of 1959, created ten African homelands, called Bantustans for black South 
Africans.[5] Not only did they create division among the black numerical majority, but they pushed them 
into rural areas and away from all urban centers. Most significantly, they excluded blacks from the South 
African body politic. Commissioner-Generals were instructed to develop their assigned Bantustan into a 
self-governing state. However, they were unable to execute any significant power because they remained 
politically and economically dependent on South Africa (Frederickson 1981). According to the 
legislation, in international relations, however, blacks in the homelands still had the status of a citizen of 
the Republic itself (Horrell 1971). In effect, these laws worked as a form of social control for black South 
Africans (Hendricks 1990). 
Black South Africans were also the only group disadvantaged by the Native Laws Amendment 
Act No. 54 of 1952. The native blacks that had to travel into urban areas for work were not allowed to 
stay in the area longer than seventy-two hours according to the act. Furthermore, authorities were allowed 
to remove blacks who were “idle or undesirable” (Section 29[iii]). This law was amended in 1956, by the 
Native Amendment Act No. 69, which allowed for the removal to include those whose “presence was 
detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order” (Section 29[iv]), and those persons could be arrested 
and put into jail. Finally, the ironically named Natives (Abolition of Passes & Coordination of 
Documents) Act No. 67 of 1952 (sic) became known as “pass laws.” The act mandated all black persons 
over the age of sixteen were to carry passes in order to gain admission into white only, urban areas. Black 
South Africans had to carry a valid passbook and could only travel into white/urban areas for work that 
had already been secured or if suitable work vacancies were known to be available (Horell 1971).  
Forced removal into homelands had emotional and economic consequences for black South 
Africans, but it also had significant consequence for coloureds. For instance, over 60,000 coloureds were 
removed from District Six, a township in the Cape Town Area, after the Group Areas Act was passed 
(Jackson 2003; Bestman 2008). Coloureds were forced to the outskirts of urban centers into crowded 
areas with poor infrastructure. Many coloureds spread outward and attempted to build communities in 
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rural areas. The Rural Coloured Areas Act No. 24 of 1963, however, allowed areas unofficially occupied 
by coloureds to be re-designated to belong to coloureds. So, although all non-whites suffered at the hands 
of the Group Areas forced removals, blacks were the only group that had to endure confinement to a 
homeland and had to deal with restricted movement.   
In addition, coloureds’ exclusion in the pass laws and native areas laws demonstrates that 
coloureds received more power and resources than black South Africans. Jointly, the laws gave coloureds 
greater access to socioeconomic resources (e.g., work, education) by allowing them to remain citizens of 
South Africa, live close to urban centers, and travel without complication. Even more explicitly, 
coloureds were offered preference in economic opportunities. The Bantu Labour Act No. 67 of 1964 
allowed employers of skilled jobs (i.e., jobs other than domestic servants, delivery-men, clerks, gasoline 
pump attendants etc.) to hire blacks only if they could provide a certificate from the Department of 
Labour showing that no coloured workers were available. The ramifications of these laws for coloureds’ 
position in the racial hierarchy were obvious: coloureds were an intermediate group. Yes, coloureds were 
discriminated against by whites in power, but they were given significant advantages relative to black 
South Africans. The white-led National Party was operating strategically; coloureds fulfilled the role of a 
“buffer” group (Bestman 2008). Not only did they provide a needed labor force, the power and resources 
coloureds were granted over black South Africans were strategically implemented as a bargaining tool, 
and cashed in by whites to obtain a larger political base.  
The Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act No. 9 was implemented in 1956 and 
provides an example of how coloureds benefited from relative positioning. The 1956 act amended the 
initial 1951 Separate Representation of Voters Act No. 46, which had eliminated the possibility of a 
coloured vote. However, in the 1956 amendment, coloureds were placed on a separate register and once 
again allowed to vote for four white representatives in the House of Assembly, one in the senate and two 
in the Cape provincial council. The act also made provision for the establishment of the Union Council 
for Coloured Affairs (UCCA). Later, the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act No. 50 of 
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1968 introduced the Coloured Persons Representative Council, consisting of forty elected members and 
twenty nominated members.[6] Allowing coloureds to regain limited power was a small concession made 
by the National Party (Saks 1991). 
Perhaps the most significant result of such councils and commissions was that led to the passing 
of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983. This act officially instituted The 
Tricameral Parliament. The Tricameral Parliament gave chambers to three groups in South Africa: a 178 
member House of Assembly for whites, an 85 member house of representatives for coloureds, and a 45 
member house of delegates for Indians. The parliament defined South Africa’s population as including 
only “the White persons, the Coloured persons or the Indians” (Republic of South Africa Act 1983: 
Section 4[ii]). The justification of black exclusion was that African affairs were handled in their 
homelands.  Matters before Parliament were to be divided into ‘general affairs’ (to be discussed by all 
houses and applying to all South Africans) and ‘own affairs’ (relevant to one particular race group). The 
Constitution also gave the president executive power. Given the unequal representation, Indians and 
coloureds could not actually get legislation passed. As a result, the new constitution again gave symbolic 
power to coloureds and Indians, but continued to completely disenfranchise black South Africans.  
It is important to make a note of Indian South Africans here. Although Indians are neither black 
nor white, and in this piece of legislation it appears they might be positioned at par with coloureds, I 
opted to exclude South African Indians in my analysis of racial limbo. I contend that Indians were treated 
as ethnic outsiders, which is qualitatively different than the white, coloured, and black South Africans 
whom made up the racial hierarchy for most of the twentieth century. For instance, South Africa instituted 
various repatriation schemes for Indians throughout its nation-building phase (see Mesthrie 1985), such as 
the Immigration Law Amendment Bill No. 5 of 1895 which mandated Indians had to return to India at the 
end of their five-year indenture period. Furthermore, Indians were not conceived of as a race group at the 
start of apartheid (i.e., not included in Population Registration Act) and even the language of apartheid 
laws constructed specifically towards Indians (and later Asians) sets them apart (e.g., Aliens Control Act 
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No. 40 of 1973). As such, I contend Indians/Asians have another identity (e.g., ethnicity, foreigner) above 
and beyond their race that distinguishes them. Thus, I focus only on coloureds for my current analysis of 
racial limbo. Future research should examine whether ethno-racial categories (such as Indian) also 
represent racial limbo.  
The United Democratic Front (UDF), the largest anti-apartheid organization, was launched in 
1983. It was a direct retaliation to the new Tricameral Parliament and membership soon expanded to 
about three million multiracial members (Marx 1998). The UDF was one successful organizer against the 
apartheid state. Progress towards greater racial equality swelled in the 1980s-1990s and powerful and 
intense anti-apartheid rebellion characterized that period. 
Frederik Willem de Klerk assumed leadership of the National Party in 1989 and the presumed 
conservative leader shocked his constituents and all former National Party presidents with his movement 
towards an anti-racist South Africa. Once in power, de Klerk recognized that apartheid couldn’t be 
sustained anymore as South Africa continued to be ostracized in trade and economic relations, banned in 
many sporting events, and suffered from extremely negative press due to its racism (Strauss 1993). In 
other words, South Africa finally felt the pressure of the break; the pressure from the universal shift 
towards human rights and democracy which forced nations to re-conceptualize racial domination (Winant 
2001). In 1990 the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) was lifted and Nelson Mandela was 
released from prison.  
In 1991, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act No. 108 was passed. This landmark 
act brought down the linchpin of apartheid, the Group Areas Act. The overall purpose was: 
To repeal or amend certain laws so as to abolish certain restrictions based on race  
or membership of a specific population group on the acquisition and utilization of  
rights to land; to provide for the rationalization or phasing out of certain racially  
based institutions and statutory and regulatory systems; for the regulation of norms  
and standards in residential environments; and for the establishment of a  
commission under the name of the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation; and  
to provide for matters connected therewith. (Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 
1991: Preamble)  
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This act signified beginning of the end of the apartheid era. In a shocking and discursive move away from 
all other apartheid documents, the act allowed the state president to “make enactments with a view to the 
readjustment of matters in a non-racial manner” (Section 87[i]) and the president was instructed to act 
“without prejudice” (Section 87[ii]). The provocative language of nonracialism in this act foreshadows 
much to come in post-apartheid South Africa.  
In any case, I contend the South Africa “whites only” Apartheid Referendum of 1992 to be the 
real representation of the fall of apartheid. The referendum was crafted to elicit whites’ support for the 
end of apartheid, and whites were warned that a “No” vote would mean South Africa would continue to 
be harmed by international sanctions, and the possibility of a dangerous civil war (Strauss 1993). After 
intense campaigning, the referendum received a majority “Yes” vote by sixty-eight percent of whites. De 
Klerk declared: “Today we have closed the book on apartheid. It doesn’t often happen that in one 
generation a nation gets an opportunity to rise above itself. The white electorate has risen above itself in 
this referendum” (Strauss 1993:356). Likewise, Mandela noted after the outcome of the results: “In 
principle, the referendum signaled the end of white privilege… the ‘Yes’ vote means that whites are now 
prepared to address these problems. There is no alternative to negotiations” (Strauss 1993:352). At this 
point, the apartheid nation-state had come to a close. This is where I end my analysis of legislation 
enacted during apartheid South Africa. 
Apartheid South Africa and the Racial Formation of Coloureds’ Position in Racial Limbo 
Apartheid as a whole was a powerful racial project that greatly influenced South Africa’s racial 
hierarchy (Winant 2001); it encapsulated many laws, social codes, and mandates that explicitly 
distributed resources across state-defined racial lines. By analyzing a comprehensive array of legislation, I 
was able to assess how the apartheid nation-state defined and positioned coloureds in a racial hierarchy. I 
found that South African whites were able to use their capital to solidify themselves as the dominant 
group, and subsequently structured all social, economic, and political hierarchies to reflect their superior 
position. For example, they used the Group Areas Act to allocate over 80% of South African land to 
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white South Africans only. Conversely, black South Africans were explicitly marked as the inferior 
group, so much so that they could not gain full citizenship or access into South Africa during most of 
apartheid. By juxtaposing these two groups, it becomes clear that in South Africa “white supremacy was 
then an explicit and systematic state policy” (Winant 2001:179).  
It was during apartheid that coloured was first legally encoded as a racial category and was 
defined as a separate and distinct race group. However, the clarity that surrounded whites and blacks did 
not exist for coloureds (or any other group besides white and blacks). The ambiguity in the coloured 
category meant the label shifted definitions throughout the era, but what remained constant was the 
neither/nor designation attached to coloureds.  
Legislation also revealed that coloureds were relegated to an inferior position vis-à-vis white 
South Africans through acts declaring relocation and restrictions on political representation. Their 
superior position vis-à-vis black South Africans was mandated as well, through exceptions coloureds 
received in other acts, such as the pass laws. Furthermore, there were some laws directed solely towards 
coloureds which served to solidify coloureds’ preferential treatment (i.e., preference in labor allowed 
coloureds to be hired over blacks).  
In general, conclusions made regarding the position of coloureds come mostly from comparisons 
of coloureds to white or black South Africans. Adhikari (2005:13) argues that “because of their lack of a 
political and economic clout and because they formed a relatively small stratum within the racial 
hierarchy, the coloured people tended to be perceived in terms of the larger groups.” Moreover, Adhikari 
argues, and I agree, coloureds’ position was always relational: coloureds were both constructed and 
treated as relative to either whites or blacks. Thinking about this in the context of Reuter’s (1969) 
typology of race mixture, it becomes clear that coloureds were sometimes relegated to being a “lower 
segment of the dominant group”, but also subjugated to levels of the “exploited group”. Yet primarily, 
coloureds were placed in “intermediate status group” (Reuter 1969). What’s more, the fact that coloureds 
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had some fluidity within their intermediate placement further supports the idea of racial limbo for 
coloured South Africans.  
In sum, legislation during apartheid reveals that the South African nation-state defined coloured 
as a distinct group from either white or black South Africans. Furthermore, coloureds were signified as a 
group with higher status compared to native blacks, but were also considered inferior compared to pure 
whites, which in effect placed intermediary. The power and resources distributed by the nation-state 
reflect these ideas about group positions in the racial hierarchy. As such, I found support in legislation for 
my expectation that the apartheid nation-state cultivated a position of racial limbo for coloureds.  
 
Post-Apartheid South Africa  
The end of apartheid represented a shift from an oppressive, white, minority-led apartheid system, 
to a black, majority-led democratic system. In the last section, I concluded that the South Africa nation-
state cultivated a position of racial limbo for coloureds under apartheid. Transitioning away from 
apartheid to a democracy represented a significant transformation of the nation-state. As a result, nearly 
all state institutions were pressed to engage in reflection and rebuilding. Would apartheid era divisions 
stick? Would new race groups emerge? How would the transformed nation-state address racial 
disparities? And importantly, where would coloureds fit into the racial hierarchy? Much research 
(Adhikari 2006; Erasmus 2001; Jackson 2003) details ambiguous and marginalized position for 
coloureds. The question I engage here is whether post-apartheid South African nation-state maintained a 
position of racial limbo for coloureds.   
Representations and Definitions of Race in Post-Apartheid South Africa    
As a part of the initial transition out of apartheid, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act No. 200 of 1993 was created. Poignantly, the preamble begins with:  
We, the people of South Africa declare that-  
WHEREAS there is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a 
common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which 
there is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able 
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to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 1993: Preamble)  
 
This piece of legislation differs drastically from nearly all apartheid era legislation. Rather than 
preoccupation with race and racial divisions, it steers the discussion of race in South Africa towards one 
of a common human race. There were seven instances of the word “race”, twenty-eight instances of 
“every person”, but no specific mention of any one race group in the entire constitution. When “race” was 
used it was combined with a qualifier, such as “all races”. These counts indicate that the new constitution 
embeds in its language the indistinction of racial categories. That is, the legislation suggests that all races 
should be accepted and treated equally, but it does not define any type of racial category.  
 This same year Mandela and de Klerk were both awarded Nobel Peace Prizes for their 
negotiations to end apartheid, and one year later, in 1994, South Africa held its first election by universal 
adult suffrage. A 62% majority of South Africans voted for Nelson Mandela and secured his victory as 
the President of the new Republic of South Africa.[7] The 1993 constitution became null when a new 
constitution, of the new South Africa, was implemented in 1996. The Constitution of South Africa No. 
108 of 1996 has been heralded as the most progressive in the world in terms of human rights. It begins:  
We, the people of South Africa, 
Recognise the injustices of our past; 
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; 
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity. 
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme 
law of the Republic so as to- 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will 
of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in 
the family of nations.  (Constitution of South Africa 1996: Preamble) 
 
Furthermore, it declares that:  
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(Constitution of South Africa 1996: Section 9[iii]) 
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Again, in this constitution there was no mention to any specific race group. Above and beyond the 
nonracial language, here, is an explicit declaration of non-discrimination. That is, the state was not 
allowed to discriminate against any one social group, including race, ethnicity, colour, or culture.  
 The constitutions represent prototypes of the early legislation in post-apartheid South Africa. 
What they demonstrate for this analysis was that searching legislation for “race” in post-apartheid South 
Africa was not a productive exercise: race was not a term widely used by the early post-apartheid 
government. The government made it explicit that race was not to be used as a method for discrimination, 
and at the same time pushed a post-racial ideology by implicitly asserting that race was not be to be used 
at all. Thus, race was able to be left undefined. Scholars (Ansell 2004; 2006; Whitehead 2010) contend 
that nonracialism was a concept purposely employed by leaders in the new South Africa; it was elicited 
alongside the mantra of Africanism and idea that class-based disparities trump racial disparities with the 
goal of moving conversations (and policies) past race.     
As one means to overcome the nonracial legislation in post-apartheid, supposedly post-racial 
South Africa, I examined how racial enumeration was treated in the census. The first post-apartheid 
census was collected in 1996. The census gathered statistics not on race groups but population groups. As 
stated:  
Statistics South Africa has continued to classify people into population group, since moving away 
from past apartheid-based discrimination, and monitoring progress in development over time 
involves measuring differences in life circumstances by population group. This classification, in 
common with other countries such as the United States of America which uses a population 
group-based classification system, is no longer based on a legal definition, but rather on self-
classification. (Statistics South Africa 1996:8) 
 
Although population group refers to race (the term the United States Census employs), the government 
again shied away from explicitly using race in their language. The most significant aspect of this new 
census was the move to self-classification. Self-classifications are often applauded as an opportunity for 
self-empowerment and agency (see Snipp 2003) because they shift the onus of classification off of the 
observer and place it on to the individual.  As a result of self-classification, debates about phenotype, 
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descent, and social acceptance that preoccupied much discourse on race during apartheid were no longer 
necessary in post-apartheid South Africa. In addition, reclassification was no longer needed.    
According to the 1996 census, the populations groups and their proportion of the population 
were: black/African (76%), white (10.9%), coloured (8.9%), Indian/Asian (2.6%), and unspecified or 
other (0.9%). It is difficult to determine whether self-classification produced a significant change in 
population statistics because previous censuses merely estimated the numerical size of each population 
group, and the estimates are believed to be skewed toward an overrepresentation of white South Africans 
(Census in South Africa n.d.). According to one estimate in 1976 by Steinberg, Macmillan and London 
(1967), 67.5% of the population was black, 21% white, 8.6% coloured, and 2.4% Indian/Asian. The 
increase in the black population and decline in the white population from 1976 to 1996 was not likely due 
to changes in individuals’ classification, but rather birth rates and emigration (Cronje 2014; Statistics 
South Africa 2010). Interestingly, the coloured population has remained remarkably stable, and even in 
2013 the percentage of coloureds in South Africans continues to hover around 8%.  
Posel (2001b) argues that racial categories in South Africa were so engrained during apartheid 
they persist as common sense, even for the coloured category that had the most ambiguity in its 
classification. For instance, Bestman (2008) and Mark (2012) give qualitative accounts of coloureds who 
passed as white during apartheid and still classify themselves as white in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Likewise, their informant’s retold of other family members who did not pass during apartheid continue to 
self-identify as coloured. The stability in classification is worth mentioning because it reveals how the 
self-classification system implemented by the post-apartheid state did not result in classification changes 
among individuals. Furthermore, apartheid-era racial categories remained even when the language of race 
disappeared in post-apartheid South Africa. This does not mean that individuals necessarily supported the 
prior apartheid state, but rather that the impact of the classification system implemented by the prior 
government lingered on.  
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Another unique data source I examined to assess representations of race came as the result of the 
1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34. This act instituted South Africa’s 
infamous Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to “promote national unity and reconciliation in a 
spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past” (Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation 1995: Section 3[i]). The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
was void of any specific mention of race, despite its clear goal of creating more racial unity. Contrarily, 
the TRC report itself does include ample narratives divided by race. I analyzed the TRC to examine how 
the past racial instances and categories were framed in post-apartheid South Africa. 
As outlined in the act, the TRC’s goals were to (1) establish the causes of the human rights 
violations, (2) provide amnesty to those providing full disclosure on violations, (3) restore human and 
civil dignity to the victims, with potential reparations, of the violations, and (4) produce a report 
summarizing the events and outlining preventative measures. The TRC produced a seven volume report, 
with well over 10,000 pages, covering each of the aforementioned aims. Volume Three focused on gross 
violations of human rights from the perspective of the victim and included testimony for those living in 
the Western Cape, with the majority of those inhabitants (57%) being coloured. Despite coloureds’ 
presence, “[o]f all submissions to the Commission received nationally from victims alleging gross 
violations of human rights, only 8.4 per cent were from the western Cape” (p. 392). Volume Three begins 
by further outlining unique features of the area:  
Five features distinguish the political and social terrain of both Western and 
Northern Cape from the rest of the country: 
a) a distinct formulation of apartheid policy declaring the Cape a ‘coloured 
labour preference area’; 
b) a unique demographic profile with a coloured majority and an African minority; 
c) extreme social and spatial engineering through the Group Areas Act; 
d) significant divisions amongst Africans between rural migrants and urban residents; 
e) an historical diversity of political groupings and ideological approaches. (TRC [Volume 3] 
1996:391) 
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Although the commission did not define the race/population groups, the terms were used frequently to 
specify which group was of interest. I showed emphasis (mine) within bullets (sic) in Volume 3 that were 
able to speak to the experiences of coloureds. For example: 
• The SAIRR gives the final death toll in the western Cape for 11 August to 28 February 1977 
(including December clashes) as 153… A strong feature of the 1976 revolt in the region was the 
very high percentage of violations involving coloured people. Of the 108 people shot dead by 
police in the Peninsula, fifty-three were coloured and fifty-five African. All but one of the deaths 
in the rural towns involved coloured people exclusively. (TRC [Volume 3] 1996:415) 
• Late August and September saw heated protest activities in the coloured residential areas, 
particularly Manenberg, Bonteheuwel, Hanover Park, Elsies River, Ravensmead, Retreat, 
Athlone and Grassy Park. One of the first coloured pupils to be killed by the police was fifteen-
year-old Christopher Truter [CT00411] of Bonteheuwel, who was shot on 25 August. (TRC 
[Volume 3] 1996:413) 
 
In most places, the TRC discussed coloureds alongside black South Africans when they resisted and 
fell victim to white apartheid authorities and/or rouge racist groups. More examples include:  
• The 1976 revolt and the 1980s’ school protests showed unprecedented militancy amongst 
coloured people and solidarity with Africans, with a high number of deaths and injuries (TRC 
[Volume 3] 1996:415). 
• Both protest and repression became violent, and affected coloured as well as African areas (TRC 
[Volume 3] 1996:392). 
• The black townships were under siege for two weeks, with an estimated 95 per cent of the African 
population as well as a substantial proportion of the coloured community in Cape Town joining 
the stay away (TRC [Volume 3] 1996:398). 
 
However, there was some discussion of instances where coloureds and whites were both victims of black 
political and/or militant groups. For example:  
• Among those killed by Poqo [black militant group] members in 1962 were several people in Paarl 
suspected of being police informers. Two of these were coloured women accused of keeping 
members away from the Poqo meetings. Another coloured woman was permanently disabled 
(TRC [Volume 3] 1996:399). 
• On 21 November 1962, Poqo members from Mbekweni, Paarl, met and resolved to attack the 
white town of Paarl… Two white people, Ms Rencia Vermeulen (17) and Mr Frans Richards 
(21), were killed. (TRC [Volume 3] 1996:400). 
 
In this example, coloureds were not spoken of as an extension of whites, as they were in the earlier 
examples of victimization alongside black South Africans, but rather they were discussed as wholly 
separate (i.e., two separate bullets). A few pages further in the document, coloureds were alleged to work 
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with blacks in the Poqo to attack white South Africans. In this reference, coloureds are again discussed in 
conjunction with black South Africans.  
• Poqo networks were alleged to have conspired to rise up against the white population in several 
small towns. In Victoria West, twenty-six Africans and coloured people were arrested at the end 
of April 1968 on charges of having conspired with one another and with sixty-five others to 
commit sabotage (TRC [Volume 3] 1996:401). 
 
Distinguishing coloureds from white South Africans stands as an interesting trend that signals a clear 
division between the two groups, as opposed to the more blurred division between coloureds and black 
South Africans. Furthermore, unlike coloured or black South Africans, most white victims were named. 
What an analysis of the TRC reveals is that coloureds were visible during apartheid, but 
considering the document’s usage of special qualifiers (e.g., “unprecedented militancy”), it appears as 
though coloureds did not occupy as much space (figuratively in the fight against apartheid and literally in 
this TRC report) as white and black South Africans. Furthermore, coloureds were victims to many white-
led crimes, but mostly when they chose to protest alongside black South Africans. Coloureds, to a lesser 
extent, were also sometimes victims to black-led crimes, but mostly when they chose to side with white 
South Africans. Interestingly, the commission felt compelled to make note of coloureds presence, but it 
was in either combination with black South Africans or in contrast to white South Africans. Moreover, 
the TRC report highlights and important trend in terms of signification of race for coloureds in 
contemporary South Africa: coloureds were relatively insignificant, sometimes distinguishable from 
white South Africans, but often confounded with black South Africans.  
Distribution of Power and Resources According to Race in Post-Apartheid South Africa    
Racial categories in post-apartheid South Africa were mainly left undefined although sometimes 
employed in government documents. The ideology of nonracialism was the reasoning behind the shift in 
language. Implicit and nonracial language also clouded legislation that directly sought to distribute or 
organize power and resources according to race in post-apartheid South Africa. Much legislation (e.g., 
penal, regulatory) embedded nonracial language, which in effect, made it difficult to determine which 
race groups received more or less power and resources for this analysis.  
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However, there are two pieces of legislation that were implemented at the turn of the century with 
the explicit function of organizing resources according to racial lines. The first was the Employment 
Equity Act No. 55 of 1998. The Employment Equity Act (EEA) begins by explaining the rationale behind 
the legislation. As stated, affirmative action measures were implemented to “redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their equitable representation in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce” (Employment Equity Act 1998: Section 2[i]). In 
effect, the EEA made discrimination in the hiring of employees punishable by law and required 
employers (with over 50 workers) to create an affirmative action plan that must include, for instance, set 
goals for achieving equitable representation (i.e., quotas) and create an internal monitoring and evaluation 
procedure.   
The highly publicized EEA was met with mixed reviews, and many debate about the success of 
the plan (see Oosthuizen and Naidoo 2010), but that is not of interest here. What is interesting is that the 
first piece of legislation exposing post-apartheid South Africa’s plan regarding the organization of 
resources according to race, was an act that gave more access (as opposed to the apartheid pattern of 
restricting access) to designated disadvantaged race groups. Who were the designated groups? According 
to the Employment Equity Act, they were blacks: “‘black people’ is a generic term which means Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians” (Section 1).  This means that, the first time a specific race was used in legislation 
in post-apartheid South Africa, it was employed as an umbrella term to group all non-whites together as 
black South Africans.   
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowering Act No. 53 of 2003 continues in the same vein as 
the EEA. For instance, it starts by stating “[w]hereas under apartheid race was used to control access to 
South Africa’s productive resources and access to skills” the current government believes “further steps 
are [to be] taken to increase the effective participation of the majority of South Africans in the economy” 
(Preamble). The act established an Empowerment Council with the aim of increasing the number of black 
South Africans in the workforce. As defined in the act:  
  
 
	  
52	  
“black people” is a generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians;  
“broad-based black economic empowerment” means the economic empowerment of all black 
people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas 
through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies. (Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowering Act 2003: Section 1).  
 
Again, this piece of legislation gave greater access to resources to the inclusive group of black South 
Africans. Interestingly, the Broad-Based Economic Empowerment Act was the first act that included a 
racial identifier in the title. There were only nine acts that included “black” in the title from 1993-2014, 
and many of them had the sole purpose of repealing old apartheid laws (e.g., the Black Authorities Act 
Repeal Act No. 13 of 2010, which repealed the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act No. 68). No other legislation 
was titled with race or any other racial identifier.  These set of laws were monumental in South Africa for 
their affirmative action policies. These laws were also significant for coloureds because they left out their 
position of racial limbo.  
The effect of such legislation was not significant just for discursive reasons; it had ramifications 
for who could qualify for more power and resources. Considering how blacks were defined as the 
designated groups (i.e., black people), many South Africans sought to clarify who exactly fit into the 
designated black category.  One example is the case of the Chinese Association of South Africa v. the 
Ministries of Labour, Trade and Industry, and Justice and Constitutional Development (2008). South 
African Chinese, who initially came to South Africa as temporary workers during the gold rush, were 
classified as coloured during the 1962 revision to Population Registration Act.  However, the affirmative 
action laws of post-apartheid South Africa did not include Asian or Chinese in the so-called inclusive 
definition of black people. Thus, the Chinese Association of South Africa, spearheaded by Victor Chong 
and Albert Peter Fung, lobbied for inclusion on the grounds that Asians were discriminated against under 
apartheid and should therefore have the same benefits as other targeted groups post-apartheid. More 
specifically, the Chinese argued that they were formally treated at par with coloureds during apartheid, 
and therefore they should now be treated at par with blacks. In the end, the High Court of South Africa 
ruled that South African Chinese people who were citizens before 1994 “fall within the ambit of the 
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definition of “black people” in section 1 of the Employment Equity Act of 1998” and “as applied to the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003” (Chinese Association of South Africa v. the 
Ministries of Labour and Others 2008: Section 1). As a result, Asians can also be considered black in 
post-apartheid South Africa.  
An affirmative action case involving coloureds is currently gaining attention in South Africa, 
which is even more applicable to the current analysis. In the case of Solidarity and Others vs Dept. of 
Correctional Services and Others (2012), ten coloureds accused the Department of Corrections in the 
Western Cape of discrimination, alleging they were overlooked for promotion because of their race. 
Unlike most other affirmative action complaints, the coloureds insisted they were denied promotion over 
other black South Africans. According to the case, the Department of Corrections used national 
demographics to conclude that blacks were underrepresented under EEA’s quotas, which resulted in the 
department bringing in black correction officers from outside of the Western Cape. The prosecution for 
the complainants claimed that regional demographics should be used over national, arguing that if 
national statistics are used “in the Western Cape, coloured employees, in particular, almost have no 
chance anymore to be promoted or appointed” (Herman qtd. in Sapa 2014).  
The judge grappled with the case, stating “a choice [had] to be made between different persons 
who all fall within the designated group” and “whether those of the applicants who are black persons for 
the purposes of the EEA and members of the coloured community in the Western Cape, have been 
unfairly discriminated against” (Section 23). In the end, the Labor Court judge ruled that all ten officials 
were black employees in terms of the Employment Equity Act and found the coloured complainants had 
suffered unfair discrimination in the selection process used for promotion to various posts. The court 
ordered that the department had to take immediate steps to take national and regional demographics into 
account when setting equity targets. However, the case has been seen again in court recently because the 
victims argued that no action was taken. For now the court reserved judgment and asked the parties to 
settle an agreement and the court will recommence later in 2014.  
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The Solidarity case exemplifies the cloudiness around racial categories, and especially the 
coloured category, in post-apartheid South Africa.  As the judge argued, the law in South Africa defined 
coloureds as black. Yet, at the same time, he recognized coloureds as a community group different from 
blacks.  This case demonstrated again a disjoint between South Africa’s designation and organization of 
race with individual’s experiences of race, especially when those individuals occupy a position of racial 
limbo.   
Post-Apartheid South Africa and the Racial Formation of Coloureds’ Position in Racial Limbo 
The purpose of this section was to examine whether the nation-state maintained racial limbo for 
coloureds in post-apartheid South Africa.  I analyzed a broad array of legislative and government 
documents that could speak to the potential redefinition of racial categories and the re-organization of 
racial categories that might have occurred after the break in South Africa, focusing my analytical gaze on 
coloured South Africans. In contrast to apartheid South Africa, data collection for my analysis of this 
period was more complicated than expected. Rather than finding ample evidence of when the nation-state 
explicitly tried to reconstruct (or even reaffirm) racial categories and organization, I found that the nation-
state mostly ignored race and racial categories and thus took the form, at least initially, of a silent partner 
in the making of race in post-apartheid South Africa.  
Moreover, early representations and definitions of race in post-apartheid South Africa were 
nearly non-existent; legislation stripped race and racial categories from its language and emphasized a 
common humanity (e.g., all people, every citizen). At the same time, however, the government continued 
to collect data on race, under the label of population group, and continued to utilize racial classification in 
its reports (e.g., TRC). Under this framing, racial categories were neither clearly defined or differentiated, 
nor explicitly positioned in a racial hierarchy. This nonracial language meant it was especially difficult to 
clarify how coloureds were being defined or distinguished as a race group in the new South Africa, 
though some documents signify a convergence of coloured and black distinctions.  
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Once post-apartheid South Africa realized that nonracialsim did not equate nicely with their goal 
of racial equality, the government implemented affirmative action legislation. Yet, the nation-state chose 
not to decide which race group was most disadvantaged, but named all non-white groups as 
disadvantaged under the label of black. Post-apartheid South Africa, then, became a nation of white and 
black,[8] with black meaning coloured, Indian, Asian, Chinese, and other.  Significantly, this explicitly 
dismantled coloureds’ position of racial limbo in legislation. In sum, expectations about coloureds being 
defined as separate race group and being positioned between white and black South African in the racial 
hierarchy were not supported by an analysis of legislation in post-apartheid South Africa. Further, my 
expectation that power and resources would not be differentially distributed in the law didn’t stand—
blacks (including coloureds) received more resources (i.e., greater access to jobs) in South African 
legislation.    
However, as affirmative action court cases reveal, the fact that the nation-state neglected to define 
race or distinguish coloureds’ racial category did not mean the category ceased to have meaning for 
individuals. Racialization’s effect means race persists without explicit naming and organizing; race can 
become so embedded in a social system that it takes a life of its own (Bonilla-Silva 1997; Omi and 
Winant 1994). It appears the coloured category continued to have meaning even without the state.  
Posel (2001b:109) supports the notion that racialization impacted the permanence of racial 
categories in South Africa: 
“[racial] categories were powerfully rooted in the materiality of everyday life. The ubiquity of the 
state's racial designations, and the extent to which they meshed with lived hierarchies of class and 
status, meant that apartheid's racial grid was strongly imprinted in the subjective experience of 
race…. it would be difficult to deny the extent to which the demarcation of South African society 
into whites, Indians, coloureds, and Africans has been normalized-for many, a "fact" of life.” 
 
In other words, the systems in place during apartheid South Africa prior to the break were so heavily 
embraced/enforced, they took on a life of their own and continued to structure social life in post-
apartheid, while being masked through more explicit claims of nonracialism or colorblindness.  
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The color-blindness of post-apartheid South Africa is even more so heighted when it comes to 
coloureds. Moreover, the nation-state opts to generally abandon the language of race, but specifically 
neglects speaking directly about coloureds. Thus, I argue that over and above the colorblindness that 
sweeps South Africa’s silence of race is coloured blindness: a silence specific to the nation-states implicit 
maintenance of coloureds’ position. As inherent in the colorblind ideology, though, being blind to race 
does not mean it is not visible in social experiences. 
So what does the analysis reveal that about where coloureds would fit into Rueter’s (1969) 
typology? All things considered, I contend coloureds remain an intermediate group and continue to hold a 
position of racial limbo in the racial hierarchy; however, I argue that coloureds’ position is less a result of 
the nation-state in post-apartheid South Africa, but rather the legacy of the nation-state during apartheid 
South Africa. It is the legacy of South Africa’s coloured blindness.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
According to racial formation theory, racial categories and hierarchies are formed and 
transformed throughout history to adapt to social, political, and economic contexts. Rigid racial 
categorization and hierarchical organization was at the crux of South Africa’s apartheid state, and 
research suggests race remains a significant feature of social life in South Africa today. Yet, little research 
has examined the formation of the coloured racial category and their position of racial limbo. This study 
examined whether apartheid South Africa cultivated a position of racial limbo for coloureds and whether 
racial limbo is being maintained today in post-apartheid South Africa.  
During apartheid, the South African nation-state crafted numerous legislative rulings that 
implemented a clear and rigid racial hierarchy. The apartheid government was led by the National Party, a 
white South African supremacy group, which used their power to secure for themselves the most superior 
position in all social, economic, and political realms. Black South Africans were conceived of as the 
antithesis to white South Africans; an inferior group that would be stripped of nearly all rights by the 
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apartheid state. Coloureds’ racial category often obtained significance through its relationship to the other 
groups; even the founding legal definition of coloureds was a person that was neither white nor black. As 
such, coloureds’ position hovered between black and white South Africans. 
On the one hand, coloureds sometimes experienced immense oppression, such as forced removal, 
violence, imprisonment, and expulsion from the political system that relegated them to the nearly 
equivalent status of the black exploited group. On the other hand, they were sometimes given 
comparatively more power and resources to black South Africans, such as the ability to travel without a 
pass, preferences in labor, and seats in Parliament, which put them in a position closer to the lower 
segment of a dominant group. I contend the fluctuation between the two poles actually solidified 
coloureds as an intermediate group in South Africa. In conclusion, my analysis of legislation and official 
government documents supports my expectations that the apartheid nation-state cultivated racial limbo 
for its coloured population.   
 By the end of apartheid, the system was nearly unanimously condemned around the world for its 
inherent and explicit racism. To fully distance itself from its racist past, the new government in post-
apartheid South Africa called upon drastic legislative measures to rid the nation-state from racial 
inequality. In doing so, though, the nation-state also seemed to rid itself of race. For instance, legislation 
didn’t name any one race group and emphasized a common humanity. Ironically, the state continued to 
collect data on population groups.  
South Africa promoted nonracialism and in effect operated under a colorblind ideology (Ansell 
2006; 2007; Bonilla-Silva 2006). This colorblind ideology means not only are racial categories ignored, 
but racial injustices are often ignored as well. Post-apartheid South Africa realized that not talking about 
race did little to ameliorate racial inequality, especially in the workforce. Therefore, the state created 
affirmative action legislation as an attempt to explicitly redress the inequality against the disadvantaged 
designated groups—that is, all non-white groups designated as black. As a result, coloureds’ position of 
racial limbo was left out of the law. The abandonment of a distinct coloured group complicated the 
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placement of coloureds in Rueter’s (1969) typology. In sum, my analysis of legislation and official 
government documents did not support my expectations that the post-apartheid nation-state maintained 
racial limbo for its coloured population.   
Moreover, I found that the nation-state opts to tiptoe around race, but specifically neglects 
speaking directly about coloureds. As consistent with the central problem in the colorblind ideology, 
being blind to race does not mean it is not visible in social experiences. I argued the nation-state operates 
under the guise of coloured blindness. Yet, just because the nation-state does not see coloureds, their 
intermediate status is still being upheld in social experience. I contend coloureds’ position of racial limbo 
is being maintained not in legislation, but in social experiences in post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, 
the rest of my dissertation will shed light into the contemporary coloured experience of racial limbo.  
Limitations 
There are a few limitations that should be addressed. First, I relied on a small sample of 
legislative documents for my data. I chose to privilege a purposive sample of influential legislation in 
order to provide a rich and detailed analysis. A more comprehensive analysis might assess all legislation 
and produce a valuable quantitative assessment of coloureds’ position (i.e., a count of times coloureds 
was mentioned in legislation relative to black South Africans).  
In addition, I only focused on legislation and state documents, which misses a lot of action in 
non-governmental or institutionalized agencies. For instance, in my research I did come across coloured-
based commissions, some with very divergent views on the position of coloureds. Exploring the impact of 
coloured movements or other strategic interracial alliances (see Van Dyke and McCammon), for example, 
could provide a more comprehensive understand of the role of the nation-state. Adhikari (1997; 2005) has 
done a superb job of studying the history of coloureds and coloured social movements. Collaborations 
between his type of research and the type of research conducted here would be an important future 
project.  
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Theoretical Contributions   
I informed this study by using frameworks of racial formation, racialized social system, and race 
mixture. These frameworks provide utility for an analysis of racial limbo; they are useful to engage with 
because they focus on the creation and construction of racial meanings (Golash-Boza 2013). However, 
these frameworks serve as heuristic models, which means they describe structures rather than forces that 
create them (Diesing 1991). In other words, they are limited by their descriptive nature, and in effect, I am 
unable to conclude on determination/causation.  I contend the current analysis of racial limbo reveals a 
few limitations of the frameworks, but also opens up room for innovation. 
For example, racial formation and racialized social systems locate the state as the preemptive 
place for race-making. Yet, Feagin and Elias (2013) contend that emphasizing the state obscures decision 
makers who control social institutions and hierarchies. Without interrogating who the main rulers or 
actors are, scholars are unable to fully take in to account the context in which race is embedded (the main 
goal of racial formation). As argued by Loveman (1999b:921) “the way the state is treated in the 
historical narratives obscures the historical complexity and contingency of the concrete political struggles 
among competing, crosscutting sectors of elites.” The limitation is in the anthropomorphism of the state 
as an actor, which neglects individuals and groups as key players in race-making.  
Relatedly, the frameworks were unable to predict how a change of power would change racial 
meanings. For instance, what happens to racial categories or hierarchies when a state transitions from a 
white-led government that promotes white supremacy to a black-led government that promotes 
democracy and racial harmony? Even more, what happens to a group in racial limbo when the transfer of 
power is between two groups of which your group is neither? This analysis reveals that attention to the 
state rulers is especially important for groups positioned in racial limbo. Apartheid South Africa 
cultivated a position of racial limbo for coloureds because they served as a buffer for whites in power. 
Contrarily, coloureds, as a political base, do not provide much utility for the black body politic in post-
apartheid South Africa. Perhaps consequentially, racial limbo was not mandated in the law. At the same 
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time, however, coloureds’ maintained their identity and position of racial limbo. Here, it seems as though 
Winant’s (2001) conceptualization of the break is over-theorized and underperforms because such 
changes in political power were unimportant in the experience of coloureds. 
 Indeed, another limitation of the frameworks is that they carry a deterministic emphasis of race-
making. That is, the nation-state functions as a superstructure, holding the majority of the power in the 
construction of races.  This top-down approach misses the agency on the ground (Feagin and Elias 2013; 
Loveman 1999b). Rebellion, protest, and group-based lobbying directly impact the policies of the nation-
state and group identities are not always created in a top-down manner. An example of a bottom-up 
process for is the making of racial limbo was the grassroots organization ProjectRACE that lobbied for 
representation of multiracial American in the United States census. The “multiracial entrepreneurship” 
has led not only to a new option of “check more than one race” in the census, but also a growing social 
identity attached to the idea of mixedness and multiculturalism (see DaCosta 2007). Adhikari (2005) does 
an exemplar job of articulating the role of coloureds’ in shaping their groups’ position. Future research 
should combine both approaches to create a comprehensive picture of racial limbo in South Africa.  
Even in my analysis of legislative and official state documents, I encounter examples of 
resistance against the state. For example, in the court cases, both during and after apartheid, I found that 
individuals consistently sought to reconcile the disjoint they felt between the nation’s definition and their 
own experiences. In agreement with Erasmus and Ellison (2008:452) such cases “demonstrate the 
multiplicity of meanings that can be assigned to the concept of race even within the contest of apartheid 
South Africa, where racial categories and racial classification were enshrined within legal statute.” 
Notably, my analysis shows the demonstrations came primarily from those who had more ambiguity and 
cloudiness around their classification: coloured South Africans.   
Finally, race mixture studies are important to consider for an analysis of racial limbo, but again, a 
three-tier typology also misses differences in individuals’ choices. The top-down focus leaves little room 
for agency by dictating that all members of a race group share the exact same relationship to their race 
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group and other race groups (Loveman 1999a). Belonging to a racial category obscures the variance of 
experience within the category, which means analyses of this type often shy away from the 
phenomenology of race and racism. The biracial identity literature shows multiple identity choices for 
groups in racial limbo in the United States (e.g., Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008) and Erasmus (2001) 
outlines different identity choices that confront coloureds in contemporary South Africa. Indeed, this 
study revealed that it was coloureds who consistently pushed the bounds of racial classification and 
further suggests greater variation within the category. Study Three of this dissertation project will address 
this proposition.  
Conclusion 
This study found that coloureds’ position of racial limbo was cultivated by the nation-state during 
apartheid, but post-apartheid nation-state contested the racial limbo of coloureds. I argue that a study of 
racial limbo and the state contributes to the literature of race and race meaning in important ways. It 
pushes scholars to consider more than just the dominant or subordinate group and orients us towards a 
more complex assessment of racial hierarchies. Throughout the analysis, the idea that societies can 
categorize groups in a neat manner was repeatedly confronted. Whether a legally racist system or a 
nonracial system controls the state, individuals will confront the state when it employs classifications that 
do not resonate. The contribution of this study is that it shows the tension between individuals’ 
experiences of agency in constructing their own racial identifications, in a context where the nation-state 
is trying to determine their racial categories. Erasmus and Ellison (2008:452) conclude that “the 'true' 
meaning of race emerges as whatever people expected, wanted or needed it to be.” Studying those in 
racial limbo can orient us toward these conclusions.  
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NOTES 
 
[1] Reuter (1969) and Frederickson (1981) largely emphasize the role of the dominant group in making 
and naming the racially mixed, but because dominant groups have control over social, economic, and 
political institutions, and thus act through the nation-state, these studies still inform top-down analysis of 
racial formation. 
[2] The history of a nation-state is always long and complex. I only attempt to highlight information that 
might provide background information for the larger goal of this study. For a comprehensive 
historiography of South Africa see Chazan et al. (1999), De Kiewiet (1941), Thompson (1996). For a 
comprehensive overview of coloureds see Cell (1982), Lewis (1987), Patterson (1953), Frederickson 
(1981). 
[3] Wade (1995) makes this point in his study of race mixture in Colombia. Wade contends that mobility 
often precedes race mixture in cases when miscegenation is not forced. In other words, non-white persons 
had to first gain access in to white domains, which would then provide more opportunity for legal 
interracial unions and miscegenation. As speculated here, the racially mixed might have had a higher 
status which could have led to more future miscegenation between whites and those of mixed race. 
[4] As an aside, Sandra Laing’s school never allowed her re-entrance after she was reclassified as white, 
and once Sandra turned eighteen she decided to reclassify herself as coloured. 
[5] The areas and corresponding tribes included: Bophuthatswana (Tswana), Ciskei (Xhosa), Gazankulu 
(Tsonga/Shangaan), KaNgwane (Swazi), KwaNdebele (Ndebele), KwaZulu(Sulu), Lebowa (Northern 
Sotho), QwaQwa (Southern Sotho), Transkei (Xhosa) and Venda (Venda). 
[6] In general, the Coloureds Persons Representative Council was representative of a conservative 
grouping within the coloured community. This vein sought to foster coloured growth operating within the 
government's policy of parallel development. Parallel development was conceived of as an alternative to a 
homeland, but with a similar strategy that would allow coloureds to develop as a “state within the white 
state” (Saks 1991:47). The Theron Commission, published in 1977, whose purpose was to “Inquire into 
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Matters Relating to the Coloureds” (Taylor 2010) continued down the path of parallel development. Erica 
Theron and her partners were not against the separation of races, but argued that if South Africa should 
remain a heterogeneous nation, coloureds should have some political leverage. Yet, by nearly all 
accounts, though, these commissions and councils had no practical political implications (Lewis 1987; 
Taylor 2010; Whisson 1976). 
[7] The majority of coloureds did not vote for Mandela. It is suggested (e.g., Adhikari 2005) that 
coloureds feared a slip in their relatively higher social status. 
[8] The idea that South Africa is a white and black nation was generated most prominently by Mandela’s 
successor, Thabo Mbeki, who delivered a speech to Parliament stating “South Africa is a country of two 
nations…One... is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographical dispersal… The 
second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in rural 
areas (Mbeki qtd. in Handland and Rantao 1999:188). 
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Table 1. Expectations for the Nation-State’s Cultivation and Maintenance of Coloureds’ Position of 
Racial Limbo 
 Apartheid South Africa 
(1948-1992) 
Post-Apartheid South Africa 
(1993-2014) 
Racial Category Yes, distinctive Yes, distinctive 
Intermediate Position Yes Yes 
Power/Resources Relative To 
Black South Africans More  Equal 
Power/Resources Relative To 
White South Africans Less  Equal 
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Table 2. Data: Legislative and State Documents of South Africa  
Apartheid South Africa 1948-1992 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No. 
55 
1949 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 
No. 46 
1959 
Population Registration Act No. 30 1950 
Population Registration Amendment Act 
No. 61 
1962 
Immorality Act No. 21 1950 Rural Coloured Areas Act No. 24 1963 
Group Areas Act No. 41 1950 Bantu Labour Act No. 67 1964 
Bantu Authorities Act No. 68 1951 Laing v. High Court of South Africa 1966 
Separate Representation of Voters Act 
No.  46 
1951 
Population Registration Amendment Act 
No. 64 
1967 
Native Laws Amendment Act No. 54 1952 
Separate Representation of Voters 
Amendment Act No. 50 
1968 
Natives (Abolition of Passes & 
Coordination of Documents) Act No. 67 
1952 Aliens Control Act No. 40 1973 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
No. 49 
1953 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 
No. 110 
1983 
Separate Representation of Voters 
Amendment Act No.  9 
1956 
Abolition of Racially Based Land 
Measures Act No. 108 
1991 
Native Laws Amendment Act No. 69 1956 Apartheid Referendum  1992 
Post-Apartheid South Africa 1993-2014 
Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act No. 200 
1993 
Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowering Act No. 53 
2003 
The Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act No. 34 
1995 Communal Land Rights Act No. 11 2004 
Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act No. 108 
1996 
Chinese Association of South Africa and 
Others v Ministries of Labour and Others 
2008 
South African Census 1996 Black Authorities Repeal Act No. 13 2010 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Report 
1998 
Solidarity and Others v Department of 
Correctional Services and Others 
2012 
Employment Equity Act No. 58 1998   
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Table 3. Racial Classification Objections in South Africa in 1968a   
 
 Total number of 
reclassifications 
 Percentage made by the 
person concerned 
White to Coloured 9 0.11% 
Coloured to White 91 100% 
Coloured to Bantu 29 0.10% 
Bantu to Coloured 136 100% 
a Source: Bowker and Star (1999) 
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Table 4. Results for the Nation-State’s Cultivation and Maintenance of Coloureds’ Position of Racial 
Limbo 
 Apartheid South Africa 
(1948-1992) 
Post-Apartheid South Africa 
(1993-2014) 
Racial Category Yes, distinctive No 
Intermediate Position Yes No 
Power/Resources Relative 
To Black South Africans More  Equal 
Power/Resources Relative 
To White South Africans Less  More 
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Figure 1. Racial Concentrations and Homelands in South Africa Based on 1970 Censusa   
 
Source: University of Texas, Library Series 
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/south_africa_racial_1979.jpg)  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RACIAL HIERARCHY AND LIMBO: GENERALIZED ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OF 
DEPRIVATION AMONG COLOUREDS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Racial hierarchies are systems of stratification premised upon ideologies that assert race is real 
and that some groups are superior to other groups (Song 2007). Races placed in the superior position tend 
to receive greater economic, political, social, and psychological benefits compared to groups in the 
subordinate position (Bonilla-Silva 1997). Racial hierarchies are present in all modern nation-states, 
although their exact structure varies across context (Bonilla-Silva 1997). Across contexts, what remains 
constant is that whiteness occupies the dominant position and blackness occupies the subordinate 
position; what differs is who and what characterizes the area in-between. I define racial limbo as 
belonging to a group positioned between a dominant and subordinate group in a racial hierarchy.  
I consider coloured South Africans an exemplar, yet understudied case of racial limbo. 
Miscegenation between white (i.e., Dutch colonists) and black (i.e., Khoikhoi Africans) occupants in the 
western cape of southern Africa circa 1600 formed the coloured population (Patterson 1953). It was 
during apartheid—the system of racial domination and segregation that controlled South Africa from 
1948-1994—that coloured was first legally encoded as a racial category and was defined as a separate and 
distinct race group. There is considerable research that describes and assesses coloureds’ position during 
apartheid South Africa, most of which concludes that coloureds held an intermediate position between 
white and black South Africans (see Frederickson 1981; Goldin 1987; Lewis 1987; Morse and Peele 1974 
Patterson 1953 and Study One). In fact, some argue that coloureds’ placement was purposeful because 
they served as a buffer between the white minority who held power and the black majority who were most 
disadvantaged (Besteman 2008). 
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Apartheid-rule ended in 1994 with the election of an African, former political prisoner, Nelson 
Mandela. Therefore, the last few decades in South Africa are marked by significant political 
transformation. However, shifts in political power have had a negligible impact on economic and 
ideological structures; white privilege and power remain prominent in post-apartheid South Africa (see 
Ansell 2006; Steyn 2001; Winant 2001). As such, the structure of South Africa’s racial hierarchy has yet 
to be significantly altered post-apartheid (Bestsman 2008; Seekings 2007; Winant 2001).  
What is most unclear about the racial hierarchy in post-apartheid South Africa is the placement of 
coloureds. Some South African scholars (Adhikari 2005, 2006; Erasmus 2001) theorize that belonging to 
a group in racial limbo acts as a master status and contend coloureds will remain a distinct and 
intermediate group. For instance, Adhikari (2005) argues that coloureds’ position in racial limbo, or 
marginality as he describes it, has been and will remain remarkably stable. Alternatively, research (Posel 
2001, see also Study One) has revealed that the post-apartheid South African government promotes a 
singular broad black base in legislation, which includes all non-whites.  
Despite ambiguity, empirical research in post-apartheid South Africa has failed to 
comprehensively study coloureds’ precarious position and their perspectives. Though there are studies 
that examine racial differences on an array of social outcomes (e.g., Adams, Van de Vijver and De Bruinb 
2011; Mattes and Christie 1997), the research does not focus specifically on coloureds. Furthermore, 
some research (e.g., Ferree 2006; Møller, Dickow and Harris 1999) only focuses on one type of outcome 
(e.g., national pride), which limits conclusions drawn about generalized attitudes in South Africa. Finally, 
research is limited by its focus on black versus white South African comparisons (e.g., Duckitt and 
Mphuthing 1998; Gibson 2006; Tredoux and Finchilescu 2010) or, to a lesser extent, coloured versus 
white South African, or coloured versus black South African comparisons (e.g., Gibson and Claassen 
2010; Swart, Hewstone, Christ and Voci 2010). Therefore, we know little about where coloureds’ 
perspectives fall relative to white and black South Africans on an array of outcomes in post-apartheid 
South Africa.  
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The routine exclusion of coloureds is lamented but justified in various ways. For instance, in a 
description of his study on racial attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa, Gibson (2006) reveals: 
I [exclude coloureds and Asians] because, first, blacks and whites are by far the most politically 
significant groups in South Africa, and the major conflict under apartheid was between blacks 
and whites. Thus, there is no ambiguity whatsoever about the relevance of these groups. Second, 
my questions on racial tolerance asks whites their views of blacks, and blacks their views of 
whites, but, among Coloured people and those of Asian origin, these queries referred to blacks. 
Thus, there is a useful symmetry on the questions for blacks and whites, but not for the other two 
groups. (P. 673)  
 
Gibson’s exclusion of coloureds disregards political leverage that coloureds have had when used as a 
buffer within the South African racial hierarchy. What’s more, the survey design, in and of itself, 
reinforces the neglect by ignoring the range of comparisons intermediate groups must make (i.e., it only 
asked coloureds their attitudes toward black South Africans).  
The purpose of this chapter, Study Two, is to examine whether perspectives of coloureds in post-
apartheid South Africa reflect their position in racial limbo. In Study One I argued the apartheid nation-
state cultivated a position of racial limbo for coloureds, but findings also revealed post-apartheid South 
Africa’s attempt to dismantle coloureds’ position in racial limbo. Now, I move down a level of analysis 
and question whether coloureds’ intermediate position in the racial hierarchy is reflected in social 
outcomes in contemporary South Africa. Specifically, I ask whether persons who self-identify as coloured 
(1) report generalized attitudes that reflect their groups’ intermediate, historical position between white 
and black South Africans, and (2) perceive their group as deprived and gratified compared to white and 
black South Africans, respectively.   
In the sections that follow, I first discus the theoretical frameworks used to guide this study: I 
employ group position theory, which makes predictions about dominant groups’ view toward subordinate 
groups, and relative deprivation theory, which makes predictions about groups’ perceptions of 
disadvantage relative to another group. I extend these theories to make predictions about coloureds, who 
are simultaneously dominant and subordinate. Considering the pervasive hierarchy and social awareness 
of group positions, I expect coloureds’ position in racial limbo to be reflected in post-apartheid South 
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Africa. Next, I overview the data and methods used to test my hypotheses, and then discuss the results. 
Though I found support to suggest coloureds’ position in racial limbo is reflected in attitudes today, 
findings also implied that coloureds’ position might be one that is transitioned out of.    
 
FRAMING  
Group Position Theory 
Group position theory (Blumer 1958) posits that dominant group members’ superior location in a 
racial hierarchy shapes their orientation toward members of other groups in the racial hierarchy. 
Specifically, dominant group members’ racial prejudice is predicated on a sense that they belong at the 
top of the racial hierarchy. Allport (1954) defines prejudice as “an aversive or hostile attitude towards a 
person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to 
have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group” (p.7). Blumer (1958) articulates the importance of 
racial identification in prejudice, contending that “prejudice is a matter (a) of the racial identification 
made of oneself and of others, and (b) the way in which the identified groups are conceived in relation to 
each other” (Blumer 1958:3). Furthermore, Blumer outlines four feelings that shape a dominant group 
members’ prejudice towards subordinate group members: a feeling of superiority, a feeling that the 
subordinate group is inherently different, a feeling of rightful claim to privilege and advantage, and a 
feeling of fear and threat that the subordinate group wants what the dominant group possesses.  
Blumer (1958) also emphasizes that a sense of group position is an on-going collective process 
emerging from historical and shared judgments about positioning. Judgments operate in public discourse, 
legislation, every-day interpersonal interactions so that individuals learn to what group they belong and 
what power and resources their group membership awards them. The public arena is discussed as the 
medium through which power holders, operating with self-interests in mind, spread beliefs about other 
groups and dictated what kind of position the dominant group should hold (Blumer 1958). In South 
Africa, one explicit collective process was legislation, which dictated what group individuals belong to 
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and what group membership meant for where they could live, eat, work, and so on. During apartheid, the 
racial hierarchy was well-defined; every South African knew their racial identification and how it related 
to their position within the racial hierarchy (e.g., Frederickson 1981). These racial identifications continue 
to have utility in post-apartheid South Africa (Siedman 1999).  
Importantly, a sense of group position becomes a “general kind of orientation” that “guides, 
incites, cows, and coerces” (Blumer 1958:5). What this means is that group position not only guides how 
dominant group members feel about other groups, but translates into broader attitudes about the social 
order—or more specifically, how to preserve the prevailing social order and protect the group’s interests 
(Blumer 1958:7). As further articulated by Bobo (1999:456), there are meaningful interests attached to 
group position: “Blumer’s emphasis on areas of felt proprietary claim and on perceptions of threat as the 
central features of racial prejudice, again, raise to a prominent place the stake or interest dominant group 
members have in particular racial order.” In South Africa, there is evidence to support that white South 
Africans’ feel prejudice toward groups below them in the racial hierarchy, and concomitantly developed 
an orientation to protect their position (e.g., Cell 1982; Marx 1998; Frederickson 1981; Winant 2001).  
The original theorization of group position theory was in fact created to rationalize dominant 
groups’ orientation toward subordinate groups. Fortunately, the theory has since been expanded, most 
notably by Bobo and his colleagues (e.g., Bobo 2000; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Tuan 2006). 
For instance, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) used data from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey, a 
large multiracial sample, to analyze perceived group competition and prejudice among blacks, Latinos, 
and Asians living in the United States. Results revealed that individuals who perceive members of their 
own group as generally facing unfair treatment in the larger social order are more likely to regard 
members of other groups as competitive threats and have more negative attitudes toward them. For 
instance, blacks reported the highest levels of unfair treatment and felt the most competition towards 
Asians and Hispanics, and these perceptions were also associated with negative attitudes towards those 
groups. Conversely, Asians did not report much competition and had less negative attitudes toward other 
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groups. Bobo and Hutchings (1996) concluded that group position theory offered the most parsimonious 
explanation of competition, prejudice, and threat—even among subordinate groups. Bobo’s work is 
important because it (1) demonstrated that group position theory could help explain prejudice among non-
dominant groups, and (2) considered how a sense of group position related to attitudes about the 
government. One significant limitation though, is that their work did not ask the subordinate groups’ 
attitudes toward a dominant group (i.e., how blacks felt about whites in the United States).  
Despite its limitations, I contend that group position theory is helpful to understanding 
generalized attitudes in South Africa. Indeed, it is not surprising that both Allport (1954) and Blumer 
(1958) mention South Africa in their original work on prejudice and group position. As I explain above, 
the South African racial hierarchy is consistent with individuals’ general orientation that white South 
Africans are the dominant group, black South Africans are the subordinate group, and coloureds are 
somewhere between (they capture what “ought to be” Blumer 1958:6). This means white South Africans 
should sense their status as the dominant group and their generalized attitudes should be consistent with 
their superior group position. Hypothetically, the same could be true of coloureds in their semi-dominant 
group position compared to black South Africans. However, coloureds’ generalized attitudes should not 
be as extreme as white South Africans’ attitudes, given coloureds do not hold the most dominant position 
in the racial hierarchy.  
Relative Deprivation Theory  
I now turn to relative deprivation theory to help explain variation in levels of deprivation by race 
groups in post-apartheid South Africa.  Stouffer and colleagues (1949) first developed the concept of 
relative deprivation in a study of The American Solider. They observed that members of the American 
army division with rapid promotion were actually less happy than members of the army division that did 
not have rapid promotion. They discovered that soldiers evaluated their own position relative to those 
they compared themselves to—in this case, soldiers within their division. With this premise, the authors 
concluded that social comparisons within and across groups impacted the extent to which a person could 
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perceive their own position as deprived or gratified. Moreover, relative deprivation was considered the 
result of social comparisons.  
Indeed, social comparison theory (Festinger 1954; Pettigrew 1976) informs the concept behind 
relative deprivation. It proposed that self-evaluations, in the absence of an objective truth, are made from 
social comparisons. When applied to relative deprivation, understanding of one’s position and what 
power and resources should be attached to that position occurs through social comparisons with a similar 
referent.  
Runciman (1966:10) provided the clearest definition of relative deprivation to date: “A is 
relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which 
may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in 
fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X.” Thus, the sense of 
being denied resources relative to a comparison group results in perceived deprivation. Furthermore, 
Runciman (1966) argued that individuals can be personally deprived, deprived at the group level, or both. 
Individual deprivation is referred to as egoistic and group deprivation is referred to as fraternal. Pettigrew 
and colleagues (2008) examined individual and group deprivation using Eurobarometer data and 
concluded, contrary to past research that relies on the individual measure, that deprivation measured at the 
group level is necessary in explorations of collective behavior and group attitudes (Pettigrew et al. 2008). 
Of interest here is coloureds’ fraternal relative deprivation.   
Some researchers (Marmot 2004; Wilkinson 2005) have used relative deprivation to explain why 
those positioned lower on the social hierarchy have worse health outcomes. For example, Marmot 
(2004:1) contends those in lower social positions “acknowledge that some are higher than you in the 
social hierarchy: they may have more money, bigger houses, a more prestigious job, more status in the 
eyes of others, or simply a higher class way of speaking.” According to Marmot, this acknowledgment 
can be a stressor, which in turns leads to negative health implications. In addition, research in political 
psychology on intergroup conflict (e.g., Kahn et al. 2009; Sidanius and Pratto 1999) suggests that 
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members of groups in societies with complex racial hierarchies understand their position by comparing it 
to the positions of other groups.  
Considering the notion that group positions are acknowledged through comparisons, I contend 
that perceived fraternal relative deprivation is applicable to examinations of racial hierarchies because it 
suggests we can link a group’s sense of position in the hierarchy (i.e., above or below another group) to 
their reported levels of deprivation. For example, I assume black South Africans, who have historically 
held, and continue to hold, the least amount of power and resources (Nattrass and Seekings 2001; 
Seekings 2007), would perceive themselves to be the most deprived group. Alternatively, white South 
Africans should perceive the least amount of perceived fraternal relative deprivation, considering their 
dominant position historically and continued privilege (Nattrass and Seekings 2001; Seekings 2007). In 
other words, a group’s perception of deprivation should reflect their vertical positioning in the racial 
hierarchy.   
One limitation with relative deprivation theory is that it assumes groups do not simultaneously 
compare themselves to multiple reference groups, which is what I hypothesize happens for coloureds in 
South Africa. Coloureds are positioned between white and black South Africans and thus I speculate are 
simultaneously relatively deprived and gratified. As explained by Morse and Peele (1974: 327) “the 
perceptual or attitudinal walls that separate most ethnic and racial groups from other such groups are 
underdeveloped for coloureds, allowing more comparison and more contrast.”  The upward social 
comparison (to white South Africans) should produce relative deprivation but their downward social 
comparison (to black South Africans) should produce relative gratification, countervailing perceptions 
that cancel each other out. Thus, coloureds’ average level of deprivation should fall between white South 
Africans and black South Africans.  
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HYPOTHESES 
To review, group position theory explains that dominant group members’ position in a racial 
hierarchy shapes their prejudice toward other groups and has been expanded to suggest that group 
attitudes and interests should align with positions the racial hierarchy. Relative deprivation explains that 
groups’ perceive their position relative to other groups and this perception drives the extent to which they 
feel deprived or gratified. These theories are useful because they may explain how a racial hierarchy can 
be reflected in social outcomes (i.e., generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation). 
Specifically, informed by group position theory I set up the following expectations: 
H1:  I expect that coloureds would report generalized attitudes that, on average, fall between 
the attitudes of white and black South Africans. 
H2:  I expect that coloureds’ generalized attitudes would remain intermediary over time, 
which is consistent with the notion that a sense of group position is an on-going process. 
Informed by relative deprivation theory I set up the following expectations: 
H3:  I expect that coloureds’ perceptions of relative deprivation would, on average, fall 
between the levels of white and black South Africans. 
H4:  I expect that coloureds’ perceptions of relative deprivation would remain intermediary 
over time.  
 A limitation I have highlighted, however, is that neither theory directly explains how the 
hierarchy might influence the perspectives of groups positioned in racial limbo. As such, this study 
extends these theories to the post-apartheid South African context and assesses their utility for 
understanding coloureds’ perceptions. The next section describes the data and methods.  
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DATA AND METHODS  
Data 
I used survey data from the South African Barometer (SAB) for this study. The SAB is part of the 
Afrobarometer research project (Afrobarometer Data), which measures the social, political, and economic 
atmosphere in various African countries. The Afrobarometer research project has surveyed over twenty 
countries on the African continent.  
The SAB is a complex, probability sample of respondents 18 years and older living in South 
Africa. SAB data allow me to examine the persistence of racial limbo as reflected in outcomes over time 
because of its repeated cross-section design. Of the four available waves of the SAB, I used Wave 2 and 
Wave 4. Each wave uses a slightly different survey instrument and I selected Wave 2 and Wave 4 because 
of the similarity of survey items. Wave 2 was collected in 2002 and included 2,400 respondents, with 
11.4% reporting a coloured racial identification. Wave 4 was collected in 2008 included 1,200 
respondents, with 9.6% reporting a coloured racial identification. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics 
(e.g., range, mean, standard deviation, and alphas) of study variables. No one variable had more than 
5.5% of cases missing and results are based upon listwise deletion.  
Analytic techniques 
Analyses were completed in Stata 11.2. Results account for the SAB’s complex survey design 
and sampling weights were applied such that results generalize to population parameters. Using standard 
t-tests, I first examined whether coloureds’ mean levels of generalized attitudes and perceived relative 
deprivation were numerically between and statistically significantly different from white and black South 
Africans. Since preliminary analysis confirmed sample composition differences in control variables by 
racial identification (see Table 2), I also examined multivariate associations to assess the robustness of the 
bivariate results. Using regression models, I predicted generalized attitudes and perceived relative 
deprivation by racial identifications. The type of regression model used was contingent on the outcome in 
question (e.g., ordinary least squares regression was used for continuous variables, ordered logistic 
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regression was for dichotomous variables). Coloureds were the excluded group in the multivariate 
analysis, thus allowing me to determine whether their outcomes were between and statistically significant 
from white and black South Africans.  
Finally, I replicated my results across Wave 2 and Wave 4, when possible. The repeated cross-
sections are not longitudinal samples. That is, the samples were comprised of different respondents, and 
do not speak to intra-individual change. However, to assess trends over the six-year period, I compared 
patterns in coloureds’ generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation from Wave 2 to Wave 4. To 
do so, I concatenated the two waves of data and completed two-sample mean-comparison tests for the 
outcomes by racial identification. I was unable to adjustment for the complex survey corrections across 
the two waves, so results here are not robust.  
Primary Independent Variable  
The primary independent variable was racial identification. As articulated by Blumer (1958), 
racial identifications are important to understanding racial hierarchy and attachments to group position. 
Racial identifications are equally important for understanding perceived fraternal relative deprivation, as 
groups compare their relative standing to other groups (Runciman 1966). For the analyses, racial 
identification was captured by dummy variables indicating respondents’ self-identification as 
black/African, coloured, and white.  
Dependent variables  
Generalized Attitudes. I used generalized attitudes as a broad label for a set of outcomes that 
assess respondents’ views of the social structure and government policies, and respondents’ political 
ideologies and involvement. The outcomes required respondents to reflect on the past (apartheid) and 
present (post-apartheid). The set of outcomes also included non-specific (e.g., attitudes toward the future 
government) and race-related (e.g., attitudes toward apartheid or anti-racism) outcomes. I selected both 
types because previous research shows that race differences in attitudes are largest when considering 
support for race-based attitudes (Bobo 2000; Dawson 1994; Tate 2010).  
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The first four outcomes captured attitudes toward apartheid. First, rank of apartheid, asked 
respondents to rank whether apartheid was the best form of government, with 0=“worst form” and 
10=“best form.” Second, approval of apartheid asked respondents whether they would approve if the 
country returned to the old system we had under apartheid, with 1= “strongly disapprove” to 5=“strongly 
approve”. Equality of apartheid, asked respondents to compare the current government with the apartheid 
government on freedom to (a) say what you think, (b) join political parties, (c) fear of arrest, (d) voting 
freedom, (e) ability to influence government, (f) safety from crime, and (g) equal treatment of all. Items 
were reverse coded so that 1= “much better” and 5=“much worse” and were constructed as a mean scale 
item. Finally, efficacy of apartheid, asked respondents to compare the current government with the 
apartheid government on efficacy of (a) enforcement of the law, (b) delivery of service, (c) corruption, 
and (d) trustworthiness. Items were reverse coded so that 1=“much better” and 5=“much worse” and were 
constructed as a mean scale item. I hypothesized that those who benefited most from the apartheid’s 
social order would have attitudes that align with maintaining that order. As applied to these apartheid-
based outcomes, such respondents would be most likely to report attitudes that are positive toward or 
supporting apartheid.  
Contrarily, respondents whose interests align with a changing the social order in post-apartheid 
South Africa would be the most supportive of the following outcomes, which capture attitudes toward the 
current government. Approval of the government on anti-racism was comprised of four items, in which 
respondents were asked how well or badly they thought the current government is handling: (a) 
reparations to people identified as victims by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, (b) uniting all 
South Africans into one nation, (c) promoting affirmative action, and (d) resolving conflicts between 
communities. Respondents chose from 1= “very badly” to 4= “very well.” I should note that Wave 2 of 
the SAB had a greater number of outcomes that captured attitudes of interest, particularly attitudes toward 
apartheid and anti-racism. Equality of apartheid, efficacy of apartheid, and approval of government on 
anti-racism were the Wave 2 outcomes not included in Wave 4.  
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Rank of future government was asked in a similar way to rank of apartheid government; 
respondents ranked the political system as they expected it to be in 10 years’ time from 0=“worst form” to 
10=“best form.” United Nation captured whether respondents believe it possible to be one united South 
African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country, where 1=”strongly disagree” and 
5=“strongly agree”.  
The final three generalized attitudes outcomes deal with political attitudes and engagement. 
Although these diverge slightly in type from other attitude measurements, they are equally important in 
accessing South African’s views of the social order. Moreover, I contend those that are invested in 
changing the social order would report the highest levels on these outcomes. Political identification was a 
dichotomous measure capturing whether the respondent identified with a political party (1=yes). Protest 
captured whether respondents have attended a protest or political march, and categories include 0=“No, 
would never do this”, 1=“no, but would do if had the chance”, 2=“yes, once or twice”, 3=“yes, several 
times” and 4=“yes, often”. Finally, for political conflict, respondents were asked, “Does competition 
between political parties lead to conflict?” Answers ranged from 0= “never” to 3= “always”.  
Relative Deprivation.  The final outcomes captured fraternal relative deprivation. In order to 
derive fraternal measurements, I had to restrict analyses to respondents who chose “race/ethnicity” as 
their primary identity group. At Wave 2, respondents were asked to select their most salient identity from 
a list of options; respondents who selected either “race” or “tribe/ethnicity” were coded ‘1’ for 
racial/ethnic identity salience. At Wave 4, respondents were asked whether their racial/ethnic or national 
identity was more important; respondents who selected racial/ethnic were coded as ‘1’.  
The first measure was fraternal economic deprivation, which was captured by the question, 
“Would you say that over the last five years, your identity group has been economically a lot better off, 
better off, the same, worse off, or a lot worse off than other groups?” Answers ranged from 1=“much 
worse” to 5=“much better.” The second measure was fraternal treatment deprivation, which was captured 
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in the question, “How often is your identity group treated unfairly by the government?” Answers ranged 
from 1=“never” to 4=“always”.  
Control Variables  
Control variables included sex (1=male; 0=female), age (continuous), and frequency of religious 
attendance (higher values represent more frequent attendance). The range of religious attendance was 1-6 
in Wave 2 and 1-4 in Wave 4.  I also controlled for socioeconomic status. It was captured by: educational 
attainment (continuous), employment status (1=employed; 0=unemployed), and financial strain, which 
was comprised of five items measuring whether respondents had sufficient funds to cover monthly 
necessities/bills (e.g., food, rent, water, etc.). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 shows mean levels of generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation by racial 
identification. Statistical significance was reported at the p < .05 level. It is denoted as a, b, and c, where 
‘a’ denotes a statistically significant difference between coloureds and white South Africans; ‘b’ denotes a 
statistically significant difference between coloureds and black South Africans; and ‘c’ denotes a 
statistically significant difference between white South Africans and black South Africans. Table 3 is 
divided into two vertical panels corresponding to the Wave 2 and Wave 4 results.  Results consistent with 
my hypotheses would mean there are significant differences between white South Africans, coloureds, 
and black South Africans in all outcomes, and that coloureds’ mean levels would be numerically between 
white and black South Africans.    
Generalized Attitudes at Wave 2 
Beginning with results for Wave 2 in the left panel of Table 3, coloureds’ generalized attitudes 
were significantly different from white South Africans’ attitudes across nine out of ten outcomes, and 
coloureds’ generalized attitudes were significantly different from black South Africans’ attitudes in all 
outcomes. White and black South Africans were also significantly different from each other on all 
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outcomes. Analyses show that coloureds were significantly different from white and black South 
Africans, and their mean generalized attitudes were intermediary between white and black South Africans 
90% of the time at Wave 2. Thus, coloureds generalized attitudes reflected their intermediate, historical 
position in racial limbo.   
 Regarding whether apartheid ranked as a best form of government, coloureds ranked apartheid at 
4.5, whereas white South Africans ranked apartheid higher as a better form of government (mean=6.3) 
and black South Africans ranked it lower, as a bad form of government (mean=3.1). Coloureds were less 
favorable toward the apartheid government (mean=2.3) than white South Africans (mean=2.8), but more 
favorable than black South Africans (mean=2.0). In terms of equality and efficacy of apartheid, 
respectively, coloureds’ attitudes (mean=2.6, 3.1) fell between white (mean=3.1, 3.4) and black South 
Africans (mean=2.2, 2.9). Overall, white South Africans had relatively positive attitudes toward the 
apartheid government, coloureds were less positive, and black South Africans were the least positive.  
 White South Africans were least likely to agree that the post-apartheid government was 
responsible for anti-racism work (mean=2.3), coloureds agreed to a greater extent (mean=2.5), and black 
South Africans were the most likely to agree (mean=2.8). White South Africans ranked the future 
government as an average form, at 5.1 (interestingly, this is lower than they ranked the apartheid 
government). Coloureds’ ranked the future government as moderately better (mean=6.2), whereas black 
South Africans ranked it high (mean=7.3).  Black South Africans were also most optimistic that the South 
African government could unite all groups (mean=4.1), coloureds were less optimistic (mean=3.9), and 
white South Africans were the least optimistic (mean=3.5). Overall, black South Africans had the most 
positive attitudes toward the current government, coloureds were less positive, and white South Africans 
were the least positive.  
 Forty-three percent of coloureds identified with a political party, compared to 29% of white South 
Africans and 66% of black South Africans. The frequency of attending a protest or political march was 
also intermediary for coloureds (mean=.5), compared to white South Africans (mean=.3) and black South 
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Africans (mean=1). Coloureds (mean=2.1) did not significantly differ from white South Africans 
(mean=2.0) on whether political parties causes conflict. That is, black South Africans (mean=1.5) 
reported that political competition does more good than bad, whereas coloureds and white South Africans 
were significantly more likely to report it is detrimental. All in all, coloureds reported levels of political 
party identification and involvement in political marches that were between white and black South 
Africans, however they were least likely to believe political competition was good.   
Generalized Attitudes at Wave 4 
 Results for Wave 4 (shown in the right panel of Table 3) display that coloureds’ generalized 
attitudes were significantly different from those of white South Africans on all outcomes. White South 
Africans’ generalized attitudes were significantly different from those of black South Africans on all 
outcomes. Contrarily, coloureds’ generalized attitudes were significantly different from those of black 
South Africans on only five of seven outcomes (71%). This means there were fewer differences in 
generalized attitudes between coloureds and black South Africans at Wave 4, compared to Wave 2. 
Nonetheless, on five outcomes, coloureds’ generalized attitudes were significantly different from, and fell 
between, white South Africans’ and black South Africans’ generalized attitudes.   
Regarding the rank of apartheid as a form of government, coloureds ranked it at 4.1. Black South 
Africans ranked apartheid lower (mean=3.0), whereas white South Africans still ranked apartheid as a 
moderately good form (mean=6.5). Coloureds were less favorable toward the apartheid government 
(mean=2.1) than white South Africans (mean=2.8), but did not significantly differ from black South 
Africans (mean=2.0). Coloureds’ ranked the future government (mean=5.7) lower than black South 
Africans (mean=6.3), but higher than white South Africans (mean=3.8). Coloureds and black South 
Africans felt South Africa could be united (mean=4.0), whereas white South Africans were significantly 
less optimistic (mean=3.5). Overall, white South Africans’ attitudes toward apartheid were the most 
positive and their attitudes toward the current government were least positive. Black South Africans 
reported the least positive attitudes toward the apartheid government and most positive attitudes toward 
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the current government. Coloureds’ mean levels remained between white and black South Africans, 
however they did not differ significantly from black South Africans’ attitudes toward apartheid or 
whether the South African government could unite all South Africans.  
At Wave 4, 61% of coloureds identified with a political party, compared to 39% of white South 
Africans and 74% of black South Africans. The frequency of attending a protest or march was also 
intermediary for coloureds (mean=.6), compared to white (mean=.3) and black South Africans (mean=.9). 
Finally, coloureds’ judgments regarding whether competition between political parties causes conflict 
(mean=1.6) fell between white (mean=2.0) and black South Africans’ (mean=1.4) judgments. Overall, 
black South Africans were the most engaged in political parties, protests, and believed political 
competition was good. In contrast, white South Africans were the least engaged in political parties, 
protests, and believed political competition would result in conflict. Coloureds’ attitudes fell between 
white and black South Africans.  
Generalized Attitudes: Tracking Changes from Wave 2 to Wave 4 
 I also examined trends in generalized attitudes across Wave 2 and Wave 4. On six of the seven 
measures (86%) that were asked at both waves, there were significant differences in mean level 
generalized attitudes between Wave 2 and Wave 4 for coloureds. White South Africans’ attitudes differed 
across the waves for only three of seven outcomes (40%), whereas black South Africans’ attitudes 
differed for four of seven outcomes (57%). To illustrate, white South Africans ranked apartheid at 6.3 at 
Wave 2, and then ranked it at 6.5 at Wave 4. These rankings were not statistically significant different 
across the waves. Neither was black South Africans’ ranking of apartheid significantly different across 
waves (3.1 to 3.0).  However, coloureds’ ranking of apartheid decreased, going from 4.5 to 4.1, which 
was a statistically significant change. Coloureds attitudes toward apartheid significantly decreased at 
Wave 4, and did so in a direction closer to black South Africans. In fact, coloureds and black South 
Africans converged across every generalized attitude from Wave 2 to Wave 4. In contrast, mean level 
differences between white South Africans and coloureds grew over time.  
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Generalized Attitudes: Multivariate Associations 
I next examined whether associations between racial identification and generalized attitudes (as 
reported above) were robust after controlling for age, gender, religious attendance, education, 
employment status, and financial strain. Results for Wave 2 are shown in Table 4; results for Wave 4 are 
shown in Table 5. In Table 4, coefficients for white and black South Africans were in the opposite 
direction of each other for nine of ten outcomes (coloureds were the excluded group). In other words, 
when white South Africans had significantly more positive attitudes than coloureds, black South Africans 
had significantly less positive attitudes. When white South Africans had significantly less positive 
attitudes than coloureds, black South Africans had significantly more positive attitudes. Thus, introducing 
control variables did not change the relationship between racial identification and generalized attitudes in 
Wave 2. 
In regressions shown Table 5 (Wave 4), coefficients for white and black South Africans were in 
the opposite direction of each other on all outcomes. However, coloureds did not significantly differ from 
black South Africans on approval of apartheid or the possibility of South Africa being a united nation. 
Again, associations between racial identification and generalized attitudes did not change once control 
variables were introduced. I turn now to analyses involving perceived relative deprivation. 
Perceived Relative Deprivation at Wave 2  
 Contrary to the generalized attitudes results, coloureds did not report levels of perceived relative 
deprivation that fell, on average, between white and black South Africans (see the bottom of Table 3). In 
fact, coloureds reported the highest levels of perceived relative deprivation. The left panel at the bottom 
of Table 3 shows that coloureds mean level of economic based deprivation was 3.7 and their mean level 
of treatment deprivation was 2.7. White South Africans perceived less economic deprivation (mean= 3.2) 
and greater treatment deprivation (mean=2.2) than coloureds, as did black South Africans (mean=3.4, 2.0 
respectively). White and black South Africans did not significantly differ from each. This result suggests 
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that coloureds’ perceive the most deprivation compared to white or black South Africans, however their 
reports do not significantly differ from black South Africans in terms of economic deprivation.  
Perceived Relative Deprivation at Wave 4 
 At Wave 4, coloureds also reported the highest levels of perceived relative deprivation. 
Specifically, coloureds reported mean levels of perceived deprivation of 3.9 for economic based 
deprivation and 3.1 for treatment based deprivation. White South Africans reported lower levels of 
perceived relative deprivation in terms of economic deprivation (mean= 3.6) and treatment deprivation 
(mean=2.7), but not significantly different levels from coloureds. Black South Africans reported the 
lowest level of deprivation in terms of economic deprivation (mean=3.3) and treatment deprivation 
(mean=2.2), and their levels were significantly different from coloureds and white South Africans. Thus, 
although coloureds continued to perceive the most deprivation relative to white or black South Africans, 
they did not significantly differ from white South Africans in terms of fraternal economic or treatment 
deprivation at Wave 4.   
Perceived Relative Deprivation: Tracking Changes from Wave 2 to Wave 4 
 Tracking trends in perceived relative deprivation over time, I found that coloureds and white 
South Africans showed statistically significant differences in their reports of perceived deprivation from 
Wave 2 to Wave 4, whereas black South Africans reported comparable levels of perceived relative 
deprivation across waves. Although coloureds’ and white South Africans’ perceived deprivation increased 
over time, white South Africans’ change in perceived deprivation was the most drastic. Therefore, the 
difference between coloureds and white South Africans perceived deprivation at Wave 4 was small and 
non-significant. In other words, white South Africans’ level of perceived relative deprivation trended 
toward coloureds’ levels of perceived deprivation over time.   
Perceived Relative Deprivation: Multivariate Associations 
 I next examined whether associations between racial identification and perceptions of relative 
deprivation (as reported above) were robust after controlling for age, gender, religious attendance, 
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education, employment status, and financial strain. Results for Wave 2 are shown in Table 6; results for 
Wave 4 are shown in Table 7. Coefficients for white and black South Africans remain negative, meaning 
coloureds’ reported the highest perceived relative deprivation, even after introducing control variables. 
However, the non-significant difference between coloureds and black South Africans on economic 
deprivation observed at the bivariate level became statistically significant in the multivariate analyses. 
Furthermore, the statistically significant difference between white South Africans and coloureds in 
perceived deprivation in terms of treatment deprivation observed at the bivariate level was attenuated 
after introducing control variables. Thus, Wave 2 control variables altered the relationship between racial 
identification and perceived deprivation.  
 Table 7 shows results of regressing perceived relative deprivation on racial identification at Wave 
4, adjusting for the control variables.  Again, the coefficients’ signs for white and black South Africans 
remain negative, meaning coloureds reported the highest economic and treatment deprivation, even after 
adjusting for control variables. However, and consistent with the bivariate analyses, white South Africans 
and coloureds did not significantly differ from each other; thus, results at Wave 4 for perceived 
deprivation were not altered by inclusion of control variables.  
 Contrary to my predictions, coloureds’ levels of perceived relative deprivation were not 
numerically between white and black South Africans. Next, I further discuss the results and evaluate 
evidence for the continuance of historical racial limbo among coloureds as reflected in their post-
apartheid attitudes and perceptions.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 I defined racial limbo as belonging to a group positioned between a dominant group and a 
subordinate group in a racial hierarchy, and argued that coloureds in South Africa represent an exemplar 
case. Considering the demise of apartheid and the state’s weakened control over individuals’ and groups’ 
racial identifications, I asked whether coloureds’ intermediate, historical position in racial limbo is 
  
 
	  
96	  
consistent with their post-apartheid attitudes and perceptions. Group position theory informed two 
hypotheses (H1 and H2) about coloureds’ generalized attitudes. I argued that just as white South 
Africans’ attitudes should align with their dominant group position, coloureds’ attitudes would align with 
their dominant position vis-à-vis black South Africans. Specifically, I hypothesized that coloureds would 
report generalized attitudes that fall, on average, between the generalized attitudes of white and black 
South Africans (H1). Accounting for the premise that a sense of group position is learned through on-
going processes, I also hypothesized that coloureds’ generalized attitudes would remain intermediary 
(H2) over time. Result supported the hypotheses. In fact, analyses at Wave 2 and Wave 4 of the SAB 
revealed that across over 93% of the outcomes, coloureds reported generalized attitudes that were 
significantly different from, and between, the generalized attitudes of white and black South Africans.   
Results from the multivariate analyses were consistent with the bivariate results; coloureds’ 
attitudes were between white and black South Africans, after controlling for age, gender, religious 
attendance, and socioeconomic status. Notably, coloureds did not differ from black South Africans in 
terms of years of education or employment status at the bivariate level. That is, coloureds were similarly 
disadvantaged in terms of socioeconomic status to black South Africans, yet their attitudes were not 
altered when accounting for their disadvantage. This finding emphasizes the importance of race in 
shaping attitudes over and beyond socioeconomic status; despite the fact that coloureds occupy an 
economic position close to black South Africans, their generalized attitudes are aligned with their 
intermediate, historical position in South Africa’s racial hierarchy.   
Although H2 was supported, results showed that coloureds’ generalized attitudes changed over 
time and at a rate greater than either white or black South Africans. Coloureds’ attitudes at Wave 4 were 
closer, on average, to black South Africans than they were at Wave 2. For instance, coloureds’ attitudes 
toward the favorability of apartheid decreased whereas their political engagement increased. The direction 
and magnitude of these changes in generalized attitudes could insinuate a movement among coloureds to 
a position more similar to black South Africans. Such transition could be the result of coloureds’ greater 
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awareness of (1) their disadvantaged socioeconomic status relative to white South Africans, or (2) the 
current South African government’s decision to redefine coloureds as black South Africans in recent 
legislation. Whatever the case, scholars must monitor future changes in coloureds’ generalized attitudes. 
If coloureds willfully band together with black South Africans, this could become coalition with 
considerable political power. Significantly, this may mean coloureds’ position in limbo is a true 
transitional state. Group position theory should be amended to consider the notion that groups positioned 
in racial limbo may join forces with subordinate groups when those subordinate groups are challenging 
the status quo that protects dominant groups.  
Relative deprivation theory informed hypotheses (H3 and H4) regarding the coloureds’ perceived 
deprivation in terms of economics and treatment from the government. I hypothesized that coloureds 
should perceive relative deprivation when they compare themselves to white South Africans and 
simultaneously perceive relative gratification when they compare themselves to black South Africans. 
Note that relative deprivation theory does not typically consider simultaneous upward and downward 
comparisons. Given such comparisons, I hypothesized that coloureds would report levels of perceived 
relative deprivation that were between white and black South Africans (H3). That is to say, the effects of 
perceiving both relative deprivation and relative gratification would cancel out. I also hypothesized that 
coloureds’ perceived deprivation and perceived gratification would be consistent over time such that they 
would report intermediary levels in both waves (H4).  
I found that coloureds’ reported the highest levels of perceived relative deprivation, in terms of 
economic opportunities and mistreatment across the waves. At Wave 2, coloureds’ perceived relative 
deprivation was significantly higher than white South Africans, but not different from black South 
Africans in terms of economic deprivation. Black South Africans and coloureds did perceive higher levels 
of relative deprivation than white South Africans when evaluating mistreatment from the government. 
Conversely, at Wave 4, coloureds’ perceived relative deprivation levels were statistically significantly 
higher than black South Africans’ levels, but not significantly different from white South Africans on 
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either deprivation measure. White South Africans and coloureds felt more deprived in terms of economics 
and mistreatment than black South Africans. Thus, H3 and H4 were not supported, suggesting that 
coloureds do not perceive offsetting levels of relative deprivation and gratification.    
Further consultation with social comparison theory (Festinger 1954; Pettigrew 1967) might help 
us understand why coloureds’ perceive the highest mean levels of deprivation. Social comparison theory 
undergirds the concept of relative deprivation by contending that individuals are most likely to choose 
similar others as referents. For instance, in Dreyer’s (1953) classic study of social comparisons, students 
with average exam scores had the greatest motivation to do better on subsequent exams because they felt 
as though they were close to the top (i.e., best grades). Conversely, the students who scored poorly did not 
consider the highest exam scores as obtainable and were therefore more content with their exam scores. 
Thus, individuals who landed in the middle (compared to individuals who scored poorly), perceived 
themselves to be more similar to those who scored better. Importantly, as a result of believing a higher 
score was obtainable, the average students felt the least satisfied with their position.  
As applied here, dramatically divergent groups (theoretically, white and black South Africans) are 
less motivated to partake in comparisons, whereas coloureds in racial limbo diverge less from white or 
black South Africans and are more likely to make comparisons (Morse and Peele 1974). Coloureds may 
be more likely to consider white South Africans, who control most economic resources, their reference 
group. If coloureds compare themselves to white South Africans, but have a disadvantaged 
socioeconomic position (i.e., closer to black South Africans), then their perceived deprivation should be 
heightened. That is, incongruence between expectation and experience might be what drives coloureds’ 
elevated deprivation. Still, this conclusion is speculative because I cannot test whether coloureds’ 
reference group is white South Africans.  
Whereas introducing control variables did not alter the relationship between racial identification 
and generalized attitudes, introducing control variables did alter the relationship between racial 
identification and perceived relative deprivation at Wave 2. Specifically, adding control variables 
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increased the coefficient for black South African racial identification on economic deprivation by 27%. 
Adding control variables decreased the impact of white South African racial identification on treatment 
deprivation by 7%.  Thus, results of the perceived relative deprivation measures were not robust after 
accounting for control variables at Wave 2.[1]  
In regard to change in perceptions of relative deprivation over time, white South Africans 
reported higher levels of deprivation at Wave 4 compared to Wave 2, despite having the highest objective 
levels of socioeconomic status. Furthermore, although coloureds’ reported the highest mean levels of 
deprivation, they went from perceiving significantly higher deprivation at Wave 2 compared to white 
South Africans, to not being significantly different from white South Africans at Wave 4. This trend 
could be the result of white South Africans responding to (recent) decreases in their political power and 
moderate decreases in their economic power. That is, as time goes on, white South Africans might 
perceive a decrease in their dominant status, which would, in turn, increase their feelings of resentment. 
An alternative explanation could be that coloureds no longer use white South Africans as their reference 
group. That is, white South Africans might not be the most obtainable group and this lessens the extent to 
which coloureds perceive relative deprivation.  
Limitations 
 There are several limitations that should be addressed. First, the SAB survey does not always 
include the same measures across its repeated cross-sectional waves. As a result, I did not have the same 
number of generalized attitudes across waves. Inconsistent survey measurements also reduced the utility 
of other waves of the SAB. However, Wave 5 of the SAB was collected in 2012 and should be released to 
the public in the near future. Future research should replicate present analyses of group contrasts as the 
South African political and economic landscape continues to change. Further, the repeated cross-sectional 
design means my results come from different population samples. Future research should also examine 
coloureds’ attitudes and perceptions using a longitudinal study design to make more reliable conclusions 
about how political and economic changes impact intra-individual variation.  
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 The data present a second limitation. Asking respondents if they are worse off than others (as did 
the question for economic deprivation) did not allow me to know what “others” the respondent was 
referring to. Gibson (2006), reviewed in the introduction, used a survey that restricted coloureds’ 
comparison group to black South Africans, yet there are reasons to believe, as I have argued above, that 
white South Africans are often coloureds’ reference  group. Capturing respondents’ comparison group(s) 
is especially important when considering racial limbo, but the critique has been voiced in more general 
relative deprivation research (see Walker and Smith 2002). One potential solution for the general critique 
is to examine social networks (Gartell 2002).  
A final limitation is that analyses which rely on identification with a group often miss variations 
between individuals within a group. For instance, Loveman (1999:892) argued there is a difference 
between “imposed categories, the identity of the categorized, and experienced groupness.” This suggests 
that a single indicator of racial identification is limited in capturing the phenomenology of race. 
Furthermore, recent research (e.g., Erasmus 2001) on coloureds intimates their phenomenology of race is 
theorized to be multidimensional. That is, there is reason to believe that individuals belonging to a group 
in racial limbo may not be homogeneous. Analyses from this study provide preliminary evidence of larger 
variation for coloureds in attitudes and perceptions among coloureds: coloureds had the largest standard 
errors in the majority (over 70%) of outcomes examined. This could be an indication that coloureds’ 
responses vary more around the mean, as compared to other groups.  
Theoretical Implications  
Group position theory and relative deprivation theory describe perspectives of individuals and 
groups trying to understand where they fit in various hierarchies and to whom they should compare 
themselves. Taking a rational approach, Blumer (1958) developed group position theory to explain a 
white dominant groups’ prejudice toward a black subordinate group while refuting the popular tendency 
to portray racially prejudiced whites as ignorant and lacking moral character. Group position theory has 
since been expanded (Bobo 2000; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Tuan 2006) to suggest group 
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attitudes and interests align with the position of groups in a racial hierarchy. Group position theory 
initially considered a two group situation only, and thus it could not fully generalize to contexts like 
South Africa with multiple group racial hierarchies. Hypotheses should continue to be expanded to 
consider other groups than just dominant v. subordinate. 
In addition, group position theory does not fully explain how changes in structural positions 
might impact group attitudes. For instance, the racial hierarchy in South Africa did not correspond 
perfectly with a change in political systems; white South Africans still occupy the most privileged 
position for power and resources whereas black South Africans remain the most disadvantaged (Marx 
1998; Seidman 1999; Seekings, Jooste, and Maughan-Brown 2005). Despite the seemingly unaltered 
racial hierarchy, changes within public discourse, legislation, and every-day interpersonal interactions 
(see Study One, and consistent with what Blumer [1958] theorizes) might be influencing a change in 
groups’ generalized attitudes. In fact, my findings suggest a slight transition of coloureds’ attitudes 
toward alignment with black South Africans over time.  
Social psychologists contributed to the development of relative deprivation theory (Runciman 
1966; Stouffer et al. 1949), which aimed to explain perceptions of deprivation that emerge inevitably 
when individuals and groups, believing they deserve a resource that they do not have, compare 
themselves to individuals and groups having attained said resource. Relative deprivation has since been 
expanded (Marmot 2004; Wilkinson 2005) to explain resentment that arose among disadvantaged 
individuals and groups doing social comparisons. Relative deprivation theory focuses typically on upward 
social comparisons; yet, coloureds in post-apartheid South African may do simultaneous upward social 
comparisons (to white South Africans) and downward social comparisons (to black South Africans). 
Relative deprivation theory did not correctly predict the imbalance of deprivation that coloureds’ 
perceived. Rather than discounting the utility that relative deprivation theory has for explaining how 
groups in racial limbo perceive their position, though, it is important that scholars more carefully consider 
social comparisons (Festinger 1954; Pettigrew 1976). Intermediate groups’ position is relatively closer to 
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the dominant position (compared to those that occupy the subordinate position) and perceiving the 
dominant position as obtainable could increase relative deprivation. Moreover, I contend that high levels 
of perceived relative deprivation may actually support the proposition that those in racial limbo recognize 
their intermediate position; they recognize they are positioned between two groups and they want to 
change such position. Indeed, more research is needed test this theory in other multiple group contexts. It 
might be useful to note here that a related research agenda regarding race in Latin America. Researchers 
named the social process in which individuals attempt race mixture as a mean to achieve higher status 
blanqueamiento (see Telles 2006 and Wade 1995, 2010 for more information). This research suggests 
members of a group in racial limbo consider whites a similar referent and actively try to achieve 
whiteness. 
I have argued that neither group position theory nor relative deprivation theory is wholly adequate 
for understanding the experiences of coloureds in post-apartheid South Africa.  Yet, I found much utility 
in expanding upon these mainstream theories. Notably, this project suggests the racial hierarchy can be 
reflected in individual level outcomes to some extent.  
Conclusion 
Given the repercussions that attitudes and perceptions can have on social action and racial 
antagonism (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Frazier 1957; Morse and Peele 1974; Pettigrew 1967; Pettigrew 
et al. 2008), analyzing the attitudes and perceptions of a group in racial limbo, especially in a context with 
a changing political landscape, is an important to contribution. Coloureds’ generalized attitudes in post-
apartheid South Africa do reflect their intermediate, historical position. However, their movement toward 
black South Africans might reflect something more important, a transformation in group boundaries. 
Contrarily, rather than reporting levels of perceived relative deprivation that were between white and 
black South Africans, coloureds reported the highest levels of both economic and treatment deprivation. 
This reveals that coloureds may expect to have greater access to power and resources and are not satisfied 
with their current position, which they perceived to be deprived. If a racial hierarchy were to be 
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conceptualized as a continuum between the poles of white and black, the pendulum for coloureds would 
have been suspended in the middle during apartheid. By most accounts, coloureds’ intermediate, 
historical position remains suspended in the twenty-first century and evidence suggests it might be a 
permanent state. At the same time, however, this analysis alludes to movement in coloureds’ position.  
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NOTES 
 
 
[1] I speculate that socioeconomic status most affected the inconsistent pattern of significance in relative 
deprivation findings. For instance, financial strain was significant in the relative deprivation models at 
Wave 2. In supplementary analyses (not shown), I found a significant interaction between financial strain 
and white racial identification in Wave 2 only. I consider that financial strain is correlated with racial 
identification and perceived relative deprivation, and therefore larger differences among financial strain at 
Wave 2 (compared to more comparable mean levels at Wave 4) may have the potential to mediate the 
relationship between racial identification and perceived relative deprivation.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables  
 WAVE 2 – 2002 WAVE 4 – 2008 
  Race                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Range Mean SE Alphas Range Mean SE Alphas
White (1=yes) 0,1 12.14% .015 -- 0,1 11.99% .013 -- 
Coloured (1=yes) 0,1 15.98% .011 -- 0,1 9.88% .010 -- 
Black (1=yes) 0,1 71.88% .018 -- 0,1 78.13% .016 -- 
Control Variables          
Age 18-91 38.139 .428 -- 18-97 37.865 .448 -- 
Male (1=yes) 0,1 51.59% .006 -- 0,1 46.53% .002 -- 
Religiosity  1-6 3.970 .044 -- 1-4 3.351 .028 -- 
Education 0-9 4.065 .061 -- 0-9 4.185 .051 -- 
Employed (1=yes) 0,1 45.12% .014 -- 0,1 45.59% .016 -- 
Financial Strain 0-24 4.578 .181 .829 0-20 4.547 .164 .822 
Racial/Ethnic Identity Salience 
(1=yes) 0,1 21.44% .012 -- 0,1 11.02% .010 -- 
Generalized Attitudes         
Favorable Rank of Apartheid   0-10 3.772 .099 -- 0-10 3.489 .102 -- 
Equality of Apartheid    1-5 2.427 .025 .829 -- -- -- -- 
Efficacy of Apartheid  1-5 2.986 .027 .674 -- -- -- -- 
Approval of Government on Anti-
Racism    1-4 2.694 .023 .703 -- -- -- -- 
Favorable Rank of Future 
Government  0-10 6.947 3.116 -- 0-10 5.874 2.969 -- 
Possibility of a United Nation 1-5 4.007 .030 -- 1-5 3.906 .038 -- 
Identification with a Political Party 
(1=yes) 0,1 .445 .015 -- 0,1 69.13% .015 -- 
Protest 0-4 .815 .032 -- 0-4 .774 .032 -- 
Political Competition Causes 
Conflict 0-3 1.663 1.030 -- 0-3 1.573 .981 -- 
Fraternal Deprivation         
Economic Based Deprivation 1-5 3.394 .064 -- 1-5 3.40 .087 -- 
Treatment Based Deprivation  1-4 2.123 .059 -- 1-4 2.377 .104 -- 
Source: Southern African Barometer 
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Source: Southern African Barometer 
Notes: a represents significant differences between coloureds and white South Africans; b represents significant 
differences between coloureds and black South Africans; c represents significant differences between white and 
black South Africans. Significance is at the p < .05.
Table 2. Race Differences of Control Variables 
 WAVE 2 – 2002 WAVE 4 – 2008 
 White Coloured Black White Coloured Black 
Control Variables       
Age 
41.867 a 39.113 b 37.141 c 41.215  42.829 b 36.718    c 
(1.183)  (.948)  (.484)  (1.181)  (1.264)  (.512)  
Male (1=yes) 
50.71%  48.16% b 52.36%  46.19%  44.38%  46.85%  
(.017)  (.018)  (.008)  (.012)  (.017)  (.003)  
Religiosity  
4.062 a 4.471 b 3.865  3.381 a 3.620 b 3.311  
(.095)  (.103)  (.054)  (.081)  ( .048)  (.034)  
Education 
5.632 a 3.821  3.761 c 5.251 a 4.067  4.036 c 
(.104)  (.115)  (.068)  (.077)  (.103)  (.060)  
Employed (1=yes) 
62.40% a 46.80%  41.00% c 64.50% a 47.48%  42.45% c 
(.468)  (.037)  (.016)  (.040)  (.040)  (.018)  
Financial Strain 
.755 a 3.056 b 5.685 c 1.428 a 3.037 b 5.218 c 
(.134)  (.344)  (.205)  (.314)  (.324)  (.191)  
Racial/Ethnic Identity Salience 
(1=yes) 
14.40%  21.65%  22.97% c 10.55%  14.94%  10.57%  
(.029)  (.029)  (.014)  (.028)  (.026)  (.011)  
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Source: Southern African Barometer 
Notes: a represents significant differences between coloureds and white South Africans; b represents significant differences between 
coloureds and black South Africans; c represents significant differences between white and black South Africans. Significance is at the 
p < .05. 
Table 3.  Race Differences of Generalized Attitudes and Perceived Relative Deprivation 
 WAVE 2 – 2002 WAVE 4 – 2008 
 White Coloured Black White Coloured Black 
Generalized Attitudes             
Favorable Rank of Apartheid   
6.278 a 4.533 b 3.102 c 6.527 a 4.133 b 2.956 c 
(.132)  (.239)  (.100)  (.268)  (.217)  (.094)  
Favorable Approval of Apartheid 
2.755 a 2.306 b 1.984 c 2.793 a 2.139  1.989 c 
(.084)  (.099)  (.042)  (.120)  (.125)  (.044)  
Equality of Apartheid  
3.119 a 2.611 b 2.244 c --  --  --  
(.052)  (.055)  (.021)        
Efficacy of Apartheid  
3.431 a 3.063 b 2.874 c --  --  --  
(.059)  (.080)  (.029)        
Approval of Government on Anti-
Racism    
2.325 a 2.472 b 2.813 c --  --  --  
(.043)  (.055)  (.025)        
Favorable Rank of Future 
Government 
5.101 a 6.212 b 7.326 c 3.810 a 5.723 b 6.308 c 
(.227)  (.248)  (.105)  (.207)  (.241)  (.117)  
Possibility of a United Nation 
3.540 a 3.865 b 4.132 c 3.501 a 3.963  3.961 c 
(.069)  (.070)  (.032)  (.115)  (.068)  (.044)  
Identification with a Political Party 
(1=yes) 
29.22% a 42.64% b 66.21% c 39.02% a 60.97% b 74.05% c 
(.031)  (.036)  (.015)  (.045)  (.038)  (.016)  
Protest 
.309 a .529 b .976 c .270 a .592 b .879 c 
(.050)  (.067)  (.037)  (.059)  (.071)  (.037)  
Political Competition Causes 
Conflict 
1.982  2.126 b 1.508 c 1.901 a 1.633 b 1.445 c 
(.058)  (.074)  (.036)  (.089)  (.065)  (.041)  
Fraternal Deprivation             
Economic Based Deprivation 
3.179 a 3.703  3.377  3.607  3.949 b 3.261 c 
(.145)  (.174)  (.076)  (.183)  (.182)  (.110)  
Treatment Based Deprivation 
2.163 a 2.718 b 2.029  2.707  3.076 b 2.195 c 
(.103)  (.189)  (.065)  (.245)  (.150)  (.121)  
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Table 4. Models Predicting Generalized Attitudes 
 
Favor 
Apartheid 
Approve 
Apartheid 
Equality of 
Apartheid 
Efficacy of 
Apartheid 
Favor 
Government 
Anti-Racism 
Favor Future 
Government 
Possibility to 
be United 
Political 
Involvement 
Propensity to 
Protest 
Political 
Competition 
Cause of Conflict 
           
White 1.792*** .710*** .575*** .337** -.160* -1.409*** -.506* -.668** -.829** -.444* 
 (.305) (.176) (.082) (.112) (.080) (.374) (.208) (.230) (.252) (.205) 
Black -1.525*** -.623*** -.397*** -.248** .377*** 1.404*** .632*** .977*** .986*** -1.405*** 
 (.269) (.155) (.060) (.092) (.064) (.282) (.163) (.167) (.183) (.180) 
Age .007 .005 -.001 .005** -.000 -.016* -.003 .007 -.014*** .002 
 (.006) (.004) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Male -.355* -.125 -.058 .014 -.000 -.021 -.112 .266** .157 .044 
 (.142) (.089) (.033) (.044) (.036) (.199) (.096) (.097) (.109) (.094) 
Religiosity -.061 -.026 .002 -.033* .018 -.016 -.009 .060 .002 -.049 
 (.046) (.032) (.011) (.016) (.012) (.070) (.034) (.037) (.035) (.033) 
Employed -.116 .049 .019 -.003 .007 .175 .129 .257* .309** .134 
 (.146) (.097) (.036) (.050) (.037) (.174) (.097) (.109) (.099) (.103) 
Education -.022 -.062* -.000 .019 -.005 -.014 -.080* .073* .163*** .086* 
 (.051) (.031) (.012) (.016) (.012) (.054) (.031) (.035) (.036) (.034) 
Financial Strain .013 -.000 .012*** .013* -.005 -.113*** -.020* .032** .003 .056*** 
 (.017) (.011) (.003) (.005) (.005) (.022) (.010) (.011) (.011) (.012) 
Constant 4.830***  2.605*** 2.925*** 2.434*** 7.266***  -1.468***   
 (.491)  (.098) (.147) (.109) (.571)  (.350)   
cut1           
Constant  -.895**     -3.663***  1.116*** -2.067*** 
  (.302)     (.323)  (.333) (.330) 
cut2           
Constant  .337     -2.580***  2.389*** -.964** 
  (.296)     (.299)  (.347) (.317) 
cut3           
Constant  1.049***     -1.619***  3.291*** .758* 
  (.303)     (.293)  (.362) (.311) 
cut4           
Constant  2.245***     .588*  4.525***  
  (.317)     (.293)  (.372)  
Observations 2135 2083 2151 2119 2100 2031 2027 2149 2132 2026 
R2 .157  .210 .058 .082 .112     
F 49.574 16.197 38.256 11.185 15.403 2.698 1.663 14.267 19.526 12.892 
Source: Southern African Barometer, Wave 2 
Notes: Coloured is the excluded group. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 5. Models Predicting Generalized Attitudes 
 
Favor Apartheid Approve Apartheid 
Favor Future 
Government 
Possibility to be 
United 
Political 
Involvement 
Propensity to 
Protest 
Political 
Competition Cause 
of Conflict 
        
White 2.572*** 1.048*** -2.001*** -.726** -.948*** -1.219*** .555** 
 (.364) (.241) (.322) (.237) (.266) (.260) (.201) 
Black -1.280*** -.318 .711* .154 .817*** .508** -.559*** 
 (.257) (.195) (.282) (.139) (.195) (.162) (.143) 
Age -.001 .008* -.001 -.000 .008 .002 -.003 
 (.005) (.004) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
Male .046 -.171* .185 .003 .243* .123 .050 
 (.118) (.078) (.125) (.089) (.113) (.097) (.084) 
Religiosity .048 -.091 .014 -.045 .100 -.041 .011 
 (.067) (.050) (.082) (.055) (.074) (.055) (.050) 
Employed .110 .117 .237 -.057 .028 .184 -.047 
 (.138) (.113) (.157) (.106) (.134) (.116) (.105) 
Education -.126* -.058 -.019 -.004 .024 .086* -.002 
 (.049) (.035) (.055) (.039) (.051) (.038) (.037) 
Financial Strain .044** .043** -.051* -.043*** -.043** .029* .064*** 
 (.017) (.013) (.021) (.013) (.016) (.013) (.013) 
Constant 4.322***  5.754***  -.348   
 (.431)  (.516)  (.407)   
cut1        
Constant  -.412  -3.731***  1.028** -1.642*** 
  (.311)  (.361)  (.318) (.314) 
cut2        
Constant  .536  -2.355***  2.336*** -.192 
  (.313)  (.339)  (.321) (.306) 
cut3        
Constant  1.600***  -1.335***  3.208*** 1.413*** 
  (.327)  (.329)  (.326) (.312) 
cut4        
Constant  3.097***  .233  4.438***  
  (.359)  (.330)  (.362)  
Observations 2059 2052 2050 2056 1893 2121 2034 
R2 .178  .085     
F 24.793 9.062 16.427 3.208 8.583 11.188 6.753 
Source: Southern African Barometer, Wave 4  
Notes: Coloured is the excluded group. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 6. Models Predicting Perceived Relative Deprivation 
 Economic Treatment 
    
White -.893* -.870 
 (.433) (.451) 
Black -.808* -1.527*** 
 (.337) (.369) 
Age .020** .009 
 (.007) (.007) 
Male .398 .198 
 (.212) (.205) 
Religiosity -.140* -.097 
 (.066) (.085) 
Employed .110 .203 
 (.228) (.211) 
Education -.018 -.004 
 (.066) (.088) 
Financial Strain .086*** .067** 
 (.023) (.023) 
cut1   
Constant -3.622*** -1.917* 
 (.693) (.783) 
cut2   
Constant -1.407* .229 
 (.662) (.759) 
cut3   
Constant .256 1.278 
 (.670) (.766) 
cut4   
Constant 1.801**  
 (.694)  
Observations 429 415 
F 5.030 3.768 
Source: Southern African Barometer, Wave 2  
Notes: Coloured is the excluded group. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 7. Models Predicting Perceived Relative Deprivation  
 Economic Treatment 
   
White -.636 -.910 
 (.582) (.564) 
Black -1.244** -1.918*** 
 (.454) (.406) 
Age .017 -.005 
 (.013) (.013) 
Male .541 -.359 
 (.326) (.347) 
Religiosity .137 -.343 
 (.192) (.182) 
Employed -.275 .417 
 (.370) (.373) 
Education -.195 .082 
 (.140) (.104) 
Financial Strain -.057 .132** 
 (.035) (.043) 
cut1   
Constant -3.597** -3.002* 
 (1.164) (1.186) 
cut2   
Constant -2.510* -1.670 
 (1.135) (1.180) 
cut3   
Constant -.791 -.089 
 (1.131) (1.211) 
cut4   
Constant 1.114  
 (1.180)  
Observations 211 207 
F 2.545 4.835 
Source: Southern African Barometer, Wave 4  
Notes: Coloured is the excluded group. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RACIAL MEASUREMENT AND LIMBO: EXPLORING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL MEASURE OF 
RACIAL IDENTIFICATION AMONG COLOUREDS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA  
 
Coloured South Africans are an exemplar case of racial limbo, meaning they are positioned 
between a dominant and subordinate group in a racial hierarchy. The coloured racial category, and 
coloureds’ intermediate position, was mandated by the apartheid government (Frederickson 1981; Marx 
1998; Lewis 1987). Although the current post-apartheid government maintains an ambiguous definition 
for coloureds, research suggests their historical, intermediate position continues to be reflected in their life 
experiences (Adhikari 2005; Erasmus and Ellison 2008; Posel 2001).  
For instance, in Study Two of this dissertation project I asked whether coloureds in post-apartheid 
South Africa report levels of generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation that reflect their 
intermediate, historical position between white and black South Africans. Informed by group position 
theory (Blumer 1956), I argued that just as white South Africans’ attitudes align with their dominant 
group position, coloureds’ attitudes would align with their dominant position vis-à-vis black South 
Africans. Result supported the hypotheses; across 80% of the outcomes, coloureds reported generalized 
attitudes that were significantly different from, and between, the generalized attitudes of white and black 
South Africans. Informed by relative deprivation theory (Runciman 1966; Stouffer et al. 1949), I 
hypothesized that coloureds should perceive relative deprivation when they compare themselves to white 
South Africans and simultaneously perceive relative gratification when they compare themselves to black 
South Africans. Contrary to my expectations, I found that coloureds’ reported the highest levels of 
perceived relative deprivation. Jointly, results supported the expectation that coloureds’ attitudes reflect 
their immediate, historical position, but results also hinted that coloureds may feel deprived by their 
position and insinuate a transition of their position could occur. In addition, analysis in Study Two also 
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revealed that coloureds showed greater variation (i.e., had larger standard errors) in the majority of 
outcomes compared to white and black South Africans. 
Although evidence does suggest coloureds are a group positioned in racial limbo, research also 
suggests that coloureds’ identifications with this position may be multidimensional. Erasmus explains that 
“[c]oloured identities were constructed out of fragmented cultural material available in the contexts of 
slavery, colonialism and cultural dispossession. This leaves their constructed and composite historical 
nature always evident and their dislocation always present. These are identities produced and re-produced 
in the place of the margin” (2001a:20). Moreover, scholars (e.g., Adhikari 2005; Erasmus 2001a, 2001b; 
Jackson 2003) often characterize coloureds’ position in racial limbo as containing assorted 
phenomenologies of race.  
In order to further explore findings from Study Two and scholarship on coloureds’ lived 
experiences, I here investigate whether multidimensional measure of coloureds’ racial identification (as 
opposed to a single-item self-reported racial identification) provides stronger evidence of the coloureds’ 
intermediate, historical position in contemporary South Africa. In this chapter, Study Three, I take up the 
call for innovative approaches to studying racial identification in survey research (Loveman 1999; Martin 
and Yeung 2003; Wacquant 1997; Zuberi 2001) and present latent class analysis as an innovative 
approach. Specifically, I conduct latent class analysis using a set of instruments theorized to capture 
phenomenology of race in order to locate potential latent classes (i.e., unobserved subgroups). I then 
determine whether the latent classes of coloured, as opposed to a single indicator, better demonstrates 
whether racial limbo is reflected in attitudes and perceptions of deprivation located, on average, between 
white and black South Africans. 
In the sections that follow, I overview the background and framing for this study. I begin by first 
defining and critiquing conceptualizations of race. I consider the argument that social scientists should 
employ innovative approaches to studying the meaning and significance of belonging to a race group, and 
contend such approaches are most needed among groups positioned in racial limbo. Such research situates 
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my expectations that I will find multiple latent classes that correspond with coloureds’ position in racial 
limbo: a class pulled towards white South Africans, a class pulled towards black South Africans, and an 
intermediate class. Next, I overview the data and measures, and explain how I will conduct latent class 
analysis on coloured respondents in the Cape Town Area Study. Finally, I discuss the results and suggest 
that although unobserved subgroups may be present among those with a coloured racial identification, the 
intragroup divisions are not strong enough to claim a new multidimensional racial identification is most 
beneficial.  
 
FRAMING 
Conceptualizations of Race 
Race is defined as “a symbolic category, based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed 
according to specific social and historical contexts, that is misrecognized as a natural category” (Desmond 
and Emirbayer 2009:336). Racial categories are popularly perceived as distinct because shared physical or 
biological characteristics are believed to be real, despite the fact that no biological basis to race as 
attached to phenotype has been scientifically proven. Expressing membership with or being labeled a 
member of a racial category is known as racial identification (Clark and Clark 1939; Thorton, Taylor and 
Brown 2000). Whereas race often captures structural categories, racial identifications capture individuals’ 
associations with such race categories. 
Racial identifications help explain how race is encoded; yet, racial identifications still do not fully 
uncover the complex processes that link race to ones’ self-concept. Tatum (1997) describes racial identity 
as defining for oneself the personal significance and social meaning of belonging to a particular racial 
group. Moreover, racial identities are learned through racial socialization, the process of learning about 
the social meaning and consequence of ones’ ethnicity and race, which occurs through the family, 
schools, media, etc. (Brown, Tanner-Smith, Lesane-Brown, and Ezell 2007).  
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As such, racial identity better encapsulates the phenomenology of race: “Phenomenological 
descriptions of racial identity can reveal a differentiation or distribution of felt connectedness to others” 
(Martin 1999:21). Adloff (2005) describes phenomenological accounts of race as exploring the lived 
experience of racial identity. For this project, I conceptualize the phenomenology of race as the 
experience, significance, and meaning of race as understood by individuals. Indeed, examinations of the 
phenomenology of race focus on extrapolating experience, understanding, and embodiment from the 
source studied (see Fanon 1956). Limitations of race research come to bear when racial identification 
(i.e., a single-item self-reported racial identification) is used without attention the multiplicity of lived 
experiences (i.e., phenomenologies of race) of those sharing the same racial identification.   
Problems in the Measurement of Race Concepts  
In 2003 the American Sociological Association took a stance that “as long as Americans routinely 
sort each other into racial categories and act on the basis of those attributions, research on the role of race 
and race relations in the US falls squarely within scientific agenda.” Whereas most sociologists and other 
social scientists (in the United States and abroad) agree that scholarship on race and racial divisions 
remains important, some scholars contend the type of research being conducted on race is less than 
fruitful. Critics have argued that the social sciences’ claim to understand race as a social construct is 
negated by their repeated use of racial identification as if it were a non-problematic set of categorical 
divisions (Martin and Yeung 2002: 522). For instance, after examining  four top social science journals 
(i.e., American Sociological Review, Demography, American Journal of Sociology, and Population 
Studies), Zuberi (2001) found that racial identification was most often employed as a cause variable in 
regressions and argued that such practice leads to reifying and essentializing race. Martin and Yeung’s 
(2003) investigation of the way race was analyzed from 1937-1999 in the American Sociological Review 
led them to similar conclusions. The authors found that the odds of analyzing race have increased over 
time, but linked the increase in odds to an increase in quantitative methods. They too concluded that 
social science researchers rely on a broad but shallow understanding of race by only controlling for racial 
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identification. This trend supports the normalization of race—meaning that race helps explain other 
variables, but does not itself need explained (Martin and Yeung 2002). 
This limitation extends beyond quantitative studies of race. Loveman critiques theoretical 
frameworks on race (e.g., racial formation, racialized social system) on the grounds that the frameworks 
over-theorize the significance of structurally-based racial categories. Moreover, Loveman (1999) argues 
that there is a difference between “imposed categories, the identity of the categorized, and experienced 
groupness” and that often research “does not recognize the variability and contingency of the ‘real’ 
consequences of ‘race’ as… a principle of vision and division of the social world” (p. 892). Loveman 
advocates for a reconsideration of race, in which scholars study race as a ‘category of practice’ rather than 
taking for granted racial ‘categories of analysis’ (see also, Wacquant 1997). These limitations are 
summarized by Bobo and Fox (2003): 
“sociologists have done much to examine the material economic and political consequences of 
socially recognized membership in particular ethnoracial categories. In themselves, however, 
such differences do not explain how people develop such categorization and identities, how they 
imbue ethnoracial groups with meaning, or when and how they draw on salient identities, beliefs, 
and feelings in any particular context or setting” (p 325).  
 
Innovative Approaches to Measuring Race  
 
 In the last decade, scholars began to consider innovative approaches to better capture the 
variation, meaning, and significance of race. Some researchers (e.g., Campbell and Troyer 2007; Harris 
and Sim 2002; Roth 2010; Saperstein 2006) have explored variations in racial identification as a useful 
way to understand differences within the phenomenology of race. For example, Roth (2010) suggests 
operationalizing a respondent’s reply to a race question on a survey as an expressed racial identification, 
an interviewer’s assessment of a respondent’s race during a survey as an observed racial identification, or 
interviewer assessed skin color as phenotype-based classifications. Consistent with this 
operationalization, scholars have found that youth report various racial identifications within the same 
survey depending on the context in which it was asked (Harris and Sim 2002), and across surveys over 
time (Hitlin, Brown, and Elder 2006; Saperstein and Penner 2012).  
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Roth (2010:1307) claims each form of racial identification “represent[s] different dimensions of 
the lived experience of race”. For example, research examining more than one type of racial identification 
has revealed meaningful differences in outcomes by identification type (e.g., Bailey, Loveman, and 
Muniz 2012; Campbell and Troyer 2007; Saperstein 2008) and other research contends that inconsistent 
racial identifications might represent a weakened racial identity or self-concept (Laster and Brown, in 
progress). Although research using multiple measures of racial identification is an improvement to a 
single-indicator of self-reported racial identification, the meaning and salience of belonging to a racial 
category is not fully addressed. 
Psychologists have begun novel attempts to distinguish and capture aspects of racial identity. 
Phinney (1992) conducted factor analysis on data from 417 high school students and 136 college students, 
which led to the creation of the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). The analysis revealed that 
affirmation/belonging (i.e., ethnic pride, being happy with one’s membership, feeling good about one’s 
background, feelings of belonging and attachment), ethnic identity achievement (i.e., continuous 
measurement, ranging from lack of commitment to a clear understanding of the role of ethnicity for 
oneself), and ethnic behaviors (i.e., involvement in social activities with ethnic group members, 
participation in cultural traditions) loaded onto separate factors of ethnic identity. Phinney (1990; 1992) 
uses ethnicity rather than race in her framework, because she contends such measures can apply 
universally to all groups.  
Sellers and colleagues (1998) also developed a multidimensional approach to racial identity. As 
opposed to a universal/mainstream approach like Phinney’s (1990; 1992), Sellers and colleagues 
emphasized the unique history of blackness to inform their model of black racial identity called the 
Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI). The MMRI is made up of four dimensions. Racial 
salience refers to the extent to which one’s race is a relevant part of one’s self-concept at a particular 
moment or situation. Racial centrality refers to the extent to which one defines themselves normatively 
concerning race. Unlike salience, centrality is thought to be relatively stable and emphasizes the rank race 
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has among self-concepts.	  Racial regard refers to a person’s affective and evaluative judgment of their race 
in terms of positive-negative judgment. Private regard emphasizes one’s own regard towards being black 
while public regard emphasizes how individuals feel others view black.  Finally, racial ideology is 
composed of individual’s beliefs, opinions, and attitudes with respect to the way she or he feels that 
members of the race should act. For instance, a nationalist ideology stresses the uniqueness of being a 
particular race group, whereas a humanist ideology emphasizes the similarities among all humans. Both 
Phinney (1990; 1992) and Sellers et al. (1998) emphasize that in order to capture the phenomenology of 
race, measurements must include dimensions of meaning, attachment, beliefs, and behaviors. 
Importantly, Sellers and colleagues (1998) link their concepts of multidimensional racial identity 
to other social outcomes. They argue that for the most part, race-related behaviors and activities should be 
highly correlated with the person’s subjective beliefs about the importance of race in their self-concept. 
Further, they contend regard and ideology are most linked to influencing behavior, but argue that regard 
and ideology will have a greater influence on behaviors when the salience and centrality of one’s identity 
within a situation is high.  
Finally, researchers have also begun to take more seriously phenotype as an additional measure 
that is also important for differentiating phenomenological experiences of race. In societies in which race 
is highly salient and often used as a device for discrimination, skin color is one easily utilized marker for 
race (Keith and Herring 1991). Phenotype is also important for individuals’ racial identification. For 
instance, researchers found that the majority of respondents sampled in a national phone survey of the 
United States, used color (e.g., black), as opposed to racial category (e.g., African American), to identify 
themselves (Davis, Jackson and Aicardi 2012). In addition, Roth (2010:1309) argues that the reliance on 
racial categories over phenotype in social science research might actually “associate racial categorization 
too closely with biology”. Considering how the social construction of race is often inferred from 
phenotype characteristics, it is important to acknowledge and explore the impact of phenotype 
characteristics, such as skin color, in social scientific research on race as well.  
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The Phenomenology of Race in Groups Positioned in Racial Limbo 
I argue that a multidimensional measurement of racial identification (as opposed to a single-item 
self-reported racial identification) is especially needed for groups positioned in racial limbo. I inform this 
argument by considering biracial identity theory in the United States and descriptions of coloureds’ varied 
identification options in contemporary South Africa. First, Tatum (1992) explains racial identity 
development is more complex for biracials in the United States because they must balance racial 
socialization into two separate racial groups. Moreover, they sometimes encounter dissonance when 
contrasting their more malleable understanding of racial identifications with others’ rigid categorizations 
(e.g., can I see myself as biracial if others do not accept me as that?).  
Further, Rockquemore and Brunsma’s (2008) qualitative interviews with black-white biracials led 
to the creation of what they called the “taxonomy of racial identity options.” Their interviews suggested 
that American biracials chose from: a singular identity (singular black or white); a border identity 
(exclusively biracial); a protean identity (sometimes black, sometimes white, and sometimes biracial, 
depending on context); and a transcendent identity (no racial identity). Rockquemore and Brunsma 
contend that U.S. biracials’ identity options are less constrained because of their intermediary position on 
the racial hierarchy.  
Rockquemore and Brunsma’s (2002) quantitative work revealed that various factors were linked 
to the taxonomy of racial identity options for biracial respondents. These authors found that the racial 
composition of respondents’ social networks (i.e., living in majority white neighborhoods), push and pull 
factors from whites and blacks (i.e., negative treatment from blacks/whites), socioeconomic status, and 
physical appearance (i.e., skin color) all impact identity choices. For example, respondents with primarily 
white social networks were more likely to identify as singular white, whereas respondents who reported 
negative treatment from whites were more likely to identify as singular black. To sum, Rockquemore and 
Brunsma’s work (2002, 2008) suggests that belonging to a group positioned in racial limbo is not a 
singular phenomenological experience, and that many social factors influence the way they identify.   
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Coloureds in South Africa and biracials in the United States share commonalities regarding the 
legacy of miscegenation between whites and blacks and their contemporary position in racial limbo 
(Frederickson 1981; Marx 1998). For instance, in my previous fieldwork, I found that both U.S. biracials 
and South African coloureds spoke about fluidity in racial identification (Laster 2008). With specific 
regard to coloured South Africans, Morse and Peele (1974:327) explain, “the perceptual or attitudinal 
walls that separate most ethnic and racial groups from other such groups are underdeveloped for 
coloureds, allowing more comparison and more contrast.”  Furthermore, research has suggested that 
coloureds in South Africa often fluctuate between two worlds (Laster 2008).  According to Erasmus 
(2001a:3), “being Coloured means being the privileged Black and the ‘not quite White’ person.”  Jackson 
(2003) also comments on coloureds’ dynamic lived experiences stating, “the fact that Coloureds are 
diasporic and fragmented mixture of several different, spatially dispersed groups means their history 
offers none of the conventional qualities associated with ethnically distinct populations” (p. 69).  
Through her personal experience as coloured and research on coloureds, Erasmus (2001b) was 
also led to create a taxonomy of racial identity options for coloureds. According to Erasmus, coloured 
identity ranges from striving towards whiteness, eagerness to be authentically black, clinging to Khoisan 
(i.e., slave) history, or by trying to transcend racial category, often signaled by qualifying their coloured 
identification with ‘so-called’(i.e., “Us ‘so-called’ coloureds”).  What is important to note here, is the idea 
that coloureds’ “groupness” that some scholars emphasize, may not fully capture differences in coloureds’ 
phenomenology of race.  
Furthermore, skin color is an important factor in the categorization of coloured South Africans. 
Erasmus explains how variation in skin color can impact a coloured racial identification: “dark skin and 
kinky hair are the markings of coloureds constructed as 'other coloured', inferior or lower class. These 
excluding relations are reflections of unresolved internal contradictions at the heart of coloured identity 
formation. Living with these contradictions is part of the pain of being coloured” (2001a:23). Erasmus 
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reiterates that coloured South Africans are not always accepted as one distinct racial category, and 
suggests markers of phenotype such as skin color, can create divisions within who is considered coloured.  
Together the research overviewed suggests that a single indicator of self-reported racial 
identification is limited in capturing the phenomenology of race, and that this might be especially true for 
groups positioned in racial limbo. Rather than treating coloureds as a monolithic group, this study asks 
whether coloureds should be examined by using a multidimensional measure of racial identification. 
More specifically, I use latent class analysis as a methodological approach to capture the variation in 
phenomenologies of race within a sample of coloured South Africans. 
Latent Class Analysis as a Methodological Approach for Capturing the Phenomenology of Race 
Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical technique that classifies similar individuals into groups 
based on their responses to a set of observed categorical variables (Madgison and Vermunt 2001; 
Vermunt and Magidson 2004). Latent class analysis has been used in various research areas. For example, 
it has been used to assess classes of depression (Lanza, Flaherty, and Collins 2003), teaching styles 
(Aitkin, Anderson and Hinde 1981), and as a multivariate way to study poverty (Dewilde 2004) and 
substance abuse behaviors (e.g., Chung, Flaherty and Schafer 2006; Lanza and Collins 2006; Velicer, 
Martin, Collins 1996).  
Latent class analysis has yet to be capitalized on in the race research. One exception was Huang’s 
(2006) piece, “Dimensions of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and National Identity in Taiwan.” Huang 
sought out to confirm whether there was a difference between Taiwanese and Chinese ethnic identities. 
Using LCA to analyze twelve instruments from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study 
(TEDS) 2001 survey, Huang located four groups: dual-identifiers, social Taiwanese identifier, hard 
Taiwanese identifier, and Chinese identifier. As a result, Huang argued that the standardly employed four 
major ethnic groups (based on respondents’ fathers’ ethnicity) did not correspond with the dimensions of 
identity. Moreover, he concluded that identity politics in Taiwan are multidimensional in nature and 
deserve more careful attention. Likewise, I argue those in racial limbo might have identifications that are 
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multidimensional and therefore adapt the latent class analysis technique to the current study. I argue that 
in using instruments theorized to capture the phenomenology of race, the latent class analysis will 
produce a multidimensional measure of coloured identification.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
In Study One I found evidence to support the assertion that the apartheid nation-state cultivated a 
position of racial limbo for coloureds, and in Study Two I found that coloureds’ attitudes in post-
apartheid South Africa reflect their intermediate, historical position. I extend previous findings by 
exploring whether a multidimensional measure of coloured racial identification (as opposed to a single-
item self-reported racial identification) provides better support that coloureds’ position in racial limbo is 
reflected in outcomes.  
Although this analysis is exploratory, I consider findings from Study Two and the aforementioned 
literature regarding innovative approaches to measure race in order to formulate hypotheses. First, I 
expect the latent class analysis to uncover multiple unobserved subgroups within those reporting a 
coloured identification. The selected instrumental variables used in the latent class analysis are theorized 
to capture the phenomenology of race. As such, I postulate those who score similarly on items linked to 
racial centrality, behaviors, and ideologies will be placed in the same latent class. In addition, I expect 
that skin color will impact the structure of the latent classes, such that differences in skin color will be 
linked to the distribution of coloureds’ across the latent classes.  
Second, I expect that the latent classes will differ on criterion variables. This means the coloured 
classes purporting different phenomenologies of race will also have different attitudes and perceptions of 
deprivation. Third, I expect the latent class analysis will produce subgroups within the coloured 
population that map unto their position in racial limbo; the experience of being pulled toward either white 
or black South Africans. That is, I expect to find a subgroup of coloureds with similar generalized 
attitudes and perceptions of deprivation to white South Africans, a subgroup of coloureds with similar 
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generalized attitudes and perceptions of deprivation to black South Africans, and a subgroup of coloureds 
with intermediary generalized attitudes and perceptions of deprivation. This finding would allow me to I 
assess whether coloureds as a whole are positioned in racial limbo, or whether the racial limbo is the 
result of multiple subgroups.  
Figure 1 illustrates the limitation of initial analyses which relied on a single-indicator; it shows 
how coloureds’ attitudes can be intermediary between white and black South Africans, but can also have 
a wider range of variation (i.e., error bar). Figure 2 illustrates the subgroups within the coloured category 
(located using LCA) that might better explain the variation within coloureds as a group positioned in 
racial limbo.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data  
 
 I used survey data from the Cape Town Area Study (CAS) for this study (Seekings et al. 2005). 
CAS was collected as a part of the multi-wave Cape Town Panel Study (CAPS), and as a part of an 
international, multi-city study called the Social Hubble project. The purpose of CAPS was to study the 
lives of youths and adults in metropolitan Cape Town. CAPS began in 2000 with Wave 1 and Wave 4 
concluded in 2004. In 2005, researchers re-interviewed respondents for CAS, this time using a survey 
instrument crafted by researchers of the Social Hubble project. The CAS survey was one of many surveys 
directly modeled after the Detroit Area Study (conducted by the University of Michigan in the United 
States). Serving as an addition to both the CAPS and Social Hubble project, the primary goal of CAS was 
to study diversity and inequality in Cape Town. CAS data is employed in the current analysis because it 
includes measurements needed for the instruments theorized to capture the phenomenology of race (e.g., 
racial identification, racial centrality, skin color).  
With a population of almost three million people, Cape Town is the oldest and one of the largest 
cities in South Africa. Most coloured history is grounded in this area; only 5% of coloureds have 
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immigrated to the area since the 1990s (Seekings et al. 2005). Cape Town continues to be meaningful 
space for preservation of coloured identity (Bestman 2001; Jackson 2003). According CAS researchers, 
Cape Town is also a valuable research site is due to its racial heterogeneity and the apartheid 
government’s stronghold over the area (Seekings et al. 2005). Figure 3 was taken from the report of CAS 
(Seekings et al. 2005) and shows Cape Town’s racial demographics by race.  
CAS used a two-stage cluster sample design to generate a representative sample of 1,200 
respondents over eighteen years of age, spread across metropolitan Cape Town. The response rate was 
66%. Forty-one percent of respondents reported a coloured racial identification. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics (e.g., range, mean, standard deviation) of study variables. Control and instrumental 
variables had no more than 5.2% missing and results are based upon listwise deletion. 
Methods and Analytical Techniques   
All analyses were conducted in Stata 11.2. Results account for CAS complex survey design and 
sampling weights were applied such that results generalized to population parameters. The analysis for 
this study was completed in three steps. 
Part One.  First, I replicated analysis from Study Two using the CAS. Specifically, I used 
standardized t-test and regression models in this part of the analysis to determine whether coloureds’ 
generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation were numerically between and statistically 
significantly different from white and black South Africans. This represents a baseline analysis of the 
criterion variables. Having a baseline analysis will allow me to compare post-LCA analyses in order to 
explore my hypotheses that the subgroups of coloureds are different from each other and are more or less 
similar to either white or black South Africans.  
Part Two. Next, I conducted the latent class analysis. In latent class analysis, individuals are 
assumed to belong of a set of latent classes, with the number of classes and their sizes not known a priori. 
Individuals belonging to the same class should be similar with respect to their observed scores, which are 
assumed to come from the same probability distributions. Furthermore, latent class analysis is a model-
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based, person-centered clustering approach. “The basic idea underlying latent class analysis is a very 
simple one: some of the parameters of a postulated statistical model differ across un-observed subgroups” 
(Vermunt and Magidson 2004:1).  Latent class analysis uses a probability clustering approach, with the 
goal of minimizing within-cluster variation and maximizing between-cluster variation (Vermunt and 
Magidson 2000). The latent class model for nominal or ordinal variables takes the form of: 
 
Here, yi denotes an object’s scores on a set of observed variables, K is the number of clusters, and πk 
denotes the prior probability of belonging to latent class k, or the size of class k. J denotes the total 
number of instruments and j is a particular instrument. The distribution of yij given the model parameters 
θ, f (yij| θjk), is assumed to be a multinomial distribution.  
To conduct the latent class analysis, I used the LCA Stata Plugin developed by The Methodology 
Center at Pennsylvania State University (Lanza et al. 2014). Using the LCA Stata Plugin, parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood using the expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm. I used the 
standard model selection tools (i.e., AIC, BIC, Adjusted BIC, and G2 statistic) to determine the best fit 
solution (Nylund, Asparouhov, Muthen 2007; Madigson and Vermunt 2001; Vermunt and Madgison 
2000).  
Part Three. Finally, I concatenated the new latent class data with the existing data and using the 
full data, I replicated the first set of analyses. That is, I examined whether the latent classes of coloureds’ 
generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation were statistically significantly different from each 
other and white and black South Africans. This allowed me to explore how a multidimensional measure 
of coloureds’ racial identification performs in terms of demonstrating whether coloureds’ generalized 
attitudes and perceptions of deprivation reflects their position in racial limbo.  
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Measures 
Instrumental Variables - In this analysis, instrumental variables refer to those measures that 
distinguished subgroups in the coloured population. The selected instruments come from Module F of the 
CAS, which was created with the goal to explore “race and culture, including both the respondents’ own 
identities and their perceptions of and relationships with people of different races or cultures” (Seekings 
et al. 2005:29). I argue the instrumental variables in Module F speak to the phenomenology of race. Out 
of the twelve initial Module F instruments I explored, I kept seven instruments that produced valuable 
item response probabilities for the latent classes.[1] 
First, whether the respondent would marry out of their race was captured in three separate dummy 
variables (1=yes): pro-marriage to black South Africans, pro-marriage to Indian South Africans, and pro-
marriage to white South Africans. Then, interracial contact in last week was captured by the question “In 
the last seven days, have you spent a social evening or some free time with friends or acquaintances who 
are not your race, either at home, going out to eat, or at a community or religious gathering? Answers 
were 1=“yes” and 0=“no.” Next, respondents were asked to respond to the statement, “You do not feel 
comfortable around people who are not your race.” Answers for the variable, comfortable around other 
races, were reverse coded so that 1=“comfortable” and 0=“not comfortable.” Broadly, these measures 
capture attitudes and interactions towards other groups and are therefore associated with racial ideologies 
and behaviors (Phinney 1992; Sellers et al. 1998). Furthermore, respondents who favor within-group 
interactions are likely to correspond with Sellers et al. (1998) conceptualization of nationalist ideology, 
whereas respondents who are more open to interracial interactions and relationships hold more humanist 
ideologies.   
Next, inconsistent racial identification captured whether the respondent’s self-racial identification 
was inconsistent (i.e., did not match) with the interviewer’s racial identification of the respondent, or if 
the respondent’s answer to the question, “How do most other people see you?” was inconsistent with their 
own self-racial identification. Respondents that received a ‘1’ on this variable had at least one form of 
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inconsistency, whereas those that received a ‘0’ were inconsistent across all measures. This measure is 
linked to racial centrality, which refers to the extent to which one defines themselves with regard to race 
across situations and captures belonging and attachment (Sellers et al. 1998). If coloureds have high and 
consistent racial identifications, they most likely send off strong and consistent signals of their race to 
others. Such signaling is linked to higher consistency (Laster and Brown, in progress; Roth 2010).  
Racial identification importance captures whether the respondent said their race was the most 
important to them in the question “Sometimes we have preferences as to how you would like other people 
to see us. You have told us that you see yourself in racial terms as [race], in cultural terms as [culture], 
and in class terms as [class]. Which of these is most important to you?” As such, respondents who 
answered that their race was most important received a ‘1’ on racial identification importance and all 
other respondents received a ‘0’ on this variable. Importance of racial identification is related to high 
racial centrality (i.e., the rank of race in terms of self-concept) as well (Sellers et al. 1998). 
Finally, I included skin color as an additional instrumental variable, but one that has the potential 
to group respondents across classes. Skin color was an interviewer-report ranging from “very light” to 
“very dark.” Responses were concatenated so that 1-4= “light”, 5=“medium”, and 6-10=“dark”. Skin 
color is one important and easily utilized marker for race (Davis, Johnson, and Aicardi 2012; Keith and 
Herring 1991). Skin color differences can also be linked to differential phenomenological experiences of 
race. For that reason, it is important to consider skin color in a multidimensional measure of racial 
identification. However, skin color diverges from other instruments because reported from others’ (i.e., 
interviewers) perceptions. Therefore, treated skin color was treated as a grouping variable in the latent 
class analysis.  
Independent Variables. The primary independent variable was racial identification. For the 
baseline (i.e., part one) analysis, racial identification was captured by dummy variables indicating 
respondents’ self-identification as black/African, coloured, and white. For the replicated (i.e., part three) 
analysis, coloured racial identification was derived from the latent classes. Therefore, racial identification 
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was captured by dummy variables indicating black and white South Africans self-identification and 
dummy variables indicating coloureds’ latent sub-grouping.  
Outcome Variables. Dependent variables for this study stand as criterion variables for this 
analysis. The outcomes selected were consistent with those analyzed in Study Two: generalized attitudes 
and perceived relative deprivation.  Pride in being South African captured whether or not the respondent 
believed being South African was important, with 1=“important” and 0=“not important.” Race relations 
improved since 1994 asked respondents, “do you think relations between people of different races in 
South Africa are better or worse than they were before 1994 or are they about the same?” Answers were 
coded so that 1=“better” and 0=“the same or worse”. Likewise, race relations will improve asked 
respondents, “do you think relations between people of different races in South Africa will be better or 
worse in 2015 than they are now, or will they be about the same?” Answers were coded so that 1=“better” 
and 0=“the same or worse”. 
The next two outcomes dealt with political attitudes and engagement. Identification with a 
political party was a dichotomous measure capturing whether the respondent identified closely with a 
political party, with 1=“yes” and 0=“no”. Protest captured whether respondents have attended a protest or 
political march in the last year, and categories include 0=“No, would never do this”, 1=“ yes, and would 
do if had the chance”. 
The final two outcomes captured perceptions of relative deprivation. For the measure of 
egoistical economic deprivation, respondents were asked, “How rich you are, relative to others in South 
Africa?” Answers ranged from 0=“very rich” to 10=“very poor”. This measure is considered egoistical 
because respondents are asked about individual level comparisons (see Runciman 1966). For the measure 
of fraternal treatment deprivation, respondents were asked, “Since 2000 were you treated worse or 
benefited because of your race?” Answers ranged from 1= “benefited”, 2= “neither”, and 3= “treated 
worse”. This measure is considered fraternal because respondents are asked about group level 
comparisons.  
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Control Variables. Control variables included sex (1=male; 0=female), age (continuous), and 
religious attendance (1=yes, 0=no). I also controlled for socioeconomic status. It was captured by: 
educational attainment (continuous), employment status (1=employed; 0=unemployed), and household 
accommodations, which recorded how many flush toilets were in a respondent’s home. Measures such as 
household accommodations can better capture SES than income in South Africa  (Seekings et al. 2005). 
These controls were consistent with the controls used in Study Two.    
 
RESULTS  
Part One: Baseline Analysis  
 Table 2 shows mean levels of control and outcome variables by racial identification. Statistical 
significance is denoted as a, b, and c, where ‘a’ denotes a statistically significant difference between 
coloureds and white South Africans; ‘b’ denotes a statistically significant difference between coloureds 
and black South Africans; and ‘c’ denotes a statistically significant difference between white South 
Africans and black South Africans. Table 2 represents the baseline analysis for this study.  
In terms of the outcomes, presented in the bottom of Table 2, coloureds’ generalized attitudes and 
perceptions of deprivation were significantly different from white South Africans in five out of seven 
outcomes (71%), and coloureds’ generalized attitudes and perceptions of deprivation were also 
significantly different from black South Africans in five out of seven outcomes (71%). Black and white 
South Africans were significantly different from each other on all outcomes. Furthermore, results show 
that coloureds’ were significantly different from white and black South Africans, and their mean level on 
the outcomes were intermediary between white and black South Africans in four out of the seven 
outcomes (57%). Those outcomes were pride in being South African, protest, egoistical economic 
deprivation, and fraternal treatment deprivation. Black South Africans reported the most pride in being 
South African, the highest propensity to protest, the highest individual-level economic deprivation, but 
the lowest amount of group-level mistreatment from the government. Contrarily, white South Africans 
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were the least prideful in being South African, reported the lowest propensity to protest, lowest 
individual-level economic deprivation, and the highest amount of group-level mistreatment from the 
government. Coloureds’ attitudes and perceived relative deprivation on those measures were intermediary 
between white and black South Africans. Altogether, coloureds’ mean level of generalized attitudes and 
perceptions of relative deprivation modestly reflect their position in racial limbo in the CAS data.  
 Given the differences in sample composition, I next examined whether associations between 
racial identification and the outcomes (as reported above) were robust after controlling for age, gender, 
religious participation, education employment, and household accommodations. Results are shown in 
Table 3. Models for pride in being South African, race relations will improve, political identification, and 
protest were consistent with bivariate results. The inclusion of control variables did alter the relationship 
between racial identification and the remaining three outcomes, which diminished the number of 
outcomes coloureds were significantly different from both white and black South Africans. Taking these 
changes into account, support that coloureds’ attitudes and perceptions reflect their position in racial 
limbo is diminished.  
Part Two: Latent Class Analysis  
After completing the baseline analysis, I moved onto the latent class analysis, which was 
conducted on the coloured subset of CAS. Seven latent instruments were used in the latent class model. I 
began by specifying one latent class and then repeated the process, increasing the specified latent class 
number each time. I determined the most reliable and valid model solution using various fit measures. 
According to fit measures shown in Table 4, the two-class model was the best solution. The two-class 
model (bolded) had the lowest AIC, BIC, and adjusted BIC. Furthermore, the drop in the G2 relative to 
the drop in degrees of freedom was the most substantial from one latent class to two latent classes.  
I next checked for identification issues by repeating the estimation using different seeds. The 
model was identified because the two-class solution was dominant across various sets of start values 
(Lanza et al. 2007). Finally, class probabilities and substantive considerations were taken into account. 
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Informed by Nylund, Asparouhov and Muthen (2007), these results suggest, with confidence, that the 
two-class solution best fits the data.[2] The Latent Class Plug-In (Lanza et al. 2014) bases assignment into 
a class from twenty pseudo-class draws, which come from the multinomial distribution defined by each 
individual’s posterior probability.  
I named the two classes the coloured core and the coloured fringe. Approximately 82% of 
coloured respondents best fit into the coloured core category, and 18% best fit into the coloured fringe 
category. Therefore, my first hypothesis (H1) that the latent class analysis would locate multiple 
subgroups was supported.  
Table 5 shows the item response probabilities for each latent class. The coloured core is generally 
supportive to interracial marriage, with a probability of over .99 for pro-marriage to white and black 
South Africans and a probability of .98 for pro-marriage to Indian South Africans. Conversely, the 
coloured fringe was more generally against interracial marriage; a probability of .96 for being against 
marriage to black South Africans, .68 for being against marriage to Indian South Africans, and a 
probability of .49 for being against marriage to white South Africans. The coloured core had a probability 
of .27 for having interracial contact in the last week, compared to a probability of .16 for the coloured 
fringe. Finally, the coloured core had a probability of .87 for feeling comfortable around other races, 
whereas the coloured fringe had a probability of .67. The coloured fringe held negative attitudes toward 
interracial marriage, felt less comfortable around other races, and had less contact with people of a 
different race. In general, the results suggest the coloured fringe class conveys racial behaviors and racial 
ideologies that favor coloureds, which is associated with more with nationalist ideology regarding their 
race (i.e., self-contained among coloureds), compared to the more humanist ideology (i.e., diverse and 
collective) as purported by the coloured core. 
Racial identification inconsistency was not common among the respondents, but the coloured 
fringe had a higher probability of being inconsistently identified (.20) compared to the probability for the 
coloured core (.09). Greater inconsistency could indicate less racial centrality because it suggests such 
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respondents might not strongly signal their race. However, the coloured fringe had a probability of .40 for 
reporting that their racial identification was important, compared to a probability of .22 for the coloured 
core. Thus, the coloured fringe scored higher on this measure of racial centrality. Jointly, this could 
insinuate the coloured fringe believes their coloured identification is important, and therefore might be 
more cognizant of when they are incorrectly identified. Figure Two plots item response probabilities for 
the two classes.  
After I selected the best-fit latent class model, I then incorporated a grouping variable for skin 
color. Given the potential for skin color to pattern coloureds’ phenomenological experience of race, my 
expectation was that class structure would vary across skin color levels. Thus, to test whether 
measurement was invariant across skin color categories, the model was run with all parameters freely 
estimated and then again with the constrained model (i.e., item-response probabilities constrained equal 
across groups). The G2 statistic was 188.58 (df=338) for the freely estimated model and 212.60 (df=366) 
for the constrained model. This resulted in a likelihood-ratio difference test statistic of 24 (df=28). This 
difference was not statistically significant, providing evidence that the latent classes have the same 
meaning across levels of skin color; thus my expectation was not supported.[3] I present a table and 
figures documenting item-response probabilities for the three skin color levels in the appendix.  
Finally, in additional supplementary analyses, I examined whether the control variables 
influenced the results. I found that age and education were significant (p < .05) predictors of class 
membership. For every year increase in age, respondents were 19% more likely to be in the coloured 
fringe class. For every unit increase in education, respondents were 2% less likely to be in the coloured 
fringe class. Even with the inclusion of covariates, the two-factor model remained the best fitting model. 
In other words, the results confirmed that two dimensions of coloured identification was robust even after 
controlling for the potentially confounding factors. 
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Part Three: Replication Analysis using Latent Classes 
 Table 6 shows the replication of the baseline analysis. The difference in Table 6 compared to 
Table 2 is that coloured racial identification is now two categories, representing the coloured core and 
coloured fringe classes. Significance is denoted as a, b, c, and d. The first column of ‘a’s denotes a 
statistically significant difference between the coloured core and white South Africans, the second column 
of ‘a’s denote a statistically significant difference between the coloured fringe and white South Africans; 
the first column of ‘b’s denote a statistically significant difference between the coloured core and black 
South Africans, and the second column of ‘b’s denote a statistically significant difference between 
coloured fringe and black South Africans; ‘c’ denotes a statistically significant difference between white 
South Africans and black South Africans; and ‘d’ denotes a statistically significant difference between the 
coloured core and coloured fringe. I first describe results comparing the two coloured classes on the 
criterion variables and then discuss comparisons between the two classes with white and black South 
Africans, respectively.  
The coloured fringe were significantly older than the coloured core (43 compared to 38 years 
old). The coloured fringe also had lower socioeconomic status compared to the core, although only 
education level was significantly different. Moreover, the coloured fringe had significantly less education 
than the coloured core class (9.9 years compared to 8.6). There were no other statistically significant 
differences in control variables across the two coloured classes.  
The coloured core and coloured fringe were significantly different from each other on only two 
outcome variables—the two variables related to racial attitudes. The coloured fringe held a bleak outlook 
on race relations; only 52% reported that race relations had improved since 1994 and 63% reported that 
race relations would improve in the future. This significantly differs from the 72% of the coloured core 
who believed race relations had improved and the 79% who believed they would improve. The coloured 
fringe did not significantly differ from the coloured core on any other attitudes or perceived relative 
deprivation.  
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Introducing control variables in the regression analyses (shown in Table 7), did not change the 
relationship between the two coloured classes and the outcomes; the coloured fringe was significantly 
different from the coloured core for the outcomes capturing whether respondents felt race relations had 
improved since 1994 or that race relations would improve. On the whole, the coloured core differed from 
the coloured fringe in less than 30% of the outcomes. Therefore, my expectation (H2) that the coloured 
classes would significantly differ on criterion variables was not supported.  
Recognizably, my hypothesis (H3) that the latent class analysis would produce three subgroups 
that would map unto white-coloured-black distinctions did not hold, given the LCA only located two 
subgroups. However, I did assess the extent to which either of the coloured classes were similar white or 
black South Africans. In terms of latent class differences compared to white and black South Africans, the 
coloured fringe was statistically different from white South Africans in 71% of the criterion variables and 
statistically different from black South Africans in 57% of the criterion variables. Conversely, the 
coloured core was statistically different from white South Africans in 57% of the outcomes and 
statistically different from black South Africans in 86% of the outcomes. As such, the results suggest that 
the coloured core reported attitudes and perceptions of deprivation that aligned more with those of white 
South Africans. Contrarily, the coloured fringe reported attitudes and perceptions of deprivation that 
aligned more with black South Africans. Perhaps results could be interpreted as indicating the two classes 
are pulled slightly toward either white or black South Africans. Yet, taken all together, the two coloured 
classes are significantly different from both white and black South Africans in the majority (>50%) of all 
criterion variables. Indeed, the coloured core and fringe were more alike each other on the criterion 
variables than they were to white or black South Africans. Therefore my final hypotheses were fully 
rejected.  
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DISCUSSION  
In Study Two of this dissertation project I found evidence that coloureds’ attitudes in post-
apartheid South Africa reflected their historical position in racial limbo. In this current study, I further 
interrogated the concept of racial limbo by attempting to create a multidimensional measurement of 
coloured racial identification. The recent wave of research that suggests a single-item racial identification 
does not fully nor accurately capture the phenomenology of race (e.g., Loveman 1999; Martin and Yeung 
2003; Wacquant 1997; Zuberi 2001) informed the rationale behind this study. I argued these critiques 
were especially important to consider in research of groups positioned in racial limbo. Research suggests 
push and pull factors might be linked to differences in lived experiences within these groups (e.g., 
Adhikari 2005; Erasmus 2001a, 2001b; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008; Tatum 2003).     
I first replicated analyses from Study Two in the baseline analysis to determine whether 
coloureds’ generalized attitudes and perceived relative deprivation were numerically between and 
statistically significantly different from white and black South Africans. I found moderate support; 
coloureds had mean levels of attitudes and perceptions of deprivation that were between and statistically 
significant from white and black South Africans in 57% of the outcomes. I then used regression models to 
explore whether these results were robust after adding in controls. In the regression analysis, coloureds’ 
attitudes and perceived relative deprivation were only intermediary in only 29% of the outcomes.  
Results in Study Three, using data from the Cape Town Area Study (CAS), were inconsistent 
with those in Study Two, which used data from the Southern African Barometer (SAB). Generalized 
attitudes and perceived relative deprivation were less distinguished across racial groups in those sampled 
in the CAS, compared to those included in the national level sampling used by the SAB.  Moreover, 
social demographics had a stronger impact on the relationship between racial identification and the 
outcomes in the Cape Town sample. I speculate that living in Cape Town, the most racially diverse city in 
South Africa, might pattern individuals’ social experiences, which could diminish the differences across 
those groups all living in the same metropolitan area compared to those surveyed nationally. In addition, 
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the outcome variables used were different across the CAS and SAB. Therefore, both sampling and 
measurement variability could account for the inconsistent results. 
In part two of this analysis, I presented latent class analysis as an innovative methodological 
approach to capture the phenomenology of race. More specifically, the instrumental variables were 
theorized to capture differences in the phenomenology of race such that those with divergent responses on 
these measures would placed in different latent classes. I found that the two-class solution was the most 
reliable, which lends support for two unobserved subgroups among those who identify as coloured. 
Considering how the majority of coloureds fit into one class (82%), I named this largest class the 
coloured core. The remaining 18% represented the coloured fringe class. Item-response probabilities 
revealed that ideologies and behaviors were the strongest drivers of these divisions, moreso than 
instruments that captured racial centrality. Specifically, those belonging to the coloured core class were 
more open to interracial relationships, had more contact with and felt more comfortable round other races. 
The coloured core also had more consistent coloured identification, but their racial identification was 
slightly less important to them, compared to those belonging to the coloured fringe class. Conversely, the 
coloured fringe held strong racial ideologies that favored coloureds and reported within-group behaviors. 
The coloured fringe also reported higher importance (i.e., centrality) of race. To borrow from Sellers et al. 
(1998), the coloured fringe might actually represent a wing of coloured ‘nationalists’, meaning they most 
concerned with, and perhaps believe it is best to support, their own group.  The majority, represented in 
the coloured core, held a more open and humanist orientation. 
Contrary to my expectation, I found that skin color did not impact the structure of the latent 
classes.  That is, although there were modest differences in probabilities for the two classes across skin 
color level (see Table 8 in appendix), skin color was invariant across the coloured core and coloured 
fringe, suggesting that others’ perceptions of coloureds’ skin color does not differentiate coloureds’ lived 
experiences. I did find that that age and education were predictive of class membership: older and less 
educated respondents were more likely to be in the fringe class. Perhaps some of the respondents who 
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lived through, and were disadvantaged by apartheid, best characterize the divergent coloured fringe 
group. Although this assumption is speculative because I do not have measures that could test this 
assumption, it may be that exposure to heighted levels of racial segregation and racial discrimination (as 
mandated through various apartheid laws) could have caused older and less educated coloureds to have a 
different, more isolated, phenomenology of race.  
Finally, using the full data, I replicated the first set of analyses to examine how the latent classes 
of coloureds performed on criterion variables. Consistent with my test of covariates in the latent class 
analysis, only age and education significantly differed across the two groups. Thus, the coloured core and 
coloured fringe were not different across most social demographic variables. In addition, the two coloured 
classes were only significantly different from each other on the outcomes measuring whether respondents 
felt race relations had or would improve. The coloured fringe held the bleakest attitudes when it came to 
those race-related measures, compared to all other groups.  
Part three of the analysis also revealed that both coloured classes were statistically different from 
white and black South Africans in over half of the outcomes. Although the attitudes and perceived 
relative deprivation reported by the coloured core were slightly more aligned with those of white South 
Africans, whereas attitudes and perceptions of deprivation reported by the coloured fringe reported that 
aligned more with black South Africans, the results were not robust enough to suggest a fully white-
leaning or black-leaning subgroup of coloureds.  
In sum, I argue the subgroups of coloureds were more like each other than either white or black 
South Africans. Even more, although the latent class analysis, which used instrumental variables 
theorized to capture the phenomenology of race, did produce a division within coloureds, the resulting 
latent classes did not correspond to significant differences across the criterion variables. All things 
considered, I argue a single-item, self-reported racial identification performs sufficiently well. In other 
words, a multidimensional measure of coloureds’ racial identification did not provide stronger evidence 
that coloreds’ position in racial limbo is reflected in outcomes in post-apartheid South Africa.  
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I consider four possibilities for these results. First, there may not be meaningful underlying 
classes of coloureds; coloreds could have a largely singular phenomenology of race. The legacy of 
apartheid and the rigid hierarchy could influence coloureds’ homogeneity. Second, the instrumental 
variables may not have been powerful enough to adequately capture the differences in coloureds’ 
phenomenology of race. That is, there could be underlying classes that were just not captured here. Third, 
the selection of criterion variables might not be the best selection or comprehensive enough to distinguish 
the classes. Fourth, and relatedly, these results could suggest that differences in the phenomenology of 
race is linked to racial attitudes, but are not robust enough to distinguish the members on other non race-
based social outcomes.   
Limitations  
 There are a few limitations that should be addressed. The CAS survey was used because it 
contained valuable instruments for the latent class analysis, but future research should replicate the 
present findings using national level data. Results here are constrained to the Cape Town area. For 
instance, adding similar race-probing questions to the Southern African Barometer could broaden the 
scope. Using other data sources could also help test the possibility that the criterion variables explored 
here underperformed.   
Thinking more broadly, analyses could be replicated across the Social Hubble project to 
determine if groups positioned in racial limbo in other contexts (e.g., pardos in the Belo Horizonte Area 
Study) contain unobserved subgroups. Perhaps coloureds are unalike other racially limbo groups. Though 
there were theoretical grounds for suggesting that innovative approaches are perhaps most needed for 
groups positioned in racial limbo, future analyses could also replicate latent class analysis on all racial 
groups. Such analyses could help determine if subgroups are more prominent in one racial group 
compared to the other. All of the aforementioned limitations and future recommendations would help 
improve the generalizability of this study.  
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As mentioned, instruments used in the latent class analysis may not be effective measures for 
capturing the differences in coloureds’ phenomenology of race. Racial identity measures directly 
informed by Sellers (e.g., “being black is an important reflection of who I am”, “I have a strong sense of 
belonging to coloured people”) or Phinney (e.g., “I am active in coloured organizations”, “I have spent 
time trying to find out more about my group, such as its history, traditions, and customs”) might perform 
better and should be explored.    
Importantly, survey research can be limiting in and of itself. Focusing on categories of analysis, 
rather than praxis (Loveman 1999) is an important limitation the current work does not address. 
Following up with qualitative interviews could help researchers determine whether such divisions are 
meaningful for individuals. Such research really allows for distinctions between imposed categories and 
individual’s choices and experiences to surface. 
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations  
 Despite the widespread rejection among social scientists that race is a biological or essential 
concept, research often relies on one measure of racial identification, and if we are not careful, this has 
the potential to reify race. Such methods are problematic because they reduce the phenomenology of race 
to a single-indicator that only captures individuals’ self-identification into a pre-ascribed racial category 
(Loveman 1999; Martin and Yeung 2003; Wacquant 1997; Zuberi 2001). Critics suggest alternative 
methods to overcome this limitation, such as using multiple forms of racial identification or measuring 
racial identities. Furthermore, biracial identity theory (e.g., Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008; Tatum 
2003) and reviews of contemporary coloured identifications (e.g., Adhikari 2005; Erasmus 2001a; 2001b) 
argued that examinations of groups positioned in racial limbo are in greater need of novel methods. Those 
in racial limbo are forced to juggle processes of racial identity development for multiple groups, which 
both complicates the development of such identities and opens up room to hold multiple or changeable 
identifications. To extend this literature, I contributed a multidimensional measurement of racial 
identification for coloured South Africans.  
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  The latent class analysis, which used instruments theorized to capture differences in the 
phenomenology of race, did in fact locate two latent factors. These two classes of coloureds initially 
suggested support that there are complex and nuanced divisions separating those who share membership 
into the coloured racial category. However, when assessed at the aggregate, I found the latent classes 
were not linked to strong divisions across criterion variables. Less than one in five coloureds fit into the 
fringe class, and the minority in the coloured fringe were more like the coloured core than either black or 
white South Africans. Rather than suggesting there is one ‘true’ group of coloureds in racial limbo and the 
others are pulled towards white or black South Africans, then, my analyses suggest that belonging to a 
group positioned in racial limbo might be a unifying experience of the phenomenology of race.   
Moreover, these analyses suggest imposed racial categories remain meaningful in quantitatively 
based social science research. That is, although there may be a modest amount of within-group 
heterogeneity in terms of the phenomenology of race, these differences do not remain significant when 
extending the examination to differences in social outcomes across race groups. Erasmus (2001a) 
contends: “in the context of post-apartheid South Africa we need to acknowledge the fluidity and the 
openness of identity” (p. 4) and further encourages “the need for moving beyond the replication of binary 
categories” (p.6). However, this current analysis suggests that, accounting for membership into the 
coloured category might actually suffice for analysis of racial differences within South Africa. Notably, 
this research suggests that even in an examination of a group in racial limbo, thought to be especially 
dynamic, a single-indicator of racial identification was sufficient.  
Conclusion  
Failing to gather and analyze data on race would mean failing adequately understand racial 
hierarchies and address inequality (ASA 2003). Yet, failing to think critically about the measurements of 
race can have unintended consequences, which could also meaning failing to adequately understand racial 
hierarchies and address inequality. This caution is especially important for research on racial limbo. 
Groups positioned in racial limbo often share more complicated paths to identity development because 
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they have to figure out where they fit into their society’s deterministic racial hierarchy. Further, the 
complex histories in the construction of racial limbo results in larger within-group variation in lived 
experiences of race. Findings from this analysis on coloureds reveal that taking into consideration 
psychologically informed measures of the phenomenology of race might locate unobserved subgroups. 
However, the latent classes showed no criterion validity; the intragroup dimensions were not associated 
with intergroup variation. As such, using a single-indicator continues to be a useful and effective 
measurement when analyzing groups in a highly racialized society. Moreover, findings from this study 
question the value of micro-level concepts of race in a society where race categories are still treated as 
essential and normalized. 
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NOTES:  
[1] The instruments that did not perform well were: (1) parents’ racial identification, captured whether 
respondent’s had parents with a different ancestry; (2) racial mistrust, which captured whether 
respondents were mistrustful of people who belonged to different racial categories; (3) racial 
homophily, which captured the number of friends the respondent had of the same race; and (4) 
rational for racial identification, which was a categorical measurement asking why respondents 
chose their racial identification. Preliminary analyses revealed that the item response probabilities for 
these variables were not differentiated across the latent classes and overall fit measures were 
improved when these items were not included.  
[2] I conducted sensitivity analyses using the four instrumental variables that were left out of the final 
analyses. Running the analysis with the four items included (despite their low performance) still 
suggested the two-class solution was best.  However, one analysis did report the smallest AIC 
measure for the three-class solution. In addition, analyses consistently suggest that differences 
between the two- and three- class solution are small. While this could suggest that the three-class 
solution is probable, the two-class solution remains the most robust. 
[3] I also ran analyses with skin color as an instrumental variable. The two-class solution was still the best 
fit and probabilities on skin color categories did not differ across the two classes.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables 
  Race Variables                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Range Mean SE  
White (1=yes) 0,1 17.62% .022  
Coloured (1=yes) 0,1 41.96% .030  
Black (1=yes) 0,1 44.42% .023  
Control Variables      
Age 18-87 36.742 .641  
Male (1=yes) 0,1 49.00% .021  
Religious Participation (1=yes) 0,1 62.26% .032  
Education 0-13 1.290 .177  
Employed (1=yes) 0,1 53.72% .031  
Household Accommodations  0-8 1.106 .075  
Instrumental Variables     
Pro-Marriage to Blacks (1=yes) 0,1 81.86% .020  
Pro-Marriage to Indians (1=yes) 0,1 82.99% .025  
Pro-Marriage to Whites (1=yes) 0,1 81.32% .019  
Interracial Contact in Last Week (1=yes) 0,1 17.32% .021  
Comfortable Around Other Races (1=yes) 0,1 11.91% .017  
Inconsistent Racial Identification (1=yes) 0,1 19.00% .019  
Racial Identification Important (1=yes) 0,1 17.84% .021  
Skin Color 1-3 1.942 .044  
Outcome Variables      
Pride in being South African (1=yes) 0,1 83.25% .020  
Race Relations Improved Since 1994 (1=yes) 0,1 72.71% .020  
Race Relations Will Improve (1=yes) 0,1 76.76% .020  
Political Participation (1=yes) 0,1 42.37% .026  
Protest (1=yes) 0,1 27.33% .023  
Egoistical Financial Deprivation 1-11 6.694 .109  
Fraternal Treatment Deprivation 1-3 1.822 .029  
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005     
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Table 2. Race Differences of Study Variables 
 White Coloured Black 
Control Variables     
Age 
43.041 a 39.202 b 34.173 c 
(1.652)  (1.034)  (.587)  
Male (1=yes) 
45.86% - 45.92% - 49.09% - 
(.040)  (.035)  (.023)  
Religious Participation (1=Yes) 
45.73% a 62.68% - 67.56% c 
(.080)  (.053)  (.035)  
Education 
12.222 a 9.717 - 9.589 c 
(.170)  (.261)  (.204)  
Employed (1=yes) 
66.04% a 52.51% b 41.72% c 
(.039)  (.043)  (.027)  
Household Accommodations 
1.977 a 1.163 b .579 c 
(.197)  (.049)  (.077)  
Outcome Variables       
Pride in being South Africa (1=Yes) 
57.69% a 82.30% b 95.35% c 
(.078)  (.029)  (.013)  
Race Relations Improved Since 1994 (1=Yes) 
81.08% a 69.09% - 71.98% c 
(.055)  (.031)  (.027)  
Race Relations Will Improve (1=Yes) 
81.95% - 76.78% - 70.94% c 
(.049)  (.032)  (.023)  
Political Identification (1=Yes) 
15.78% - 23.03% b 74.22% c 
(.059)  (.030)  (.036)  
Protest (1=Yes) 
7.82% a 23.53% b 39.91% c 
(.026)  (.040)  (.031)  
Egoistical Financial Deprivation 
5.463 a 6.875 b 7.148 c 
(.195)  (.144)  (.154)  
Fraternal Treatment Deprivation 
2.083 a 1.940 b 1.584 c 
(.025)  (.055)  (.040)  
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005 
Notes: a represents significant differences between coloureds and whites; b represents significant differences between 
coloureds and blacks; c represents significant differences between whites and blacks. Significance is at the p < .1. 
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Table 3. Models Regressing Race Identification on Outcome Variables 
 
Pride in being 
South African 
Race Relations 
Improved Since 
1994 
Race Relations 
Will Improve 
Political 
Identification Protest 
Egoistical 
Financial 
Deprivation 
Fraternal 
Treatment 
Deprivation 
White -1.114** .240 .042 -.266 -1.190** -.792*** -.081 
 (.382) (.395) (.396) (.324) (.392) (.204) (.269) 
Black 1.435*** .329 -.171 2.249*** .773** .120 -1.248*** 
 (.336) (.232) (.230) (.252) (.267) (.201) (.244) 
Age .013+ -.001 -.003 .014* -.004 -.005 .000 
 (.008) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.006) 
Male -.163 -.013 -.003 -.100 .144 -.067 -.155 
 (.159) (.174) (.177) (.172) (.168) (.143) (.167) 
Religious Participation .497* .135 -.087 .169 .346+ .181 -.161 
 (.204) (.190) (.203) (.218) (.200) (.142) (.165) 
Education -.023 .078* .013 -.040 .019 -.108*** .060+ 
 (.062) (.036) (.039) (.036) (.035) (.027) (.034) 
Employed .124 -.111 .125 .433* .215 -.445** -.004 
 (.257) (.201) (.207) (.186) (.183) (.153) (.155) 
Household Accommodations .099 .375** .235+ -.323 .106 -.156 .353** 
 (.133) (.131) (.127) (.218) (.089) (.147) (.120) 
Constant .927 -.366 .895 -1.402** -1.896** 8.417***  
 (.770) (.608) (.577) (.491) (.595) (.372)  
cut1        
Constant       -.851 
       (.434) 
cut2        
Constant       2.929*** 
       (.541) 
Observations      1044       979       943     1031       1042      1044      983 
F 6.510 3.834 1.538 15.827 4.606 11.535 13.710 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005	  
Notes: Coloured is the excluded group. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
	   	  
159 
	  
Table 4. Comparison of Baseline Models for Latent Class Analysis 
No. of Classes AIC BIC Adjusted BIC Likelihood Ratio G2 DF 
1 440.638 468.700 446.488 426.638 120 
2 136.420 196.552 148.954 106.420 112 
3 141.361 233.564 160.582 95.361 104 
4 148.006 272.279 173.911 86.006 96 
5 157.597 313.940 190.188 79.597 88 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005 
Notes: Boldface type indicates the selected model. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information 
Criterion; DF = Degrees of Freedom 
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Table 5. 	  Item-Response Probabilities for Latent Classes 
Classes Coloured Core Coloured Fringe 
Percentage of Cases 82.32% 17.69% 
Instruments   
Pro-Marriage to Blacks  .9989 .0382 
Against Marriage to Blacks .0011 .9618 
Pro-Marriage to Indians  .9787 .3159 
Against Marriage to Indians .0213 .6841 
Pro-Marriage to Whites  .9999 .5003 
Against Marriage to Whites .0001 .4997 
Interracial Contact in Last Week .2784 .1607 
No Interracial Contact in Last Week .7216 .8393 
Comfortable Around Other Races .8726 .6712 
Not Comfortable Around Other Races .1274 .3288 
Inconsistent Racial Identification .0937 .2023 
Consistent Racial Identification .9063 .7977 
Racial Identification Salient .2226 .4088 
Racial Identification Non-Salient .7774 .5912 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005	     
	   	  
161 
	  
 
 
 
Table 6. Race and Latent Class Differences of Study Variables 
   
 White       Coloured Core Coloured Fringe  Black 
Control Variables  1 2    1 2  
Age 
43.041 a - 38.081 d 42.350 b b 34.173 c 
(1.652)   (1.171)  (2.180)   (.587)  
Male (1=yes) 
45.86% - - 47.23% - 38.43% - b 49.09% - 
(.040)   (.037)  (.064)   (.023)  
Religious Participation (1=yes) 
45.73% a - 64.72% - 55.29% - - 67.56% c 
(.080)   (.054)  (.098)   (.035)  
Education 
12.222 a a 9.964 d 8.695 - b 9.589 c 
(.170)   (.267)  (.472)   (.204)  
Employed (1=yes) 
66.04% a a 55.35% - 42.61% b - 41.72% c 
(.039)   (.046)  (.080)   (.027)  
Household Accommodations 
1.977 a a 1.181 - 1.108 b b .579 c 
(.197)   (.056)  (.069)   (.077)  
Outcome Variables           
Pride in being South African (1=yes) 
57.69% a a 81.46% - 85.66% b b 95.35% c 
(.078)   (.035)  (.066)   (.013)  
Race Relations Improved Since 1994 
(1=yes) 
81.08% - a 72.36% d 51.82% - b 71.98% c 
(.055)   (.036)  (.076)   (.027)  
Race Relations Will Improve  (1=yes) 
81.95% - a 78.85% d 62.91% b - 70.94% c 
(.049)   (.037)  (.071)   (.023)  
Political Identification (1=yes) 
15.78% - - 22.69% - 24.28% b b 74.22% c 
(.059)   (.029)  (.070)   (.036)  
Protest (1=yes) 
7.82% a a 22.57% - 28.87% b - 39.91% c 
(.026)   (.041)  (.101)   (.031)  
Egoistical Financial Deprivation 
5.463 a a 6.845 - 6.937 b - 7.148 c 
(.195)   (.151)  (.274)   (.154)  
Fraternal Treatment Deprivation 
2.083 a - 1.946 - 2.000 b b 1.584 c 
(.025)   (.050)  (.111)   (.040)  
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005 
Notes: a represents significant differences between whites and coloureds (in each respective class); b represents significant 
differences between blacks and coloureds (in each respective class); c represents significant differences between whites and 
blacks; d represents significant difference between coloureds in latent class 1 and coloureds in latent class 2. Significance is at the 
p < .1. 
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Table 7. Models Regressing Race Identification and Latent Classes on Outcome Variables 
 Pride in being 
South African 
Race Relations 
Improved Since 
1994 
Race Relations 
Will Improve 
Political 
Identification Protest 
Egoistical 
Financial 
Deprivation 
Fraternal 
Treatment 
Deprivation 
White -1.166* 0.861+ 0.576 -0.133 -1.428* -0.633* -0.365 
 (0.514) (0.473) (0.409) (0.455) (0.567) (0.283) (0.528) 
Black 1.393** 0.932* 0.361 2.385*** 0.524 0.279 -1.555** 
 (0.471) (0.362) (0.315) (0.417) (0.491) (0.255) (0.492) 
Coloured Fringe -0.092 0.679+ 0.597+ 0.124 -0.314 0.198 -0.294 
 (0.406) (0.341) (0.300) (0.373) (0.454) (0.225) (0.426) 
Age 0.013+ -0.001 -0.003 0.014** -0.005 -0.005 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Male -0.179 -0.020 -0.029 -0.097 0.146 -0.090 -0.101 
 (0.160) (0.171) (0.174) (0.174) (0.173) (0.144) (0.166) 
Religious Participation 0.524* 0.137 -0.106 0.161 0.331 0.161 -0.160 
 (0.207) (0.187) (0.203) (0.223) (0.200) (0.144) (0.164) 
Education -0.022 0.066+ 0.005 -0.048 0.024 -0.107*** 0.059+ 
 (0.064) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.034) 
Employed 0.126 -0.110 0.129 0.466* 0.183 -0.451** -0.019 
 (0.261) (0.200) (0.207) (0.196) (0.185) (0.152) (0.154) 
Household Accommodations 0.104 0.391** 0.246+ -0.316 0.099 -0.159 0.352** 
 (0.135) (0.133) (0.124) (0.217) (0.091) (0.148) (0.120) 
Constant 0.942 -0.843 0.457 -1.475* -1.648* 8.286***  
 (0.823) (0.647) (0.642) (0.569) (0.744) (0.360)  
cut1        
Constant       -1.169* 
       (0.543) 
cut2        
Constant       2.632*** 
       (0.621) 
Observations         1028        967         929      1015        1026      1028       974 
F 5.790 3.748 1.819 14.357 4.111 9.774 12.529 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005	  
Notes: Coloured is the excluded group. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 1. Evidence Supporting the Generalized Attitudes and Perceptions of Deprivation of 
Coloureds Reflects their Position in Racial Limbo 
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Figure 2. Evidence Supporting the Generalized Attitudes and Perceptions of Deprivation of 
Coloured Subgroups Supports their Position in Racial Limbo 
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Figure 3. Growth of Cape Town’s Population, by Race 
 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005; Seekings et al. 2008.  
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Figure 4. Item-Response Probabilities By Latent Classes 
	  
 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005
	   	  
167 
	  
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Item-Response Probabilities for Latent Class, By Skin Color  
 Coloured Core  Coloured Fringe  Light Skin Color 85.76% 14.24% 
Pro-Marriage to Blacks  .9973 .0341 
Against Marriage to Blacks .0027 .9659 
Pro-Marriage to Indians  .9815 .2387 
Against Marriage to Indians .0185 .7613 
Pro-Marriage to Whites  .9995 .4738 
Against Marriage to Whites .0005 .5262 
Interracial Contact in Last Week .3258 .2739 
No Interracial Contact in Last Week .6742 .7261 
Comfortable Around Other Races .8760 .6479 
Not Comfortable Around Other Races .1240 .3521 
Inconsistent Racial Identification .1397 .0042 
Consistent Racial Identification .8603 .9958 
Racial Identification Salient .2037 .6671 
Racial Identification Non-Salient .7963 .3329 
Medium Skin Color 83.52% 16.48% 
Pro-Marriage to Blacks  .9989 .0260 
Against Marriage to Blacks .0011 .9740 
Pro-Marriage to Indians  .9848 .3535 
Against Marriage to Indians .0152 .6465 
Pro-Marriage to Whites  .9997 .4552 
Against Marriage to Whites .0003 .5448 
Interracial Contact in Last Week .2818 .1503 
No Interracial Contact in Last Week .7182 .8497 
Comfortable Around Other Races .8639 .5783 
Not Comfortable Around Other Races .1361 .4217 
Inconsistent Racial Identification .0806 .3023 
Consistent Racial Identification .9194 .6977 
Racial Identification Salient .2427 .3007 
Racial Identification Non-Salient .7573 .6993 
Dark Skin Color 78.16% 21.84% 
Pro-Marriage to Blacks  .9943 .0890 
Against Marriage to Blacks .0057 .9110 
Pro-Marriage to Indians  .9660 .3310 
Against Marriage to Indians .0340 .6690 
Pro-Marriage to Whites  .9995 .5678 
Against Marriage to Whites .0005 .4322 
Interracial Contact in Last Week .2365 .1192 
No Interracial Contact in Last Week .7635 .8808 
Comfortable Around Other Races .8839 .7733 
Not Comfortable Around Other Races .1161 .2267 
Inconsistent Racial Identification .0757 .1937 
Consistent Racial Identification .9243 .8063 
Racial Identification Salient .2113 .3846 
Racial Identification Non-Salient .7887 .6154 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005   
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Figure 5. Item-Response Probabilities By Latent Classes in Light Skin Color Category 
	  
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005
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Figure 6.  Item-Response Probabilities By Latent Classes in Medium Skin Color Category 
 
Source: Cape Town Area Study 2005
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Figure 7. Item-Response Probabilities By Latent Classes in Dark Skin Color Category 
	  
Source: Cape Town Area Study 
2005
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this three-part dissertation project was to investigate the concept of racial limbo 
by studying the history of coloureds in South Africa and examining coloureds’ contemporary attitudes, 
perceptions of deprivation, and racial identifications. I defined racial limbo as belonging to a group 
positioned between a dominant and subordinate group in a racial hierarchy. Scholars (e.g., Daniel 2007; 
Frederickson 1981; Marx 1998; Telles 2004) argue examinations of groups in racial limbo are important 
because these examinations reveal hidden facets of racial hierarchies and can likewise reveal limitations 
of race theories. Yet, prior research on race limbo is limited in its scope, cohesiveness, and conceptual 
clarity, which leaves the construct fuzzy.  
 
CONTRIBUTION 
This dissertation project contributes to the literature in four important ways. First, I examined 
racial limbo in contemporary South Africa. Most research on racial limbo in the last twenty years has 
focused on the United States (for example, see Brunsma 2006; DaCosta 2007; Rockquemore and 
Brunsma 2008; Root 1996), whereas research on coloureds in apartheid South Africa is outdated 
(Frederickson 1981; Goldin 1987; Lewis 1987; Patterson 1953), and often historical (Adhikari 1997, 
2005) or qualitative (Erasmus 2001) in approach. I argued coloureds represent the strongest case for racial 
limbo because of their exposure to South Africa’s rigid hierarchy, their longstanding, well-defined and 
intermediate position, and because their current status cannot be characterized as either mixed or 
marginal. 
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Second, I employed the racialized social system (Bonilla-Silva 1997) as conceptual model. I 
argued it served as a useful conceptual framework because it helps mend the top-down v. bottom-up 
fracture of the literature regarding racial limbo. On the one hand, the top-down perspective focuses on the 
historical formation of racial limbo (e.g., Adhikari 1997, 2005; Daniel 2007; Davis 1991; Marx 1998; 
Telles 2004). This descriptive line of research concentrates heavily on how nation-states and ideologies 
construct racial limbo. On the other hand, the bottom-up perspective analyzes individuals belonging to 
groups in racial liminal (e.g., Brunsma 2006; Erasmus 2001; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008). The two 
perspectives are rarely in conversation with each other, minimizing integration of what we know across 
social levels. Guided by the conceptual model, I argued that in first examining how the South-African 
nation-state cultivated a position of racial limbo for its coloured population, and then exploring whether 
racial limbo was manifested in the contemporary life (i.e., attitudes, perceptions of deprivation, and racial 
identifications) of coloureds, I could assess how racial hierarchy shapes macro- and micro-level 
outcomes. 
 Third, I employed multiple methods in this dissertation project, which provided an additional 
challenge to the top-down and bottom-up divide. Specifically, triangulating quantitative and qualitative 
techniques across historical and survey data allowed for the simultaneous examination of the breadth and 
depth of racial limbo. Fourth, I improved on past methods by developing a multidimensional measure of 
the coloured racial identification, and explored whether it better reflected coloureds’ position in racial 
limbo (compared to a single-indicator of self-report).   
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In Study One, I investigated whether the apartheid nation-state cultivated a position of racial 
limbo for coloureds and whether their intermediate position is maintained in post-apartheid South Africa. 
I informed this study using frameworks of racial formation, racialized social system, and race mixture 
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(Bonilla-Silva 1997; Omi and Winant 1994; Reuter 1969; Winant 2001). These frameworks are useful for 
an analysis of racial limbo because they focus on the creation and construction of racial meanings 
(Golash-Boza 2013). I conceived of legislative data as a productive way of engaging with a nation-state’s 
race-making processes (Marx 1998). In total, I analyzed thirty-three legislative documents from apartheid 
South Africa (1948-1992) and post-apartheid South Africa (1993 to 2014) for this study. My 
methodological strategy was informed by Omi and Winant (1994) and their conceptualization of racial 
projects, which emphasize signification and organization of race. Specifically, I examined how the South 
African nation-state (1) defined coloureds, (2) positioned coloureds between white and black South 
Africans in the racial hierarchy, and (3) distributed power and resources to coloureds relative to white and 
black South Africans.  
Analyses revealed that apartheid South Africa named coloureds as a distinct race group, but 
defined them by what they were not: neither black nor white. Further, the state distributed less power and 
resources to coloureds (e.g., forced removal, expulsion from the political system) compared to white 
South Africans.  At the same time, however, the state often distributed more power and resources to 
coloureds (e.g., the ability to travel without a pass, preferences in labor) compared to black South 
Africans. Thus, I concluded the apartheid nation-state cultivated a position racial limbo for its coloured 
population. Contrarily, the post-apartheid South African nation-state challenged coloureds’ position in 
racial limbo; they named all non-white South Africans black, and gave black South Africans more power 
and resources in the law through affirmative action legislation. Furthermore, evidence generally suggested 
that the post-apartheid nation-state purported an ideology of nonracialism. By refusing to name racial 
categories in early legislation, and later explicitly neglecting to differentiate coloureds, I argued post-
apartheid South Africa operated under a guise of coloured-blindness. Yet, despite the nation-states’ 
attempted erasure of coloureds’ position in racial limbo, I found that coloureds’ intermediate status was 
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still being upheld in social experience. In sum, I found that the nation-state held a powerful role in 
constructing racial limbo, but was less successful in deconstructing their position.  
In Study Two, I investigated whether the generalized attitudes and perceptions of deprivation of 
coloureds might align with their position in racial limbo. Specifically, analyzing two waves of the 
Southern African Barometer (SAB), I examined whether self-identified coloureds in post-apartheid South 
Africa (1) reported generalized attitudes that reflect their group’s intermediate, historical position between 
white and black South Africans, and (2) perceived their group as both deprived and gratified compared to 
white and black South Africans, respectively. Group position theory (Blumer 1958), which makes 
predictions about dominant groups’ view toward subordinate groups, informed hypotheses about 
coloureds’ generalized attitudes. I argued that just as white South Africans’ attitudes align with their 
dominant group position, coloureds’ attitudes would align with their dominant position vis-à-vis black 
South Africans. Relative deprivation theory (Runciman 1966; Stouffer et al. 1949), which makes 
predictions about groups’ perceptions of disadvantage relative to another group, informed hypotheses 
about perceptions of deprivation. I hypothesized that coloureds should perceive relative deprivation when 
they compare themselves to white South Africans and simultaneously perceive relative gratification when 
they compare themselves to black South Africans. 
I found that coloureds’ attitudes reflected their position in racial limbo—coloureds reported 
generalized attitudes that were significantly different from, and between, the generalized attitudes of 
white and black South Africans in over 80% of the outcomes across both waves.  However, there was less 
support for coloureds’ intermediary attitudes in Wave 4 compared to Wave 2. I argued the convergence of 
coloureds and black South Africans’ generalized attitudes in the later wave suggests that coloureds are 
increasingly aligned with black South Africans.  
In contrast, rather than perceiving levels of deprivation that were between white and black South 
Africans, I found that coloureds’ reported the highest levels of economic and treatment deprivation across 
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the waves. This latter finding suggests that coloureds’ do not perceive their experienced levels of 
deprivation (relative to white South Africans) and gratification (relative to black South Africans) as 
balancing out. I argued that incongruence between expectation and experience may drive coloureds’ 
elevated perceived deprivation. In sum, findings from Study Two provided evidence for how coloureds’ 
intermediate, historical position is reflect in attitudes today, even without the backing of the nation-state 
in contemporary South Africa. I also consider whether the heighted perceptions of deprivation could be 
taken as a signal that coloureds do perceive their position as intermediary, but are dissatisfied with such 
position. 
Finally, in Study Three, I investigated whether a multidimensional measure of coloureds’ racial 
identification (as compared to a single-item self-reported racial identification) better reflected coloureds’ 
position in racial limbo in contemporary South Africa. I considered recent scholarship that called for 
innovative approaches to better capture the phenomenology of race (Loveman 1999; Martin and Yeung 
2003; Wacquant 1997; Zuberi 2001) and research that suggests such innovative approaches are especially 
needed in examinations of groups positioned in racial limbo, because their racial identifications are 
thought to be multifaceted (Adhikari 2005; Erasmus 2001a; 2001b; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2002; 
2008; Tatum 2003).  Thus, I innovated a methodological approach by conducting latent class analysis 
(Madgison and Vermunt 2001; Vermunt and Madgison 2004) on coloured South Africans in the Cape 
Town Area Study (CAS). Specifically, I used instrumental variables theorized to capture the 
phenomenology of race for the latent class analysis to examine whether there was variation in the 
coloured racial identification. I then determined whether the latent classes of coloured, as opposed to a 
single-item self-reported racial identification, better demonstrated whether racial limbo is reflected in 
attitudes and perceived relative deprivation located, on average, between white and black South Africans. 
 The latent class analysis produced two classes. The majority of respondents fell into what I called 
the coloured core and remaining respondents fell into what I called the coloured fringe. The coloured 
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core generally believed being coloured was unimportant, and held ideologies and behaviors supporting of 
racial inclusion. Conversely, the coloured fringe generally believed being coloured was important, and 
held ideological and behaviors exclusive to coloureds. Yet, further analysis revealed the two classes did 
not differ on the majority of criterion variables (i.e., generalized attitudes and perceived relative 
deprivation) and neither class was pulled strongly toward white or black South Africans. These results 
provide little evidence of heterogeneity within coloureds’ racial identification. Moreover, the results 
suggest that self-reported racial identification provides adequate traction for examinations of coloureds in 
contemporary South Africa.  
 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
I employed Bonilla-Silva’s (1997) racialized social systems as a conceptual model for this 
dissertation project. The racialized social system model proposes that a society determines racial 
categories and where groups are positioned in a racial hierarchy. Groups’ positioning in the racial 
hierarchy in turn impacts the benefits they receive and their collective interests and behaviors (Bonilla-
Silva 1997). This model borrows from the social structure and personality framework, which “…direct[s] 
our attention to the hierarchically organized processes through which the macrostructures come to have 
relevance for the inner lives of individual persons and, in theory, the processes through which individual 
personals come to alter social systems” (McLeod and Lively 1999:77). Thus, I argued that this conceptual 
model was useful because it help mends the top-down verses bottom-up fracture of the literature 
regarding racial limbo, by implying that racial hierarchy shapes macro- and micro-level outcomes.  
Specifically, the racialized social system guides my dissertation project by supporting the 
argument that racial limbo represents one position in South Africa’s racial hierarchy, and this position, in 
turn, influences the attitudes, perceptions, and identifications of those in racial limbo. Moreover, the 
racialized social system conceptual model guides the funnel approach I used to structure my dissertation: 
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I began with evaluating the nation-state and worked down levels of analysis, thus building conclusions 
that speak to multiple social levels. Furthermore, it helped to set up a clear path for analyses and 
background the investigation of other testable theories used in each respective study. What an assessment 
of each study revealed is that adapting mainstream theories to account for racial limbo might actually 
increases the theories explanatory reach.  
For instance, I first informed Study One by using frameworks of racial formation and race 
mixture. However, these frameworks are heuristic, which means they describe structures rather than 
forces that create them (see Diesing 1991). For example, racial formation locates the state as the 
preemptive place for race-making. Yet, without interrogating who the main rulers or actors are, scholars 
are unable to fully take in to account the context in which race is embedded (Feagin and Elias 2013; 
Loveman 1999b). The limitation is in the anthropomorphism of the state as an actor, which neglects 
individuals and groups as key players in race-making. The current analysis of racial limbo revealed that 
state actors are important. For example, coloureds were considered an important buffer group during the 
white-minority led apartheid government, whereas the importance of coloureds’ position was questioned 
in the black-led post-apartheid South Africa.  
Another limitation of the frameworks is that they carry a deterministic emphasis of race-making. 
That is, the nation-state functions as a superstructure, holding the majority of the power in the 
construction of races.  This top-down approach misses the agency on the ground. In my analysis, those in 
positions of racial limbo surfaced as the ones most often provoked by the nation-states’ imposed 
categories.    
Then, in Study Two, I employed group position theory (Blumer 1956) and relative deprivation 
theory (Runciman 1966; Stouffer et al. 1949), arguing that these theories help explain the perspectives of 
individuals and groups trying to understand where they fit in various hierarchies. Yet, neither group 
position theory nor relative deprivation theory could wholly explain the experiences of coloureds in post-
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apartheid South Africa. Group position theory initially considered a two group situation only, and thus it 
could not fully generalize to contexts like South Africa with multiple group racial hierarchies. My 
analysis assessing whether coloureds’ attitudes reflected their position of racial limbo supported the idea 
even semi-dominant groups might recognize their position and therefore align interest and attitudes 
accordingly.  
Relative deprivation theory focuses typically on upward social comparisons; yet, coloureds in 
post-apartheid South Africa have simultaneous upward social comparisons (to white South Africans) and 
downward social comparisons (to black South Africans). Although relative deprivation theory did not 
correctly predict the imbalance of relative deprivation/relative gratification for coloureds, I argued better 
conceptualizing social comparison might better explain the results (Festinger 1954; Pettigrew 1976). 
Moreover, I speculated the high levels of perceived relative deprivation may actually support the idea that 
those in racial limbo recognize their intermediate position; they recognize they are positioned between 
two groups and they want to change such position. Given the implications that attitudes and perceptions 
of deprivation can have for social action and racial antagonism (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Frazier 1957; 
Morse and Peele 1974; Pettigrew 1967; Pettigrew 2008), theories on these topics (such as group position 
and relative deprivation) should continue to be expanded in order to account for the growing number of 
multiracial contexts across the globe. 
Finally, I informed Study Three by engaging with critiques regarding the way race is treated in 
social scientific research (e.g., Loveman 1999; Martin and Yeung 2003; Wacquant 1997; Zuberi 2001). 
Critics suggest alternative methods to overcome this limitation, such as using multiple indicators or 
measuring psychological aspects of race. Further, I employed biracial identity theory and reviews of 
contemporary coloured identifications (e.g., Adhikari 2005; Erasmus 2001a, 2001b; Rockquemore and 
Brunsma 2008; Tatum 2003) to argue that examinations of groups positioned in racial limbo could 
especially benefit from innovative approaches. The latent class analysis conducted, using instruments 
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theorized to capture the phenomenology of race, did in fact reveal two latent classes within the coloured 
population. However, I found the latent classes were not linked to strong divisions on criterion variables. 
Less than one in five coloureds fit into the fringe class, and the minority in the coloured fringe were more 
like the coloured core than either black or white South Africans. Rather than suggesting there is one ‘true’ 
subgroup of coloureds in racial limbo and the others are pulled towards white or black South Africans, 
my analyses suggested that belonging to a group positioned in racial limbo might be a unifying 
phenomenological experience of race.  Moreover, my analysis suggested imposed racial categories remain 
meaningful in studies of coloureds’ experiences.  
Taken altogether, the theoretical implications of this project are numerous. This dissertation 
project demonstrated the importance of consulting conceptual frameworks that elucidate interconnections 
across social levels in systematic studies of race. In addition, this dissertation project suggests that 
adapting and expanding mainstream race theories to make predictions about racial limbo might be 
helpful.  
 Looking at this dissertation project as a whole, it becomes clear that limitations of theoretical 
frameworks within each respective study were often addressed in a subsequent study. For instance, a 
limitation of racial formation theory (used in Study One) was that it proposes the idea that belonging to a 
structurally imposed racial category means attachment to race group. Yet, Study Three actually supports 
the framing by suggesting a single indicator can capture groupness. Group position theory (used in Study 
Two), allowed me to assess an additional expectation implied in racial formation theory: that race takes 
on a life of its own after being embedded in social structures. Moreover, Study Two suggested coloureds’ 
intermediate, historical position was reflected in contemporary South Africa, even when coloureds are 
ignored by the post-apartheid government. All in all, this dissertation finds support for a multi-level, 
systematic approach to studying race.  
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Broader Implications 
Despite limitations of the racialized social system (that it is descriptive, not potentially falsifiable, 
and remains unconvincing regarding causation), I argue it provides a useful conceptual model for this 
dissertation project. Specifically, guided by the racialized social system conceptual model, I was able to 
show how hierarchies were constructed and investigate whether they have relevance in individuals’ lives. 
This dissertation project does not fix problems inherent in the racialized social system’s heuristic nature, 
but by attempting to overcome its shortcomings, I was able to contribute to a longstanding sociological 
debate: structure versus agency?  
If questioning whether a racial hierarchy could impact micro-level outcomes, my dissertation 
project would suggest: structure matters. Specifically, the apartheid nation-state’s pervasive racial 
hierarchy structured all political, social, and economic institutions. As a result, all South Africans knew 
definitively who they were, where they could live, with whom they could interact, and also where they 
were positioned in the racial hierarchy. Results presented here also suggested the implications of 
structures have a lingering effect; they were reflected in individuals’ perspectives (e.g., arguments 
brought forth in court, attitudes measured in national survey data) even after the apartheid system had 
fallen.  
At the same time, however, coloureds consistently fought to make their own understandings of 
race have traction in society. The large number of racial reclassification cases involving coloureds during 
apartheid serves as an example. Further, contemporary changes in post-apartheid South Africa (e.g., 
affirmative action legislation and combining the black and coloured racial categories) have had a 
negligible impact on the coloureds’ attachment to their group. For the most part, coloureds have rejected 
the changes implemented by the post-apartheid government. Even more so, analysis that allowed for 
phenomenological differences in the experiences of race to show up suggested that there is a small, 
divergent subgroup within the coloured population. Therefore, agency matters too. That is, even in the 
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current top-heavy analysis of racial limbo, agency was present. Future studies that include coloured 
voices could future explore the individual and group level agency coloureds have in constructing or 
deconstructing racial limbo.  
  Furthermore, I argued that coloureds, moreso than other cases of groups in racial limbo, have 
come to terms with their intermediary position, and have possibly created an identity around being 
coloured. Thus, findings regarding variation within the coloured category, or whether coloureds might 
push back against the macro-level forces that work to create their position, would provide a convincing, 
conservative argument about racial limbo more broadly. Indeed, what the South African case tells us 
about racial limbo is noteworthy: individuals belonging to a group positioned between a dominant and 
subordinate group in the racial hierarchy might be those most confronted with the tension between 
constructing ones’ own understanding of race in a context where the nation-state is trying to determine 
one’s racial placement.  
  Perhaps, then, a characteristic of positions of racial limbo is the hint of malleable boundaries. 
That is, even the slightest hint of potential fluidity or change in racial identification might open up room 
for resistance among those occupying a limbo position. In fact, research suggests those in racial limbo 
elsewhere are pushing the boundaries of race (see Brunsma 2006; Daniel 2007; Telles 2004; Wade 2005). 
For example, some biracials in the United States are advocating for a single “multiracial” category in the 
census (DaCosta 2007). Coloureds expose that groups can in fact find cohesion around the idea of 
mixedness. Yet, examinations of coloureds also suggest that even if a distinct category based upon a 
limbo status were to come into fruition in the U.S., it doesn’t mean those in the category would be 
complacent with the new structural changes.   
Finally, this case study racial limbo in South Africa may reveal something about limbo positions 
in general. As discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation project, limbo is a position that applies to 
many social contracts. Examples include parolees, second-generation immigrants, and bisexuals. All of 
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these statuses are produced differently, but the production results in an intermediate position between two 
statuses, both of which have more stringent boundaries. This research highlights that limbo positions are 
important and meaningful—a position that emphasizes the constant tension between structure and agency.  
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 This project has acknowledged limitations, which are specified in each respective study. 
However, there are a few broad limitations that apply to the entire dissertation project. First, although a 
systematic analysis of coloureds across social levels did allow for instances of agency to surface, a 
specified exploration of coloured voices are largely missing from this dissertation project. Following up 
with in-depth qualitative interviews would provide a necessary, complementary examination of 
coloureds’ experiences of racial limbo in contemporary South Africa. Specifically, asking coloureds how 
they understand and feel about their assumed racial limbo, and exploring how perceptions of racial limbo 
might impact coloureds’ self-concepts could shine light into the lived experience of racial limbo. It would 
also help us better understand how individuals acknowledge or respond to racial hierarchies. Formulating 
qualitative questions informed by the results of this dissertation project (e.g., What do you think of 
inclusive black definition mandated in the Employment Equity Act? Do you believe there is a fringe 
group within coloureds?) would help bolster the conclusions made here.  
 Agency could also be explored in social movement analysis. Rebellion, protest, and group-based 
lobbying have the potential to directly impact the policies of the nation-state, yet they remained 
unexplored in this dissertation project. Examining individual/group based movements that occurred 
alongside legislation would provide a more comprehensive picture. Research has shown how a black 
radical flank increased success of the civil rights movement in the United States (Haines 1984). Exploring 
whether coloureds were divided in movements or built strategic interracial alliances (see Van Dyke and 
McCammon 2010), for example, could better explain coloureds’ response to the government. Adhikari 
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(1997; 2005) did a superb job of studying the history of coloureds and coloured social movements. 
Collaborations between his type of research and the type of research conducted here would be an 
important future project.  
Second, the exclusion of Indians and Asians from this dissertation project is an additional 
limitation. Indians/Asians are another group in South Africa that is neither the most subordinate nor 
dominant. I argued their ethnic and/or foreigner orientation complicates their position in the racial 
hierarchy (Bonachich 1973; Kim 1999) and did not include them. However, future research should 
replication analyses to Indians/Asians in order to determine whether their attitudes, perceptions of 
deprivation, or identifications are qualitatively different from coloureds. One might speculate that 
ethnicity operates similarity in terms of occupying a limbo position.  
Third, to ensure the concept is generalizable, systematic analyses of racial limbo in other contexts 
is necessary. Obvious cases include the United States and Brazil. Both of these contexts were sampled as 
a part of the Social Hubble project, therefore analyses similar to those completed in Study Three should 
be replicated. Other contexts, even those with less clear racial hierarchies and positions of racial limbo, 
should also be examined. Examples include the Dominican Republic, Japan, or Iraq. The way racial limbo 
groups are treated and the implications of being positioned intermediary in these contexts may expand the 
utility of the concept.  Accordingly, racial limbo is a concept that deserves more attention because it 
provides sociologists with information on the demarcation of groups’ positions in racial hierarchies and 
heterogeneity in the experience of belonging to a given group.   
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